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Moscow Urged To Slow Inevitable NATO Expansion

MK2903074095 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 21, 26 Mar-2 Apr 95 (Signed to press 28 Mar) p 5

[Report by Irina Kobrinskaya, senior researcher of the Russian Academy of Sciences' United States and Canada Institute, under the "In the World" rubric: "How To React to NATO's Expansion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The main factor in shaping a Russian stance on NATO's expansion should be the acknowledgement of an unpleasant, but unchangeable fact: Russia does not have legitimate tools directly to influence this process. The development of a political strategy and, what is particularly important, tactics with regard to the expansion, should be a logical follow-up on this assessment.

For Russia, the consequences of NATO's expansion will largely depend on the time factor: the later it occurs, the less painful its results will be. A swift expansion of NATO, despite society's indifference to this problem, which has been confirmed by polls, will be taken painfully by many as yet more evidence of Russia's defeat. A reaction may be mixed, but just as negative: defeatist sentiments and an even greater frustration or, on the contrary, the desire to counter the "Western offensive" at whatever cost. The last idea may have a strengthening of Russia's military power as its direct consequence; that is, instead of consistent military reform, conversion, and the modernization of the military-industrial sector, there will be a tightening of the rules of conscription for the Armed Forces and a concurrent buildup of military capacities in defiance of the existing treaty limits, and the destruction of the foundation of European security it took so much effort to build.

Another line of Russian "counteroffensive" will evidently be accelerated efforts to set up a CIS military-political bloc—precisely what many Western experts have warned against, seeing this as the key counterargument to plans for an expansion of NATO. The catastrophic political and socioeconomic consequences of such a turn of events are clear enough for a crisis-hit Russia.

A swift expansion of NATO, although it does not pose a direct threat to Russia, will not improve conditions of its national security anyway. For this reason, the goal of Russian policy should be to drag out the expansion process. Is this possible?

Here a few key points should be singled out that may slow down this process. First, in the absence of a direct threat to the security of Central European countries (that is, a threat from the East) and, all the more so, in case of continuing democratic reform in Russia, the requisite consensus among NATO member countries on the admission of new members does not seem so self-evident. Second, one criterion for admitting new members will apparently be the modernization of their armed forces, which will require huge costs. The competent Polish newspaper GAZETA BANKOWA points out that if the Polish Army is to achieve compatibility with NATO forces, it will require expenditures of $25 billion over five or six years, while in order to participate in the alliance's military organization it will have to raise its annual defense spending to 5 percent of GNP (currently, it accounts for 2.1 percent). Third—and this has also been recognized in Brussels—the admission of new members will considerably compound the already perceptible problems of the alliance's operation, particularly with regard to coordination, control, and command.

Russian policy should be molded by taking precisely these factors into account. Its first essential element should be the establishment of stable, mutually advantageous economic and political relations with its former Warsaw Pact partners. In case a mechanism of consultations between Russia and NATO is devised in practice, as has already been proposed by the West, a system of security guarantees for Central Europe may also be worked out. Precisely the countries of this region put forward a concept of "mutually overlapping security guarantee roofs" for Russia (USSR) and NATO at the beginning of the 1990's. Russia's stepped-up efforts to reform the OSCE will be a move in the same direction. Finally, recognizing NATO a guarantor of European security, Russia should enhance cooperation with this organization in the area of peacekeeping.

Spontaneity and a lack of foresight in case of both a firm "counteroffensive" and concessions with regard to NATO's expansion will inevitably cause losses for Russia. And if the alliance's expansion is really inevitable, it is essential, without relaxing our efforts, to try to gain the largest possible dividends both in the short run and for the future.

OSCE Official Warns of Chechen Conflict Speading

AU2803142295 Paris AFP in English 1347 GMT 28 Mar 95

[Report by Eszter Szamado]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Budapest, March 28 (AFP)—Fearing the war in Chechnya could spread to neighbouring republics, the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) plans to open a permanent mission in Groznyy as early as mid-April, OSCE official Istvan Gyarmati said Tuesday [28 March].

The mission would serve to mediate between the Russian authorities and the international community over political issues or problems during deliveries of humanitarian aid, Gyarmati said, citing the example of the French medical aid group Medecins sans Frontiers whose doctors were banned by the Russians over allegations they had smuggled weapons to rebel Chechens.

Gyarmati, who just returned from a fact-finding mission to Chechnya, Ingushetia and Moscow, said the risk that the Chechen conflict might spread appeared "much greater than at the time of my last mission there one and a half months ago."

"Borders are not respected in this part of the world, and administrative borders will be respected even less", he added.

Russian troops entered Chechnya on December 11 in a bid to crush a three-year separatist government in the mainly-Moslem republic. So far, the Russian troops have largely destroyed the capital Groznyy and taken several other towns but are still encountering fierce resistance from the rebels.

Gyarmati said the mission would help prepare local elections in Chechnya.

"For the elections, there is one deadline: the Federal Russian elections in December. If that one can be arranged in Chechnya, than the structures are present for a local election there", he said.

The mission would be located in Groznyy and staffed by six people, each there for a six month tour of duty, he said, adding that the mission would be led by a Hungarian official.

Gyarmati warned that fighting between the Russian army and secessionist troops was spreading towards the neighbouring republics of Daghestan and Ingushetia.

He said however that the pattern across the republic was uneven with Russian troops and civilians starting some reconstruction work and elementary administration.

However, the OSCE mission had not seen "any signs that a political arrangement would be on its way," he said.

Gyarmati warned that people in small towns and villages were particularly exposed to danger of aerial bombings because of the lack of shelters in the lower population areas, while in the cities uncontrolled armed Russian gangs continued nightly atrocities including shootouts, robberies and rapes, he said.

In Ingushetia, his mission found that the political and economic situation was "relatively stable" but on top of its own population of 350,000, the republic had to provide for 200,000 refugees including 135,000 Chechens who fled the current conflict and 65,000 minority Ingush people who fled Ossetia in 1992.

Gyarmati said that little humanitarian aid had arrived in Chechnya and Ingushetia although Russian authorities no longer objected to international aid.

"The international community should better exploit this opportunity", he said.

Staffing the OSCE mission, he said, "will be a very difficult task both from a political point of view and concerning daily living. Most probably, they will have to arrange for even their drinking water to be brought in.

"As an encouragement, I would like to tell my would-be colleague that these six months will probably be the most interesting experience of his life—if he survives."

U.S. Program To Provide Conversion Aid

MM2903143195 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Mar 95 First Edition p 6

[Report by A. Petrov: "The West Will Help Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A new program published by the U.S. Department of Commerce is geared to providing aid for CIS defense enterprises undergoing conversion.

One hundred people currently working at defense plants in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine will undergo special business training. Over a two-month period they will be given in-depth instruction in enterprise management experience and will then be sent on a practical tour of duty to companies which are currently expanding their product range.

The aim of the program, as U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown explained, is to assist in turning defense enterprises into commercial structures. Second, the United States is counting on U.S. companies thus gaining access to the CIS markets.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 30 Mar

LD3003055895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0541 GMT 30 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 30 TASS—Moscow-based Russian newspapers continue to discuss the Chechnya problem.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI carries an interview with Nikolay Yegorov, Russia's vice-premier and minister for ethnic affairs and regional policy.

The Russian president's former representative in the North Caucasus, who witnessed the beginning of the Chechnya crisis, Yegorov lays bare the causes of the crisis and the ulterior motives behind it.

Yegorov believes that "in Chechnya, we have encountered a real threat to the territorial integrity and national security of Russia. The Russian Federation's break-up as an outcome of the three-years-long sluggish diplomacy in the North Caucasus could have turned into actuality".

"(Dzhokhar) Dudayev took the liberty of arbitrarily changing the constitution of the country, neither more nor less. That attempt was being attentively watched by people from supercriminal entities. If the country is unable to demand strict observance of its fundamental law, it would inevitably be swept by anarchy, limitless arbitrariness and lawlessness." Therefore, Yegorov concludes, it was necessary to cut that knot.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA points to yet another danger: Russia is faced with a "reanimation of the KGB". "It is, possibly, Aleksandr Korzhakov, the powerful chief of the presidential guards, who steers matters to that end. Political analysts continue to note this state figure's mounting influence on Russian politics.

"The chief bodyguard of the country determines a strategy for the development of the oil producing industry, tackles arms trade matters, is a connoisseur of banking, the nuclear power industry and non-ferrous metallurgy, and has his own point of view on the privatisation of state property, etc." the newspaper writes.

"But Aleksandr Korzhakov is no longer satisfied with his duties' being only to ensure the physical safety of the head of state. Sooner or later we shall come to know a more precise name of the service headed by him," the newspaper concludes.

It is precisely with the name of the chief of the presidential guard service that the newspaper associates attempts to create Russia's federal security service, the attempts which are being debated at all levels.

IZVESTIYA reports that Russia is being drawn into a world scandal which the authorities prefer to keep silent about, namely, the penetration of Russia by the notorious Japanese religious sect Aum Shinri Kyo and the role played in this by Oleg Lobov, the incumbent secretary of the Security Council to the president of Russia.

On the strength of documentarian data, the newspaper reveals Lobov's active involvement in the founding of the so-called Russo-Japanese university and describes his connections with sect leader Shoko Asahara.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA gives some details of the death of Jochen Piest, a correspondent of the German STERN magazine in Chechnya. It turned out, the government newspaper writes, that "Dudayev's main headquarters had worked out a provocative sabotage act in the area of the strategically important railway bridge over the river Terek with a view to attracting the attention of foreign news media". The bridge was mined and was to be demolished by a suicide engine driver operating a diesel locomotive. However, the operation failed, and journalists, among them the STERN correspondent, fell victim to the engine driver's actions.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA frontpages a dispatch by its correspondent about a meeting of the state commission for the rehabilitation of the economy and social welfare structure of the Chechen Republic. The meeting was held on March 28 and was presided over by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

The premier demanded that ministries submit precise estimates and timetables for work of primary importance and that a working group consisting of representatives from all the ministries concerned be set up to coordinate rehabilitation activities.

The Russian Defence Ministry newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) describe preparations for two victory-day parades to take place in Moscow. Preparations for them "are being carried out seriously and responsibly as is required by tradition," Colonel-General Vladimir Toporov, Russian deputy minister of defence, told journalists.

Toporov gave tentative fugures reflecting the number of participants in the two parades. About 4,000 war veterans and about 2,000 servicemen from the Russian Armed Forces will march through the Red Square, and almost 10,000 servicemen will take part in a march-past on Poklonnaya hill. The latter will also involve 240 combat vehicles in a mechanised column and about 70 flying vehicles in a fly-past.

Commander Calls Exercises in Tajikistan 'Success'

LD2903173095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1519 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe, Mar 29 (INTERFAX)—The exercise held by the CIS peacekeeping force in Tajikistan was a success, Colonel General Vladimir Semenov, commander of the Russian land force, told journalists Wednesday [29 March].

He said that the training in coordinating fire for repelling enemy attack had achieved its goals.

The exercise, under the guidance of Colonel General Valeriy Patrikeyev, commander of the CIS peacekeeping force, involved the units of the Russian 201st Motorized Division, the 30th separate motorized battalion of the Uzbek armed forces and a reinforced motorized company of the Tajik Defense Ministry. A total of 1,500 troops, 60 armored vehicles, 22 combat jets, 18 helicopters and numerous anti-aircraft guns took part in the exercise.

Semenov told journalists that there was nothing wrong in Tajik servicemen taking part in the exercise in as Tajikistan is a full member of the CIS Collective Security Treaty.

An international organization senior official, attending the exercise as an observer, believed that Tajikistan's involvement in the exercise was not wholly consistent with the government- opposition ceasefire agreement under which the Tajik government forces are barred from participating in exercises or troop movements until April 26, when the agreement expires.

Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov told journalists that the exercise has demonstrated the high preparedness of the peacekeeping force and its ability to repel any attack on the CIS southern borders.

The exercise was observed by heads of numerous diplomatic missions accredited in Tajikistan, a Uzbek deputy defense minister, the Tajik defense minister and officials of the UN military observer team.

Bolshakov on Interstate Economic Committee's Work

MM2703152595 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Mar 95 First Edition

[Unattributed report: "Customs Triumvirate"—from the "Economic Union" Section p 1]

[FBIS Translated Text] A session of the Interstate Economic Committee [IEC] Presidium and Collegium has been held in Moscow. Aleksey Bolshakov, deputy chairman of the Russian Government and chairman of the IEC Presidium, commented on its results at the request of an "Economic Union" correspondent.

"On the whole we have carried out what was planned. We discussed IEC staffing and structure, adopted a decision on the creation of an Interstate Currency Committee (ICC), instructed the heads of government to sign a corresponding agreement, discussed the customs union between three states—Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—and, finally, simply briefed the CIS members on our work and programs aimed at creating a full-fledged, single economic area.

"This is not an easy question, but it is very important—and the fact that Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus have decided to set up a customs union is a very positive development, although there is still a great deal of work to be done. It will be done here in Moscow, and done continuously. We discussed issues relating to foreign economic activity, such as the regulation of customs duties and rates and, above all, the synchronization of acts of legislation and normative acts. As you are well aware, mixed economies are only just starting to emerge in each of our states, consequently there is virtually no legislation on many issues, and we are working under temporary normative acts and government edicts and decrees.

"Organizing such a union is a very difficult task which will require immense amounts of work from all the branches of power. A considerable contribution to the resolution of the problem is being made by the decision to set up the ICC, which is intended to organize cooperation in the sphere of currency, payment, and credit relations, the convergence of currency regulations, and the coordination of monetary, credit, and currency policy between the states party to the agreement. We will meet as and when necessary, but not less than twice a year.

"Incidentally, we are developing our cooperation not only within the IEC framework but also in the form of bilateral agreements. For instance, a delegation from Turkmenistan, which is not yet a member of the IEC, took part in the session. But Russian-Turkmen trade, economic, and political relations will be developing far more in 1995 than they did in 1994.

"If you have studied previous IEC documents, then you know that they stipulated expenditure proportions for each member state, but I cannot yet give a specific figure. Once again we failed to ratify a specific estimate at the session, but we did ratify the IEC staffing levels. All the participants, apart from Ukraine, announced their candidate representatives for the IEC. First and foremost, it was decided to set up departments and avenues for the IEC connected with general economic activity and financial issues, without dealing at the initial stage with the staffing of departments handling production issues. In general, a great deal of useful work has been done."

Foreign Minister Kozyrev Begins Syrian Visit

Arrives in Damascus

LD2903222795 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2118 GMT 29 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Dmitriy Gorokhov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Damascus, 30 Mar—"We have an interest in assisting the Syrian-Israeli dialogue," Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev declared on his arrival in Damascus from Cairo on Wednesday. He said that he intends to discuss various aspects of the Middle East negotiating process at his forthcoming talks on Thursday with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad and Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar'.

"I am also very interested in how our Syrian counterparts see the development of the Middle East situation as a whole," he stressed. "We are experiencing some anxiety over the position in the Palestine-Israel area of a peace settlement."

A. Kozyrev pointed out that his diplomatic baggage does contain certain ideas, but he let it be understood that he does not intend to anticipate the conversation with his Syrian interlocutors. "Now is not the time for 'loudspeaker diplomacy' - the situation is too serious," the Russian minister stated.

He described the strengthening of bilateral relations with Syria as an important priority, categorically rejecting the idea that Russo-Syrian relations were in some decline. According to him, the range of contacts was quite large. "But we want more," he emphasized.

Speaking of the conversations with Egyptian leaders during his stay in Cairo, the first capital that he visited on his current Middle East trip, A. Kozyrev voiced satisfaction with their results. "We seem to be on the same wavelength in our approaches to the region's basic problems," the Russian foreign minister said.

Seeks To Improve Bilateral Ties

LD3003115895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1136 GMT 30 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Damascus, Mar 30 (INTERFAX)—Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has declared that Russia is dissatisfied with the level of its relations with Syria.

In an interview with INTERFAX in Damascus Wednesday evening, he noted that the two countries "are linked by the traditional versatile bonds of friendship and cooperation."

Kozyrev reported that he had brought to Syria new Mid East settlement initiatives.

He wished to keep the content of the new proposals to himself since, as he put it, "the situation is serious and delicate, and we would like to discuss some of the new ideas with our Syrian opposite numbers."

He refuted media assertions that a recession has shaped up in Russian-Syrian ties.

Kozyrev is scheduled to meet with his Syrian counterpart Faruq al-Shar' in Damascus Thursday and possibly with President Hafiz al-Asad.

Flying off Cairo Wednesday, Kozyrev told journalists that he had conveyed to Egypt's President Husni Mubarak an invitation from Russia's President Boris Yeltsin to visit Moscow "at any time convenient for him."

Describing the process of a Middle East settlement, he stressed that it was "in a critical state."

He disclosed that a problem related to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty had been discussed with Mubarak. "The impression is that more and more countries have been realizing the significance of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the need to make it universal and permanent."

He voiced hope that an appropriate favorable solution would be found.

Egypt's Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa who attended the news- conference declared that Cairo's position on this issue "has been unchanged and will remain such unless Israel revises its stand."

Musa stressed that "Egypt cannot let Israel's nuclear program to stay out of international control."

As is known, Egypt links its consent to prolong the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to Israel's adherence to it.

Touching upon a visit to Moscow by Mubarak, Musa announced that its terms would be fixed through diplomatic channels.

Holds 'Constructive' Talks With al-Shar'

LD3003131795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1249 GMT 30 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Dmitriy Gorokhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Damascus March 30 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev described as very trusting and constructive the negotiations he had with Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar' on Thursday. They met on the premises of the Syrian Foreign Ministry in Damascus on Thursday morning.

The conversation that was mostly one-on-one, precedes Kozyrev's meeting with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad. The meeting will be held 340 kilometres north-west of the Syrian capital in the city of al-Qardahah, Hafiz al-Asad's native place. He invited the Russian minister there.

Before taking a plane from Damascus, Kozyrev told Russian journalists what the main topics of the dialogue will be. "We have done vast preparatory work in Moscow, also on problems of debts, and on possible construction projects. I believe that president Hafiz al-Asad and I will discuss these matters and will later describe them in a more specific way".

Problems of the Middle East settlement held an important place during the negotiations. "We have some additional ideas as to how to advance the peace process, and we have shared these ideas," Kozyrev said.

The Syrian side should now be given opportunity to study these ideas. I believe we shall have specific achievements in this area, too. There is no denying concern over the state of affairs in the regional peace process. Interaction and cooperation between Moscow and Damascus is ever more needed to prevent stagnation and even a setback in the Middle East settlement.

The Russian and Syrian ministers signed a bilateral intergovernmental agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation in Damascus on Thursday.

Kozyrev Favors Strengthening NPT Regime

LD2903154695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1452 GMT 29 Mar 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] CAIRO (EGYPT), Mar 29 (Interfax)—Russia is in favor of preserving and strengthening nuclear non-proliferation regime. It also strives to make a large step forward in this direction at the upcoming conference of the NPT member-countries in New York, Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev declared at a press conference on Tuesday evening in Cairo. In Cairo he negotiated with his Egyptian colleague 'Amr Musa.

Egypt is the first stage in Kozyrev's trip to the Middle East in the course of which he is scheduled to visit Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and the Palestinian autonomy in the Gaza Strip.

According to Kozyrev, one of the aims of this visit to the Middle East is "to estimate the contribution which the Russian party can make in the nuclear non-proliferation regime both on the global and the regional level."

Sources close to the Russian delegation reported to Interfax that Kozyrev has brought to the Middle East concrete ideas and plans regarding involvement of countries of this region in solution of issues related to nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Kozyrev reported that he has discussed this problem with Moussa "in a constructive and positive way."

"I am very glad that Egypt backs the idea of nuclear non-proliferation regime on a well-balanced and just basis," Kozyrev underlined.

At the same time he expressed regret due to Israel's refusal to join the NPT and called on all countries, which are still not member-countries of the NPT, to join the Treaty.

Speaking about cooperation between the Russian Federation and Iran in the field of atomic energy, Kozyrev underlined that he sees no problems in developing such relations "with any country which is member of the NPT and which is under the guarantees of the IAEA." "All member-countries of the NPT should have an access to peaceful utilization of atomic energy. This is the essence of the treaty," Kozyrev said.

Asked to make his comments on the proposal to impose an oil embargo against Libya, which was submitted by the United States to the UN Security Council, Kozyrev reported that he would possibly express his position on this issue "in one or two days." Kozyrev pointed out that he "must more thoroughly examine the Americans' proposal and to learn about opinion of the Arabian friends on this problem."

Speaking about the situation in Chechnya, Kozyrev reported that "Russia's government undertakes certain efforts to establish ceasefire and to widen the process aimed at creation of a civil infrastructure which was entirely destroyed by the criminal regime and criminal bands."

According to Kozyrev, the final aim of these efforts is "to hold free and just elections in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation as a result of which this republic would acquire its own government."

Lobov on Including East European Countries in NATO

LD3003115595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1134 GMT 30 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 30 (Interfax)—Though his attitude to the idea of expanding NATO with the inclusion of Central and Eastern European countries is "definitely negative", the secretary of Russia's Security Council Oleg Lobov believes that "there must be no haste in making categoric assessments" in regard to this question. He said so in an exclusive interview with Interfax correspondent Boris Grischenko.

"Central and Eastern European countries have a number of ethnic and territorial issues that remain unresolved," Lobov said. He referred, as an example, to Slovakia, to which he paid a working visit recently. According to him, these problems make the topic of NATO membership "natural for the newly-independent states seeking to join some "stabilizing force".

This is what "the politicians, who, in a search for guarantees for their countries' territorial integrity, seek to get integrated into some European or global structures, proceed from. At the same time many of them do not deny the possibility that some other structures may emerge in the future."

"The expansion of NATO and its drawing close to Russia's borders is, naturally, undesirable to Russia, since relations between the Russian Federation and NATO are not stipulated legislatively. The Partnership For Peace program has not been signed either, which means a lack of practicable mechanisms that would regulate Russia's relationship with NATO," Lobov said.

Under the circumstances, he noted, NATO continues to be "a purely independent and powerful organization, which, like Russia, takes its own political decisions."

As Lobov said, under the circumstances two versions of creating a system of European security would be the most acceptable ones to Russia.

Firstly, he said, an absolutely new structure that would involve all European countries - both NATO members and those which have not joined the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization yet - could be formed. The participation of Russia and the CIS countries located in Europe would become natural in this case.

However, this scheme, as its opponents claim, may prove to be too cumbersome. Lobov also foresees another motive for objections: "What would happen to NATO if such a system is formed?"

Another version, according to Lobov, is "for Russia and the Central and Eastern European countries to join NATO virtually simultaneously, if they wish it, of course." In this case, Lobov said, Russia would not "strongly object" to the decision of any country that seeks to join NATO.

"Many issues would be resolved, if it were possible for the candidate countries to join NATO gradually, as they get ready for it," Lobov stressed. He pointed to the need to solve such complicated issues as the transition to the unified NATO standards for arms, equipment, communications and the like by the countries seeking to integrate into that system.

Therefore, Lobov said, a simultaneous transition by those countries seeking to get integrated into NATO is unrealistic. Proceeding from these countries' positions in regard to NATO, the U.S. is offering Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechia and Slovakia a large number of military F-16 planes at relatively low prices. However, these countries have no financial opportunities to purchase them, Lobov said.

Apart from buying new military equipment, the countries seeking to join NATO should consider the expenditure connected with servicing and repairing it, buying spare parts and retraining the personnel handling it. As Lobov said, "the political integration of these countries into NATO is possible, but military integration will take many years, maybe decades."

Lobov views the version in accordance with which NATO expands at the expense of the Baltic countries and states in Central Europe, while Russia is persuaded to conduct a dialogue with NATO in the framework of the Partnership For Peace program, as totally unacceptable to Russia. He believes that under the circumstances Russia will have to take steps to strengthen its own and its neighbors' defense capacity.

This will require additional spending, Lobov stressed, and in political terms it would look like endeavors to return to the Warsaw Pact and restore the bipolar system of security in Europe.

The idea of forming a unified air-defense system for CIS countries, for instance, should be viewed from this angle, Lobov noted. He drew attention to the fact that a unified air-defense system is on the one hand beneficial to Russia and all CIS countries, and on the other it raises legitimate questions: "Is it not a relapse into the "Cold War"?" "Won't this step lead to a new confrontation between two powerful military groups in Europe?"

Lobov described the establishment of Russian military bases in Trans-Caucasus republics and the treaties on jointly guarding outer borders signed with CIS countries as a consequence of the policy of NATO expansion. "If we could join the NATO system simultaneously, these issues would be resolved in the framework of a common policy, without the suspicion that was inherent in the "Cold War" times," he said.

However, Lobov stressed, the joining of NATO by the new European countries is a process that must not be considered as swift. As he noted, Russia should neither dramatize it, nor resort to steps of military or economic pressure in retaliation.

Shakhray Says West 'Strengthening Revanchist Tendencies'

AU2903133195 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 29 Mar 95 p 3

[Interview with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray by Burkhard Bischof; place and date not given: " 'West's Position Strengthens Revanchism'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bischof] You are considered to be one of the few moderate and reform-oriented politicians in the Russian Government. Is that how you see yourself?

[Shakhray] I agree with this. I am something like the last of the Mohicans of the 1991 government. But I must say that President Yeltsin has managed to safeguard continuity in the government's work in spite of all the changes in its composition.

[Bischof] Is the impression that there has been a certain hardening of positions in Russian domestic and foreign policies lately correct?

[Shakhray] That impression is wrong. That might have something to do with the outside world's changing image of Russia. Russia frequently confronts the problem of double standards being applied in assessing it. We understand that the cliches of Western politicians and mass media have a share in that. The actions and intentions of the former USSR are simply transferred to today's Russia.

We often make the mistake of not explaining our actions in advance. But let me repeat: The policy of the Russian Government is not getting any harsher, but it is determined by our national interests and is being implemented consistently. It has also become more predictable and reliable.

[Bischof] What mistakes has the West made since 1991 that have brought about a certain disappointment in Russia about the Western democratic and economic model?

[Shakhray] There are a number of factors. There is a widely-held view in the West that Russia has to be educated, that Russia is still a child who is not up to the challenges of the European parliamentary system and European structures. That is the wrong way of looking at things. It is difficult to speak about Europe without including Russia; if you ignore Russia, Europe is reduced to Western Europe. And the West is thus limiting its own room for maneuver.

Another example is the debate on the eastward expansion of NATO. That has established new and additional barriers between Western Europe and Russia.

Or take the conflict in Chechnya: For three years the West played down the severe human rights violations by the Dudayev regime, considering them effects of a national liberation struggle against the Russian empire. But the attempt by the Russian Government to bring the separatists back to reason is criticized by the West.

But the most important point is that double standards are also applied in the economy: Unilateral tariff and trade barriers make debt conversion difficult and eat up credits. Nationalists and extremists in our country make use of that by telling the people: "Look, that is what the West is like. Instead of helping us, it is trying to bring us to our knees economically and in terms of military policy!" And the next thing they do is demand that the president and the government should resign, because they are allegedly in league with the West. In short: The West's behavior is strengthening revanchist tendencies in Russia.

[Bischof] Do you see a danger of the Chechnya conflict spreading to the entire northern Caucasia region?

[Shakhray] No, I do not see any such danger. The other conflicts in that region, like the ones in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Ingushetia are forming a kind of barrier to that. People in Caucasia want peace, and they refuse to support politicians who want to instigate wars. But nevertheless, I can see that the effects of the Chechnya conflict will be felt for a long time to come.

[Bischof] Some commentators regard the National Security Council, of which you are a member, as a sort of new politburo. Is the Security Council really the actual center of power in Russia?

[Shakhray] No. It only existed on paper for two years, and it has become a real advisory instrument to the president only recently. Quite often the president does not agree with what the Security Council recommends. The former Communist Party politburo made all the decisions, and the secretary general had to observe them; it embodied the organ of collective irresponsibility. Comparing the Security Council with the politburo is inadmissible. But I personally think that the Council could work more efficiently.

[Bischof] Will there be a presidential candidate called Sergey Shakhray next year?

[Shakhray] I am, indeed, aiming to become president, but I will not run before the year 2000. I am 38 years old now, and my party, the "Party of Russian Unity and Accord" has only been in existence for a year and a half. There is still a lot to be done.

Shifting U.S. Perceptions of Yeltsin Viewed

MM2903200395 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Mar 95 p 4

[Article by Stanislav Kondrashov: "Is There an Alternative to Yeltsin? This Is Occupying Clinton More Than Question of Alternative to Clinton"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "There is currently no alternative to Yeltsin"—that unequivocal statement was made by Boris Yeltsin at a press conference. But this press conference was not held today or yesterday, but two years ago. And not in Moscow, where this blatant self-promotion would have sounded rather odd to Russian ears, but at the other end of the world—Vancouver in Canada. Meeting for the first time with President Clinton, who had recently taken up residence in the White House, Yeltsin was seeking U.S. support in his fight against the Khasbulatov-backed Supreme Soviet.

He got it. A lot of water has flowed—rushed—under the bridge since then. The illusions about the decisive weight of transatlantic aid and aid from overseas in general have dissipated. But the strange and intriguing question has not disappeared; it has only grown in magnitude—is there an alternative to Yeltsin?

It is strange because there is seemingly nothing simpler than to hold elections, as scheduled, next June and find out through the voters and through the people whether, in their opinion, there is an alternative or not. But for some reason there is no certainty that the elections will be held.

It is intriguing because it will be the second free elections—rather than the first elections of 1990—that will show whether the mechanism of Russian democracy really is up and running. It could be a defeat for a politician, a victory for the new system, a break with centuries-long traditions, and an epoch-making breakthrough—the ruler, were he to lose, would quit his supreme post, submitting to the will of the people. If he wins, he will remain in place, having renewed his popular mandate. This never happened once under the tsars or the Communists. The last tsar gave up the throne, but he was executed nonetheless. The country was "dragged" from under the first and last Soviet president in order to get rid of him. With the exception of Khrushchev, alternatives to general secretaries were only found after their death.

To take the bilateral format, Yeltsin and Clinton will be meeting for the fourth time 9 May. And this will be the first time against the backdrop of Chechnya, which has confused and horrified not only Russian but U.S. citizens as a result of the number of casualties, the scale of the destruction, and the massive use of military equipment on our own territory. Against this backdrop, having emphasized the question of an alternative, the Russian president's popularity has fallen to a record low, and fears about an authoritarian or ultranationalist comeback in Russia have increased dramatically. All this, in the shape of the "Russian factor," is entering the U.S. domestic political struggle, which has its own backdrop—the onslaught of critical Republicans. Having won a decisive advantage over the Democrats in Congress and state governors' mansions, they want to take over the White House as well—at the presidential elections of November next year.

Thus, there is a Russian backdrop and an American backdrop. Both can be said to be threatening, but for different reasons. If testing democracy with second free elections will be fundamentally epoch-making for Russia, for Americans replacing the man in the White House is a matter of routine. Without tanks or special troops on Pennsylvania Avenue there is always a ready alternative to hand in a country which has elected around 40 of its countrymen President in some 50-odd elections.

Under a previous agreement Clinton was to have traveled to Moscow in the first half of the year. But he hesitated for a long time over whether to attend the victory anniversary, which Yeltsin had timed the meeting to coincide with so as to boost his political standing. Republican congressmen were up in arms—under no circumstances should he go. Under no circumstances should he put in an appearance against the bloody backdrop of Chechnya.

Their Senate leader—Robert Dole—making no secret of his intention to run for the presidency in 1996, roundly denounced the Clinton administration's Russia policy. He stated that "Soviet communism is not yet finally dead" in Russia. He stated that Clinton's foreign policy tenet of "Russia above all" was in conflict with U.S. national interests—particularly in its "Yeltsin above all" version.

Even the ultracircumspect Secretary of State Christopher gave in to the Chechnya emotion, letting slip at a meeting with the Italian foreign minister that "it may be worth looking for an alternative" to Yeltsin.

If we take their backdrop and our backdrop, the one-day meeting between the two presidents is just an episode which will be neither decisive nor defining. But the Clinton administration has clearly decided that giving in to the Republicans in this instance would be to strengthen their overall positions and admit that they were right. The affront to Yeltsin, with whom—and with whom alone, as long as he is in the Kremlin—they have to do business, would also be counterproductive. And there would be no point in the Americans giving a gift to Yeltsin's opponents in Moscow, who deny his right to preside over glorious dates in Soviet history.

Washington has also realized that, going beyond the diplomatic framework, the issue could move into something more important and sensitive—the attitude to the people and its most sacred memories.

THE NEW YORK TIMES set out the essence of the matter in an editorial: "It is proper for the President to be in Moscow that day to honor the Russian dead of World War II.... Clinton should express Americans' sympathy and gratitude to the millions of Russians who died in battle from Leningrad and Stalingrad to Berlin. No other country contributed more to the war or lost more, no country played a more important role in the defeat of Germany."

By personally going to Moscow and sending Vice President Gore to the ceremonies in Paris, London, and Berlin, Clinton has gotten his priorities right.

But then there are symbolic and practical overtones of some importance. At the Americans' insistence the Moscow visit program has been drawn up in such a way as to separate the memorable past from unacceptable elements of the present. Clinton will stand alongside Yeltsin on Red Square, as war veterans march past. But he will avoid a visit to Poklonnaya Gora, where a military parade is planned involving the same military hardware which U.S. TV viewers saw plenty of in destroyed Groznyy.

Thus, today's small-scale war is kept separate from the great war of the past. But even the great shared victory has, as it were, been split up by the Washington visit planners. After Moscow Clinton will go to Kiev, separating and making distinct the Ukraine's share of the former all-Union memory. There—indirectly if not directly—the U.S. President will express a preference for the bloodless

Kiev method of combating Crimean separatism over the bloody Moscow method used in Chechnya.

As the general public—primarily war veterans and people of the older generation—see it, what looms largest in Clinton's visit to Moscow is the emotional side, the commemoration and the gratitude. But if we look at its business side, then, of course, it is multilayered—Chechnya in the light of attempts to find a political settlement and international monitoring of human rights; relations between Russia and NATO, which has decided to expand eastward; nuclear disarmament and verification issues; and U.S. aid for economic and political reform in Russia in the full understanding that U.S. potential and the resources allocated to influence the Russian economy and, much more so, the Russian political scene at the macro level are small.

The present will be discussed in relation to the prospects for the future. But the question (of an alternative) which I called intriguing will most probably be left up in the air. It is extremely important in principle but in terms of everyday relations it is a delicate and, if you like, pointless matter.

When Dole laid into Clinton for seeing Yeltsin as the only light in the Russian window, one Washington observer reasonably recalled that the highly respected senator had once advocated cooperation with Brezhnev, without worrying about an alternative. In what way is Yeltsin any worse than Brezhnev as far as Americans are concerned?

Second, politicians at the helm of the executive cannot afford to be as critical as opposition figures in Congress. They simply have no choice. They can only do the necessary state business with those who are at the helm of the other (nuclear!!!) power. And the people in power are not opposition, alternative figures. Whether you like it or not, you have to do business with everyone: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev—half a century of confrontation, with a few highs and far more frequent periods of tension in our relations. Each Soviet leader was the only alternative at the time (although, as a rule, with elements of collective leadership) and, thank God, things never came to a nuclear catastrophe with any of them.

A cold assessment of past decades strips away a lot of what is considered exceptional about the present. The flip side of today's disappointments and difficulties is the impatient hopes for stable progress and rapid movement toward democracy in Russia. Yet in the two years since Vancouver we have witnessed rapid, sometimes spasmodic, and by no means stable dynamics in relations between the United States and Russia.

At the initial stage the full and virtually unconditional support for Yeltsin from the Clinton administration inflamed the opposition of the branches of power in Moscow and to a certain extent promoted the October 1993 culmination of tanks firing on the Supreme Soviet. Later, having analyzed the democrats' failure in the December 1993 elections, Clinton considered it necessary during his January 1994 visit to Moscow to slightly distance himself from Yeltsin, publicly welcoming three sources of democracy in Russia—the president, the new parliament, and the new Constitution.

December 1993 was ultimately followed by December 1994—Chechnya and the move into opposition to Yeltsin by hitherto loyal supporters headed by Gaydar. The Republican onslaught on President Clinton was accompanied by a confusion of his own—could Yeltsin still be considered the bulwark of Russian democracy if, by relying solely on "power figures" [siloviki], he had essentially lost the support of all the Russian democrats recognized in the West? So what has happened as a result? The weightiest proof of democracy in Washington's eyes is now the Russian mass media, which, by freely exposing what has been happening in Chechnya, are proving that there is virtually nothing left of democracy.

That is a paradox. But I think that even this line of ideological defense used by the Clinton administration against its Washington critics would be countered if the Russian president, violating the Constitution, were to refuse to hold the presidential elections on time. Then, probably, he would finally be seen to be not a democrat but an autocrat confirming the omnipotence of Russian traditions in changed conditions and a different framework of authority.

Here, however, we should note yet again that in U.S. foreign policy idealism (or an enthusiasm for ideology) always takes a back seat and, when necessary, is sacrificed to pragmatism and practical advantage. Because a calculating and, when necessary, universally applicable pragmatism is more effective than anything in serving U.S. national interests, which—as part of the concept of U.S. world leadership—include a preoccupation with the fate of the new Russia.

The nuclear disarmament process and the eradication of any sources of nuclear threat to the United States are to the fore here. Russia cannot fail to be a most important partner, because it, as the successor to the USSR, has most nuclear weapons. Since the conditions of Russian instability cannot rule out emergency situations, such a partner should not be irritated but should be involved as much as possible—and disciplined.

A whole month—April—lies between the announcement of Clinton's visit to Moscow and the visit itself. An international conference on the extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty will be held in New York in the second half of April. Washington is dealing with this problem more than any other capital, setting the task of making the treaty open-ended in the new multipolar world, where around 10 countries are candidates for nuclear status or have already secretly acquired it. Washington has no reason to exacerbate relations with Moscow on the eve of this forum. The two main powers will have to form a united front at it. And this is probably one of the hidden explanations behind Clinton's agreement to go to Moscow, despite his domestic American difficulties.

Clinton's visit to Kiev after Moscow also has a definite purpose. Having recently developed emphatically warm relations with Ukraine, the United States is by degrees implementing a strategy of building a dual line of defense in the event of events taking an unpredictable turn in Russia. It is a form of defense and, at the same time, a way to pressure it. The first line of defense is NATO's expansion by admitting the East European states that are striving to join. The second defense is the second waiting line for NATO members—the three Baltic states—to which Vice President Gore alluded during his recent visit to Estonia. And—Ukraine.

Washington, like the other Western capitals, is unable to decisively influence domestic political developments in Russia. It has to satisfy itself with a minimum program of external influence. This is something that it probably is capable of doing—creating a military-political situation without any alternatives that will rule out any revenge by Moscow in East Europe and the post-Soviet area irrespective of how the situation in Russia develops.

Unidentified Foreign Submarine Tracked Near Kola Peninsula

LD2903212095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2058 GMT 29 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 29 (TASS)—Russian military sailors detected a foreign submarine plying the ocean near the Kola Peninsula on Tuesday and monitored it for 12 hours, the press centre of the Russian Navy said on Wednesday.

Under international norms, a 12-miles coastal zone of a country is considered to be its territorial waters. A Navy spokesman told ITAR-TASS that formally the submarine did not sail into Russia's territorial waters, but was in dangerous proximity to the Russian coast. The incident caused a serious concern in the Navy command.

The submarine was detected at 9:00 on Tuesday during routine exercises. Russian ships started pursuing the intruder until it was 100 nautical miles away from Russia's territorial waters. Then they were ordered to stop their pursuit.

This is not the first such incident involving a foreign submarine. On February 11, 1992, the American nuclear submarine Baton Rouge collided with a Russian nuclear-powered military ship. On march 20, 1993, a Russian submarine collided with an American nuclear submarine in Russia's territorial waters. On November 2, 1994, a foreign nuclear submarine sailed five kilometres into Russia's territorial waters near the Kola Peninsula.

Submarine Presumed To Be American

MK3003074095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 30 Mar 95 p 1

[Report by Kirill Dybskiy in the "Incident" column: "A Foreign Submarine Has Been Found in Kola Bay. Possibly Nuclear. And United States"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Late in the evening of 28 March antisubmarine forces of the Russian Northern Fleet, which were on combat duty in the Kola Bay, detected, 2-2.5 miles away from Russian territorial waters, a steady acoustic signal of an object which was soon identified as a foreign submarine. According to a source in the Northern Fleet headquarters, the character of maneuvering by the submarine and the analysis of its route do not rule out that it had already been in our territorial waters. [passage omitted]

The Northern Fleet command officially confirmed the incident but refused to name the type of the transgressor submarine or to which state it belonged. Nonetheless, independent navy experts believe it is very unlikely that this was a diesel submarine from a Scandinavian country. Submarine activity by other European countries in this area is also not very high. On the other hand, the Kola Bay is a stable "habitat" for U.S. Navy submarines (one can recall a whole number of incidents with Russian and U.S. submarines in this area). Experts point out that "only the Americans are bold enough to play around in foreign waters, feeling they can act with total impunity." Judging by the character of maneuvering made by the Russian side, the submarine was nuclear.

Soskovets Prefers 'Separate Agreements' on Black Sea Fleet

MM2703113195 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Kiev Insists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As you know, the results of First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets's working visit to Kiev in connection with the preparations for President Boris Yeltsin's official visit to Ukraine have received a mixed assessment from some State Duma deputies and the public. It has been said, in particular, that Soskovets gave in to Ukraine on questions of the future of the Black Sea Fleet.

Responding to these charges, the first vice premier stated at a 23 March press conference that the fleet's status was indeed the key issue during the talks.

The Ukrainian side's main objections concern the siting of various infrastructures associated with the activity of the Black Sea Fleet. Thus, Kiev is insisting on the withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet's aviation units from Ukrainian territory. But, in Oleg Soskovets's view, it is better for separate agreements to be signed on all these contentious issues by military men who "understand the nature of a base, the nature of ports, the nature of the marines today, etc."

FCS Spokesman Disputes Ukrainian Reports of Lost Uranium

LD2403213295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1950 GMT 24 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Olga Samyonova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 24 (TASS)—A spokesman for the Russian FSK [FCS] counterintelligence service said on Friday that "no leakage of uranium has been registered" in Russia.

Oleg Tomorovsky made this statement in response to Ukrainian media reports that Kiev police on Thursday seized six kilograms of uranium-235 and 238 on two former Russian military servicemen. In a bid to sell uranium abroad, the men allegedly brought it in three half litre jars, Ukrainian sources said.

"We have established good cooperation with Ukrainian (law enforcement) bodies", Tomorovsky told Tass adding that his service is "ready to render any assistance in the investigation into this case."

Vyacheslav Trubnikov, first deputy director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) [FIS], told a briefing on Thursday that in spite of a number of media reports about weapons-grade uranium allegedly smuggled from Russia, "Western secret services had never confirmed a single case" of such export.

Estonians Caught Trying To Smuggle Out Secret Maps

MK2303141095 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 20, 19-26 Mar 95 (Signed to press 22 Mar) p 4

[Unattributed report under the "Special Services" rubric: "They Tried To Sell Secret Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Northwestern Border District Directorate has announced details of the arrest of two Estonian citizens who tried to smuggle out of Russia secret topographical maps of the Russian Federation General Staff.

A total of 17 packages with an overall weight of more than 30 kg, which contained 6,250 maps of a number of areas and oblasts of Russia and other countries, were found in a tool box under a seat of an Estonian technical maintenance bus, INTERFAX reports. The bus was on its way back from Russia to Estonia and was examined by border guards at the Kunichina Gora passage post of the Pechory checkpoint (Novgorod Oblast). The maps were printed in 1986 using a scale of 1:50,000. Each of the maps is marked "Secret." According to the directorate, in the 1980's such maps were printed only by the Main Administration of Geodesy and Cartography of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

The Federal Counterintelligence Service is carrying out an investigation into the seizure of the maps.

Egypt's Musa Hopes Mubarak Will Visit Russia 'Soon'

LD2903171195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1642 GMT 29 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Dmitriy Gorokhov and Georgiy Shelenkov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Cairo March 29 TASS—It is hoped that the official visit of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak to Russia at the invitation passed to him from Boris Yeltin today will take place soon, Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa said in an interview with ITAR-TASS today. Musa added that the visit required thorough preparation via diplomatic channels.

Commenting on the meeting between President Mubarak and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, Musa said Moscow, a co-sponsor of the Arab-Israeli negotiations, plays a major role in the progress toward a peaceful settlement in the Mideast. Musa said he hoped Russia had new proposals for the negotiations, adding that it was premature to release more details to the press.

The talk of Mubarak and Kozyrev in the presidential palace lasted for an hour and a half instead of the planned 30 minutes. Central subjects were activation of the peace process, issues relating to the extension of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in the face of Israel's refusal to endorse it, other international problems, including the former Yugoslavia, and bilateral issues. The talk also addressed the Chechnya conflict.

Kozyrev handed to Mubarak a personal letter from President Yeltsin inviting Mubarak to come to Moscow on an official visit.

Speaking on the meeting, Kozyrev stressed Mubarak's invariable motivation to promote the Egyptian-Russian cooperation to a higher level. The president's visit to Russia will no doubt deepen the two states' dialogue, Kozyrev said. The Russian foreign minister emphasised Egypts's key role in the Mideast settlement. Kozyrev said he laid out Russia's ideas concerning the activation of the peace process at his today's meeting with Mubarak.

Exchange of opinions during his upcoming meetings with leaders of Syria, Israel and Palestine will be quite useful, Kozyrev continued.

As for the extension of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Kozyrev said his talks with Mubarak and Musa left him with the impression that solutions to issues would be found. Although discussion with Israel is still ahead, the Cairo talks give a ground for optimism, Kozyrev said.

After the official part of the visit was over, Kozyrev went to Luxor, southern Egypt, to travel on from it to Damascus late on Wednesday.

Duma Official on Sale of Nuclear Equipment to Iran

LD2503213595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1317 GMT 25 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Yuriy Kozlov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 25 Mar—The U.S. side cannot have objective grounds for concern over Russia's proposed delivery of nuclear equipment to Iran, journalists were told today by Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the State Duma's International Affairs Committee.

First, noted the Russian parliamentarian, the point at issue is the sale of a light-water reactor, similar to the one the USA is currently foisting on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea through South Korea. Second, Moscow is just as interested as Washington in strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty provisions, since most states, the nuclear programs of which are of concern to the world public, happen to be situated close to Russia's borders. It should be noted in this context that the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), which monitors that obligations in this area are strictly complied with, has no complaints at all with regard to Russia or Iran where this issue is concerned, noted Vladimir Lukin.

Finally, the economic aspects of the matter must also be borne in mind, emphasized Vladimir Lukin. The contract with Iran is to earn a quite impressive sum for Russia, which, incidentally, is immeasurably higher than the financial assistance Americans set aside for Russia. In these circumstances, the insistent U.S. objections against the sale of nuclear equipment to Iran appear more like yet another ideologically-motivated instance of pressure on Russia rather than like understandable concern. Vladimir Lukin suggested that discussion of this problem during a possible Russian-U.S. summit in Moscow is likely to proceed in this key.

Commentary on U.S. Objections to Reactor Deal With Iran

LD2503175695 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in English 1210 GMT 25 Mar 95

[Commentary by Vladislav Chernukha]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Russian Intelligence Service has prepared a report on the prospects of prolonging the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]. The report was presented to journalists in Moscow earlier this week. Participants in the press conference state much about the capability of Iran to build a nuclear weapon.

Vladislav Chernukha was at the press conference and compiled the following: Washington and the American mass media have give special attention to the issue since last January. That is, after the signing of a contract for the delivery of Russian reactors to Iran for its nuclear power plant in the city of Bushehr. Despite the exclusively peaceful character of the deal and it full compliance with the NPT, the United States has launched a campaign against the contract. Its chief arguments are as follows: Firstly, Iran will use cooperation with Russia to perfect its military nuclear program. And secondly, the use of Russian reactors will enable Iran to reduce notably the time needed for the building of a nuclear weapon.

As for the first argument, it is groundless for several reasons. First of all, because the Russian reactors are (?designed) for the Iranian nuclear power plant on light water, and consequently do not produce weapons' grade Plutonium. Besides, just like Russia, Iran is a participant in the NPT and consequently its nuclear activity is supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

As for the American argument that, by using Russian reactors Iran can reduce the period of building a nuclear bomb down to five years, it fails to stand up to any criticism. One of the Russian Intelligence Service members, Gennadiy Yestafiyev, noted at the press conference that the United States itself says that the military nuclear program in Iran is in embryo state and, by Russian intelligence data, that country lacks any coordinated or integral program of this kind. As it was pointed out at the press conference, even realization of the Russian-Iranian agreement on cooperation in the nuclear sphere will begin to produce results not earlier than in seven to eight years. Russia does not wish to promote the appearance of a nuclear bomb in Iran, even indirectly. So, it intends to remain vigilant on the matter as a country opposing the spreading of such a weapon.

More on this from representative of the Russian Intelligence Service, Gennadiy Yestafiyev.

[Yestafiyev in Russian, fading to English report] We closely follow the entire range of issues concerning nuclear nonproliferation in various countries, including in Iran, Gennadiy Yestafiyev says. And as soon as it gets any alarming signal, the Russian Intelligence Service will take appropriate actions. For the time being, however, Russia has no grounds to share the point of view of American officials on Iran's capability to have a nuclear weapon of its own in the near future, Gennadiy Yestafiyev noted.

Expert on Possible Use of Russian CW in Japan Attack

LD2203205595 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1900 GMT 22 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Theoretically the possibility cannot be ruled out that the sarin gas used in the terrorist act in the Tokyo underground was of Russian origin. Vil Mirzoyanov, a famous chemist, stated this in an interview with Ekho Moskvy.

[Begin Mirzoyanov recording] The protection of chemical weapons [CW] at facilities and depots is not appropriate to their danger. That is why I do not rule out that—if it has not happened in Japan on this occasion—it will not happen in the future. To eliminate this possibility it is necessary to immediately ratify a convention on banning chemical weapons so that international control can be established over all the bases where chemical weapons are being stored. [end recording]

MVD Reiterates Offer To Aid Japan in Cult, Sarin Case

OW2603104095 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in Japanese 1107 GMT 25 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] has indicated to Japanese public security organs its readiness to cooperate in the investigation of the sarin incident that took place in the Tokyo subways.

On 21 March, according to information obtained by ITAR-TASS news agency reporters, the Center for Social Relations under the Russian Federation's MVD notified the HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN Moscow branch office that it has no information concerning the fact that sarin, a toxic material, has been sold by enterprises in the Russian Federation.

Concerning sarin, which is believed to have caused the death of ten people and injured thousands of others in the Tokyo incident, several foreign news agencies have reported that it was obtained from Russia.

While expressing its heartfelt condolences and sympathy for the Japanese victims, the MVD's Center for Social Relations once again stated its readiness to cooperate in the investigation of the incident.

Meanwhile, concerning Aum Shinrikyo, which is suspected of being involved in the subway sarin incident, the Japanese side has requested the MVD's Center for Social Relations to provide information on its activities in Moscow, and the center has already provided to the Japanese side the most detailed data it has in hand.

Background to Eviction of Japanese Religious Sect Viewed

MM2903154195 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Mar 95 p 2

[Report by Arkadiy Zheludkov: "Japanese Sect in Moscow: After Fire and Judgment—Seizure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow—All of one day passed in Moscow between the fire in the building housing the Russian-Japanese University and the next sitting of the case of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect at the Ostankino Intermunicipal Court. As we know, extremely serious accusations of planning and executing an act of terrorism in the Tokyo subway have been made against Aum in Japan.

In the current discussions in Japan of Aum Shinrikyo, particular attention is being paid to the links between the sect's leader, Shoko Asahara, and high-ranking Russian officials, especially Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov.

Our newspaper has already written about the meetings and contacts in Moscow and Tokyo between the Japanese guru and the high-ranking Russian official. As well as about the brainchild of this curious duo—the Russian-Japanese University.

The court has evicted Aum Shinrikyo from its premises at No. 14 Petrovka Street. By a decision of Ostankino Intermunicipal Court, under the chairmanship of Judge Irina Vorobyeva, the sect's property has been seized. The case has been heard in court since 20 August, but up until 15 March there was no progress. The action brought against the sect by a certain Committee for the Salvation of Youth from Totalitarian Sects contained a demand for compensation for the moral and material damage caused by television and radio sermons, as well as "live" appearances by Shoko Asahara to audiences at lectures and seminars. By 15 March the action was worth 20 billion rubles. The inventory of the sect's property kept at Petrovka Street contained more than 40 items. No documents or files containing papers figured on this list.

The fire on 26 March did not begin in the university's premises. It broke out on the next floor up in one of the rooms of an organization which was subletting them. Soon the ceilings between the stories were ablaze. Unfortunately, the university's premises were damaged. The day after the fire we were simply not admitted to the building. That day temporary passes were not valid. After being given lengthy explanations about who was guarding the owners' peace so vigilantly, we managed to locate the commander of the 1st regiment of nongovernment security with the assistance of Moscow Main Directorate for Internal Affairs staffers. But even after talking to him we could not proceed beyond the guard post. "Lobov probably did not give his permission," our protector from the Moscow Main Directorate for Internal Affairs joked.

Immediately after visiting the university, I set off for Ostankino Court where the next hearing of the Aum Shinrikyo case was to have taken place. The court had not yet made a final ruling but an interim one was prepared. It appeared directly after publication in the press of yet another message from Asahara to his disciples and the public. The message, among other things, says: If you hear anything about suicide, then know that we have been killed, that is physically destroyed by the organs of state power." Although it had been mentioned earlier in the message that Buddhism and suicide are incompatible, there was no lack of assumptions being made. The same is true of the whereabouts of Asahara, who is hiding from Japanese justice. There is an opinion that he is now in Russia.

The court's ruling makes direct reference to Asahara's message: "Under these circumstances, taking into consideration the actions of the leader of the Aum Shinrikyo religious organization, branches of which are situated on Russian territory, and also to guarantee the life and health of Russian citizens who are members of the aforementioned religious organizations, the court considers it necessary to essentially halt the activities of the 'Aum Doctrine of the Truth' Moscow Religious Association and the Russian branch of the Japanese religious corporation Aum Shinrikyo, before considering the action. Any court ruling comes into effect from the moment of its publication, but is not, as a rule, executed promptly: Everything depends on the executive branch's efficiency. Or on the energy of voluntary assistants...."

Representatives of the Committee for the Salvation of Youth from Totalitarian Sects reacted to the court's ruling in a restrained manner. Plans to evict the sect members were discussed with the bailiffs and the police. Passions were seriously inflamed in the courtroom. In accordance with the court ruling, it is proposed that the premises and property at all seven Moscow branches of Aum Shinrikyo should be seized immediately.

While this piece was in preparation, the editorial office received a call from a representative of the committee, Aleksandra Ivanovna Vedernikova, who suggested that we go to the sect's ceremonial eviction from the building at No. 14 Petrovka Street....

Academician Criticizes Japan Over Toxic Gas Incident

LD2903172595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1519 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Mar 29 (Interfax)—"The tragedy in the Tokyo underground would never have occurred if the Japanese authorities had taken timely measures, which I proposed to them yet last autumn," Academician Anatoliy Kuntsevich told an Interfax correspondent today.

Kuntsevich is a well-known specialist in chemical weapons. He is also a consultant to the UN secretary general on chemical weapons.

Kuntsevich repeated that an unknown toxic substance had been emitted into the atmosphere in the Japanese town of Matsumoto on June 27, 1994 at night. A residential district in the radius of 100 meters was affected. Six people died and about 150 people were contaminated.

Kuntsevich said the Japanese police had thought sarin had been used then. However, he said that at the time he believed this could have been another toxic substance. He said he was sure that this was another toxic substance when he heard the types of suffering from the incident reported by the media.

Kuntsevich said he was bewildered by the fact that no criminal proceedings had been instigated on the accident in Matsumoto.

Kuntsevich said that after the tragedy in Matsumoto he had proposed that a commission be created taking into consideration the danger of such incidents for both Japan and other countries. He said such a commission should include chemical experts, scientists, experts on use of toxic substances, medical workers and representatives of the public.

Kuntsevich said the Japanese authorities had ignored his proposal. He said he was bewildered to learn that the development of diseases suffered by the tragedy's victims in Matsumoto had not been analyzed. He said such analysis could have determined which toxic substance had been used during the tragic night and could have led the police to the criminals.

Unfortunately, history repeats itself, Kuntsevich said. He said the Japanese authorities had not made any statement on the tragic accident in the Tokyo underground on March 20, in which ten people died from sarin poisoning. He said the authorities have yet to put forward any official charges.

Kuntsevich said he had the impression that this was done on purpose so that the media could develop various versions, for those loving scoops, including the version of some mysterious "Russian trace."

He said the media reports that the members of the sect had acquired sarin in Russia was a conscious move in order to mislead the public investigation. Kuntsevich said he believed the true tie was leading to several Japanese state and private structures.

He said he had followed the tragic events, had seen how the victims of the chemical attack in the Tokyo underground were being saved and how chemical substances were being seized in the buildings belonging to the Aum Shinrikyo sect. He said he had seen with his own eyes that Japan had very-well organized and perfectly trained chemical troops and units.

Kuntsevich said a serious scientific-technical base was required for training chemical troops so well. He said the actions of chemical troops and corresponding units of the police proved that Japan had specialists, technology, raw material, means of chemical intelligence, i.e. there was well-organized production of sarin and other toxic substances.

Kuntsevich said that in principle there was nothing illegal in this if the fixed amount of such production was respected.

He said he believed that the Japanese government must admit to producing toxic substances. He added that

Japan continues to repeat that it does not produce either chemical or biological weapons.

Kuntsevich said he believed that Japan was producing toxic substances in certain amounts, judging by the high-professional actions of the chemical troops during the tragedy in the Tokyo underground.

He said he would like that the Japanese Government explain why it had ignored investigation of the tragedy in Matsumoto and making it clear that Japan had its own basis for creating and producing chemical and biological weapons.

IF Note: Anatoliy Kuntsevich was born in 1934. He is a doctor in chemical weapons, a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences from 1987, now an Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a lieutenant-general. Kuntsevich worked as the head of the Soviet Army's military-technical center, the deputy head of the USSR Defense Ministry's chemical troops.

Kuntsevich is a Hero of Socialist Labor. He has been awarded with the Lenin prize and the Golden Wolf international prize for outstanding contribution to the sphere of chemical disarmament. He became a consultant of the UN secretary general on chemical weapons in 1987. Kuntsevich took part in the group of UN experts who worked out a report confirmed by the 44th session of the UN General Assembly in October 1989. The report was called The Basic Principles and Procedures of Timely and Efficient Investigation of Reports on Possible Use of Chemical, Biological or Toxic Weapons.

Political Issues

Medvedev: Security Service Not Blocking Access to Yeltsin

LD2403151795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1506 GMT 24 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Valeriy Sevryukov, Andrey Serov, and Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 24 TASS—"I have not been aware of any artificial obstacles" for contacts with the president from staffers of the Security Service of the head of state, Sergey Medvedev, recently appointed presidential press secretary, told his first briefing for journalists since his appointment today. "If presidential assistants have a need to discuss something with the president, there are no difficulties", the press secretary said.

"Rumours about the Presidential Security Service are exaggerated", Medvedev said.

Chernomyrdin on Prospects for Second Stage of Privatization

LD3003152395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1248 GMT 30 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 30 (Interfax)—At the sitting of the Russian government Thursday in Moscow Russia's Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin categorically opposed the "re-nationalization of unprofitable enterprises."

Having recognized that "ineffective hosts head several privatized enterprises who, in the better cases, think only about re-selling shares," Chernomyrdin declared that "in this case it is necessary to search for a new, zealous owner." Chernomyrdin made it clear that "one cannot place responsibility for these unprofitable enterprises on the shoulders of the state under any conditions."

Chernomyrdin said that the "ensuring of investment orientation for the development of production and granting possibility to investors to procure control blocks of shares (as a rule, not less than 25%) are the major tasks of the second stage of privatization in 1995."

According to Chernomyrdin, this stage of the privatization in the Russian Federation, which was started in the second half of 1994, "has a qualitatively new nature."

Chernomyrdin underlined that special procedures of selling shares of enterprises-debtors would be used in the future on a much wider basis. "If we do not do this there will be only empty "boxes" standing throughout the country and the industry will not work," he said.

Chernomyrdin believes that in order to implement the second stage of privatization it is necessary, firstly, to ensure the budget's revenues (in accordance with the plan, more than 9 trillion rubles), secondly, to create a necessary legislative and normative basis, and thirdly, to work out organizational issues and technology of implementation of the second stage.

In addition, Chernomyrdin is convinced that one should find answers to the question on the state of affairs in the field of privatization in the regions and on tasks facing them It is also necessary to impartially assess the privatization process in the most important branches, including amounts of involved investments. It is necessary to have a precise and complete picture of what is being done for the post-privatization support of enterprises, about its results, and how the assets allocated for the support of privatized enterprises, including assets granted by the governments of the G-7 member countries and international financial organizations, are being coordinated.

"We must clearly understand how to fix blocks of shares of the enterprises under privatization in the federal and state ownership, to know the total number of such enterprises in the Russian Federation with their gradation on the scale of the fixed block of shares and with the division on branches and regions," Chernomyrdin underlined. He also deems it necessary to carry out a thorough analysis of existing violations in the legislation of the Russian Federation made in the course of privatization and revealed by the law enforcement bodies and measures aimed at their removal.

According to Chernomyrdin, in March the inflation rate in Russia should not exceed "8.5 out of a maximum of 9%." Chernomyrdin predicted its further reduction in April. He said that "strict execution of the budget both on revenues and on expenditures" is the major condition for this.

"It is impossible not to see that the economy is starting to breathe and people starting to search for ways, not only to survive, but for comprehensive work which gives hopes for economic growth in the near future," Chernomyrdin said.

Speaking about the results of the full sitting of the government last Friday, Chernomyrdin said that "in general we have managed to plan a program of actions for 1995 and for the next three years."

In his words, the first quarter of 1995 convincingly demonstrates that "we can follow a strict "schedule" preserving the pace and potential of the economy's revival."

Chernomyrdin agreed with the opinion that sometimes full sittings of the government remind one of party and economic conferences and plenums of the Central Committee of the communist party: "sometimes we cannot get rid of conventionality, magnificence, and tongue-twisting." However, Chernomyrdin believes that we need such a forum where ministers and leaders of the regions, scientists and representatives of the legislative power, leaders of enterprises can discuss the most pressing economic issues and adopt decisions. To this effect he thought that it would be expedient to hold specialized, thematic conferences "so that the essence would not sink in the heaps of issues."

Estonian Gun Imports Linked to Crime

954F1868A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russia No. 11, 15 Mar 95 p 13

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondent Nikolay Sorokin: "Guns Wholesale, Cartridges by the Barrel"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **How high-ranking government figures manage to "forget" huge quantities of arms on Dudayev's territory and how much they earned for this remains to be determined, but a no less interesting question is why on the territory of Russia our own gangsters are armed as well as the Chechen pilot formations.**

There are several sources from which arms get into the hands of criminals of all colorations, and one of the main and most productive is the contraband of light rifled weapons from the Baltics, mostly Estonia. Also, according to FCS [Federal Counterintelligence Service] officer Sergey Gorlenko, there is massive smuggling of weapons from Estonia not only to Russia but also to Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikistan. Unbelievable, but true—in little Estonia, more than 90 firms are licensed by the state to trade in arms.

In May of last year Uuno Ellen, general director of the Estonian Department of Police, signed an international certificate for the export of 40,000 handguns and 2 million cartridges for them. According to this document, the Estonian company Calvert was authorized to deliver to Azerbaijan 20,000 Tokarev handguns, the same quantity of Makarov handguns, and 2 million cartridges for them. The Seidli company was to act as a broker in the deal. In July, the Estonian press published a document, from which it follows that the AVVO company intended to purchase from the Bulgarian Defense Industries company 20,000 AK-74 automatic rifles and sets of ammunition for them. Next, according to FCS officers, automatic rifles were to be shipped to one of the CIS countries. This document allegedly was signed by Estonian Minister of Internal Affairs Arike, who, by the way, denies his involvement in this matter. Nevertheless, FCS officer S. Gorlenko said in a conversation with a LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent that according to information in the possession of Russian counterintelligence, not only was the Estonian minister of internal affairs involved in contraband shipments of arms, but also police commissioners Alos and Klandorf, Minister of Defense Tupp, Ministry of Defense Chancellor Moelder, Rear Services chief Eelme, and Kaiitseliit (Estonian national guard) head Nezme; even the names of Minister of Foreign Affairs Juri Luik and some State Assembly deputies were mentioned.

Again, according to FCS information, at the beginning of last year Kaiitseliit's Tartu detachment in Yugoslavia purchased through the intermediary services of the Argus company about 30,000 Tokarev handguns, which were illegally delivered to Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and Kazakhstan.

In October 1994 the trial of four "couriers," arrested by FCS and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] operatives during an attempt to sell a rather large shipment of Yugoslav-made Tokarev handguns, was completed in Moscow. Tokarev handguns are generally popular among criminals, especially among killers—they are relatively cheap, pierce practically any armored vest, and most importantly, are not standard issue weapons in Russia—and therefore do not have registration numbers—and therefore are almost always left on the scene of the crime without fear that they will be identified by the serial number. Practice shows that the weapons most frequently used in contract murders and gang score-settling are "imported," that is, produced in former socialist countries and China by Soviet licenses. Thus, demand for contraband weapons is very high. Also very popular are SVU (home-made explosive devices).

A Tokarev gun costs $500-600 in Estonia; it Moscow it can already be sold for $1,000-1,200. Imagine how much profit was skimmed off by Kaiitseliit, which bought the aforementioned consignment of guns at $60 apiece.

Of course, it would be an exaggeration to accuse Estonia of flooding Russia with guns. Nevertheless, the facts prove that illegal exports of guns to Russia, as well as trading in contraband Russian strategic materials, has become serious business for Estonians.

There are also other sources that generously feed our organized crime with powder. One may mention among them military depots—the so-called "arsenals" set up immediately after the World War II and filled with old but operational and unaccounted-for weapons. Plus "black search brigades," which recover arms at cites of military fighting and restore them. There are also quite a few virtuoso craftsmen making armaments. FCS operatives recently arrested some of these "folk craftsmen," who had set up virtually an assembly line for the production of automatic weapons, and of very high quality at that, in Moscow subway metalworking shops. And the RUOP [regional organized crime department] told us that, visiting in the course of an investigation one of the "military" depots, they were stunned: Endless rows of warehouses, scattered over a huge territory, were guarded by only four guard towers; thieves easily got in through broken windows; inside warehouses, weapons were simply lying around on the floor—what the thieves could not take with them, they simply discarded.

Where there is demand, there is supply. Citizens' need for weapons has increased so much that weapons are sold more often not by lone traders, and not piecemeal but by "firms" and wholesale. This kind of trade permits solid profits to be earned, and in cash at that, in record short time. And there are no interethnic arguments in this one. Three years ago the Azerbaijani environmental society

Navruz purchased in Arzamas for cash 1,612 APC's [armored personnel carriers], after which they were moved to a transshipment point—an aviation regiment base commanded by an... Armenian. And how can one explain the fact that Dudayev's commandos do not have any difficulty when it comes to the supply of arms and ammunition? How does it get to them, and from where?

The main problem is not that a certain category of our citizens just love to buy and sell weapons. These things happen all over the world. In Russia it is most likely a result of the authorities' complete inability to change the legislation as needed, and deep- reaching corruption at the top (of both political and enforcement agencies); as a result, special services and law enforcement organs are tied hand and foot. MVD officers (for understandable reasons they asked us not to mention their names) told me that in the course of routine operational-investigative actions they have unexpectedly come upon leads to people (who are involved in trading modern weapons) at such a high level that they had to back off, to put it mildly. "Up there, at the top, they still live by the laws of mutual cover-up. On the other hand, the entire country lives this way, and you cannot get out of this circle," the officers said as we said goodbye.

One of the unwritten laws of our life stands as a motto on the cover of the American SOLDIER OF FORTUNE magazine: "Nothing is easier than killing." And this is true.

Media Issues

Ilyushin: No Grounds for Duma To Overrule Edict on Public TV

LD2303143695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1403 GMT 23 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS observer Tamara Zamyatina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 23 TASS—The top aide of the Russian president said on Thursday [23 March] that he saw no grounds for paliamentary veto of Boris Yeltsin's decree which gave green light to the denationalisation of the first channel of the Russian television.

"The is no reason why the State Duma should overrule the president's decree concerning (the creation of) Public Russian Television [RPT]", Yeltsin's first aide Viktor Ilyushin told ITAR-TASS today commenting the negative reaction from some MPs and part of the state-run Ostankino TV company staff to the privatisation of the first tv channel into a joint-stock company.

Ilyushin believes that the president's decree must be fulfilled by everyone who had been instructed to provide for the start of RPT's broadcasting on channel one from April 1, 1995.

Military, Nuclear & Space Issues

Military Slow To Disclose Details of Latest Rocket Incident

MM2903194195 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Mar 95 p 2

[Report by Andrey Aderekhin: "The Military Tried To Conceal Missile 'Attack'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Krasnodar—As already reported, at the beginning of the week there was an "unintentional launching" of six live rockets at a Krasnodar military airfield. The details of the incident indicate that the reason for the rocket "attack" on the Kuban's kray center was most likely not a technical malfunction but rather the military's now customary sloppiness.

Clearly, in these conditions it was extremely difficult to establish the details.

It is startling that, as in the recent incident near Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Station, the main "hero" of the events was the Su-25 aircraft again. IZVESTIYA's correspondent has managed to establish that the picture of the incident differs in many ways from that reported to INTERFAX by the Russian Federation Air Force Press Center spokesman.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Vologin, chief of the Kray Internal Affairs Administration Press Service, passed the news office an extract from the operations summary. "On 27 March at around 1100 hours, as a result of a safety regulations violation by Aviation Weapons Engineer Major K., when scheduled work was being carried out to change over from winter to summer operation, six rounds of R8-OK shaped-charge fragmentation shells were accidentally discharged from Su-25 aircraft identification number 74 from the territory of military unit 22290's airfield, four of which exploded in a field and two of which damaged the roof of dacha building 81 in Srednyaya Ulitsa in the 'Sady Kalinina' horticultural partnership and a telegraph pole."

It has been learned from other sources that the Su-25 was standing in a flight line at an aviation regiment airfield located at Kilometer 9 on the Rostov highway. At 1025 hours six rocket shells were launched from the aircraft in a matter of seconds because of negligence by military personnel. These rockets, 1.5 meters long and 80 mm in diameter, are designed to kill concealed enemy personnel and destroy armored vehicles. Two of the launched rockets did not travel far and exploded on the territory of the airfield itself. Two others exploded in a field nor far from a dacha settlement, approximately 2 km from the airfield. The other two rockets landed right on the dacha settlement, which is located on the territory of the second section of the "Solnechnyy" state farm.

Having visited the accident site Lieutenant Colonel S. Olshevskiy, deputy chief of the Krasnodar Headquarters for Civil Defense and Emergency Situation Affairs, related: One of the rockets that landed on the settlement exploded next to a power transmission mast, destroying it, damaging the metal fence around a dacha, and shattering the glass in two houses. Finally another rocket landed right on the wooden floor in the attic of a country house.

The occupier of this house was nearby but luckily not inside. The surprise rocket attack and powerful explosions frightened the people who were in the dacha settlement at the time, and it was pure luck that none of them was killed or injured.

Once they have been precisely established, the material losses suffered by the citizens should be compensated by the military. The military prosecutor's office is studying material on the accident.

In the opinion of a military man who asked not to be named, it is quite clear that the reason for the rocket launch was the criminally negligent handling of terrible weapons. All the Su-25 aircraft's fire control systems were switched off except the ill-starred rocket pod, of which the other participants in the events were unaware....

Hiding behind the concept of "military secrets," the military took a long time to grant representatives of civil defense and police headquarters access to the aircraft's flight line and did all they could to delay reporting the number of rounds.

Zhirinovskiy's Electoral Appeal to Army Viewed

LD3003090095 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0820 GMT 30 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS observer Tamara Zamyatina]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 30 Mar—Observers see Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's decree conferring the military rank of "lieutenant-colonel of the reserve" to Vladimir Zhirinovskiy as a signal to the Russian army to vote for the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party [LDPR] in the future presidential elections.

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy did not wait long to use this timely election service provided by the defense minister to issue a leaflet called "The chairman of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party's appeal to the personnel of the Russian Armed Forces." Describing "the priority measures to be implemented after victory in the presidential elections" the future candidate to the post of president pledges to eliminate within a year "such a shameful phenomenon for the state as homeless officers and warrant officers," to raise servicemen's salaries to a sum equivalent to $600-$750, and so on.

Having shown outstanding strategic thinking in the course of the Chechen operation, appreciated only by the Liberal Democratic Party, Pavel Grachev made an important political decision which, according to the press service of the LDPR group in the State Duma, was welcomed by "military labor collectives and individual citizens" throughout the country.

The military specialists whom an ITAR-TASS observer has met believe that conferring an extra rank to a captain of the reserve violates the norms accepted in the army and insulted the dignity of other servicemen who have served in the army 15-20 years and have changed dozens of garrisons all over the country before receiving this rank.

It is a telling fact that the apparatus of General Boris Gromov, who after leaving his post of deputy defense minister was appointed Russian deputy foreign minister, has deemed Pavel Grachev's decree as "a complete surprise" and does not want to believe it until official confirmation has been received.

Preparations for 9 May Military Parade Discussed

954Q0166A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 95 p 1

[Commentary by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vitaliy Moroz: "Military Parade in Celebration of the 50-Year Victory Anniversary Must Be Commensurate With the Significance of This Sacred Date"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A couple of weeks ago, or slightly more, a reader—a war veteran—called the editorial offices and asked whether a military parade is being planned within the system of celebratory events marking the 50-year victory anniversary. Although a government decision on this subject had not yet been announced, he was told with a great degree of certainty that yes, just on that very day an echelon with combat equipment had passed the editorial offices on its route via the intra-city rail track to the parade grounds. Having expressed thanks for the information, the veteran said these memorable words:

"You know, I will not be able to attend the parade anymore. My health keeps me homebound. But I feel better now. To leave such an anniversary without a parade would mean losing self-respect, forfeit state honor...."

Is this not too lofty a statement—just like that: national self- respect, state honor? Is this not excess emotion, overkill? I am convinced that it is not. Jubilees based on war victories have always been celebrated with the participation of troops in Russia. This tradition goes back at least to the beginning of the eighteenth century. So what could happen to our long-suffering Fatherland for us to renege on the centuries-old tradition this time in celebrating one of the greatest anniversaries in our history, to cater to the momentary political interests and peculiarities of this point in time?

It looks as if this time we are not going to forfeit state honor. And a military parade to celebrate this glorious jubilee of victory in World War II will be held not only, for instance, at the famous Champs-Elysees but also where especially much had been done for this victory—in Moscow.

Why not at Red Square, where the immortal parade of November 1941 and the stirring and grand Victory Parade in June 1945 became part of history? Where, finally, five years ago the last of the past military parades was held? One cannot help but ask this question, of course. And the answers could mean different things. But today it is far more important to ensure that on 9 May nothing on the national main square should cloud the mood of those who directly participated in earning this victory for us: front-line veterans and heroes of the home front.

And although the military parade in honor of the victory jubilee will be held for the first time not in the same place where front- line veterans will walk in a solemn march, it still will be mostly for them. And for this reason alone it cannot be truncated, squeezed into the bounds of some political restrictions. It so evolved over time that at military parades we do not merely pay tribute to tradition—we in a way report to the people, to the country, what we are, how we are trained, how we are equipped, and what we are capable of.

The times when our military parades became the subject of intense attention of foreign experts, when new prototypes of armaments created a stir in the ranks of diplomats, are long past. Also gone are any reasons to identify these parades with demonstration of force. The hardware we will see on the 9 May parade is probably better known abroad than among our population. I remember how some time past, at an armaments exhibition, two foreigners ducked into the hatches of a Tunguska and examined its innards for at least half an hour, while an engineer from the Ulyanovsk Mechanical Plant, who was presenting this anti-aircraft defense system, only shrugged nervously about how to explain such curiosity.

If nothing untoward happens, we will see at the military parade the aforementioned Tunguska, and Grad multiple rocket launcher; self-propelled artillery systems born at different times—Akatsiya and Msta; the already-familiar tanks equipped with new defensive systems; infantry and paratroop fighting vehicles... Of no less educational experience for everyone will be aviation participating in the parade: Strategic missile-carriers, long-range and tactical bombers, world-famous Su-27 and MiG-29 fighters, An-124 "Ruslan" giant transport; air support helicopters. I think that anyone who will be present at the military parade or watch it on television will certainly expand his military knowledge, be it as it may in a most general form.

Parades are an undertaking that requires certain financial support. I doubt that we gain anything by dispensing with them for some or other motives and celebrating big holidays without military rituals organically complementing them. More likely, it is the opposite—we lose more. A ruble saved does not replace what can preserve and strengthen the link between times and generations, make an imprint in our memory and spirituality, bring us closer to history.

Military parades require serious, painstaking preparation. After all, the word "parade" itself stems from the Latin "prepare." Numerous training goose-step march-throughs, be it in foot formation or as part of the vehicle column, are hardly fun for the participants. They involve great physical and psychological strain, require will and stamina. But in the end everyone who has had the honor of participating in a military parade remembers it for life with satisfaction and pride.

So let the military parade, with which the country will celebrate our 50-year anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War, be worthy, by its level and scale, of this date that is sacred and dear to every honest Russian. Let the effort of the military authorized to hold it merge organically with politicians' support, and be aided by comprehensive support of state structures. This is another tradition we have no right to lose.

Nuclear Site Inspection Reveals Poor Safety Standards

LD3003000795 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1515 GMT 29 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Bakina]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Moscow, 29 Mar—The results of an inspection carried out by the Russian State Supervision Agency for Atomic Power Capabilities indicate that one in 13 employees of Russian enterprises that use nuclear materials and work with dangerous radiation levels demonstrated unsatisfactory knowledge of safety procedures. This information is contained in the department's annual report for 1994 released to the ITAR-TASS correspondent. [passage omitted]

Last year 126 work disruptions were registered in nine of Russia's nuclear power stations, which is slightly less than in 1993. Most 'notable' in this respect were Kola, Novovoronezh, and Balakovo. Most of the disruptions were due to aged equipment and the human factor. The radiation situation in the regions surrounding the nuclear power stations did not change.

However, specialists are more concerned with the problems of nuclear waste and used nuclear fuel. Thus, the inspection established that the storage facilities are filled on average to 60 percent of their capacity and will become full in the next two to three years. Because of large quantities involved, the radio and chemical enterprises of Russia store their waste in open water reservoirs or simply in the open air. The storage capacities for the nuclear fuel used by the navy are practically exhausted, and conditions under which it is stored do not correspond to the documented norms.

The safety of the nuclear materials is far from desirable. In 1994, 19 incidents of uranium theft were registered as well as 12 incidents of theft of the ion-emitting sources.

Launch Failure Deals 'Lethal Blow' to New Booster Program

MK3003075095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 30 Mar 95 p 1

[Report by Pavel Felgengauer under the "Conversion" rubric: "A Failed Launch of a Cheap Booster for Cheap Satellites. Strategic Missiles Like Flying Along Ballistic Trajectories"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MIT)—the main designer of the "Topol" and "Topol-M" strategic missile systems—has tried with the help of Russian private investors to burst into the world market for commercial space launches with a completely new booster, "Start-2." The first launch on Tuesday, 28 March, ended in failure—communications with the booster were lost during flight.

Grigoriy Yasinskiy, MIT first deputy general director, who supervised pre-launch preparatory work on 28 March at the launch pad of the Strategic Missile Forces' Plesetsk test range, explained to your SEGODNYA correspondent the main idea of the system as follows: "'Start' is a cheap booster for cheap satellites." In order to implement this commercial program a scientific-technical center named "Kompleks" was set up at the state-run MIT. The launch of the rocket was financed by the IVK joint-stock investment company. [passage omitted]

The "Start" program was designed to recycle and to put to good use "spent" fuel elements of strategic missiles and also create jobs and generate extra earnings for the Strategic Missile Forces and military-industrial sector enterprises. The new cheap carriers could be launched "from virtually unprepared launch pads in terms of engineer preparation at any point of the globe." The drive for cost-cutting turned out badly for the designers. For publicity purposes, they tried to place into orbit a foreign satellite during the very first test launch of a "Start-2" rocket, and a failure, which is quite a common outcome in such cases, has triggered a loud scandal with very serious potential consequences.

The Americans, who for the most part call the shots on the world space market, oppose in principle the use of strategic ballistic missiles for international space launches, all the more so "at any point of the globe," because this may cause the proliferation of dangerous missile technologies. No one needs competitors with cheap boosters. Even if the 28 March launch were a success, the "Start" program would have been off to a difficult start. Now, as should be, a domestic state commission will be determining the specific reasons for the debacle. The entire "Start" program, however, appears to have experienced a lethal blow.

Regional Affairs

Two U.S. Citizens Killed in Khabarovsk

LD2903165095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1451 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—Two American citizens, a man and a woman, were found dead on Tuesday [28 March] evening in their apartment in Khabarovsk, Maritime Territory in the Russian Far East, a U.S. embassy official said in Moscow on Wednesday. The official confirmed that the couple had come to Russia in 1992 on an academic exchange programme. The local police who had found the bodies revealed that the woman had been strangled, and the man had died from head wounds.

The official refused to disclose the victims' names prior to notifying their U.S. relatives. However, he told TASS they were Asians by birth, but not the Chinese, as some media reports earlier claimed.

The Khabarovsk Criminal Investigation Department is investigating into the double-murder. The American side is represented by the U.S. consulate in Vladivostok, the Maritime regional centre.

'Powerful Explosion' at Maritime Kray Military Depots

LD3003110795 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1045 GMT 30 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Dmitriy Kashirin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vladivostok, 30 Mar—A powerful explosion occurred at the Maritime region's military depots near the Chinese border at mid-day today, Moscow time (about 1900 local time).

According to unconfirmed information, about 200 carloads with rocket projectiles exploded at the depots in the village of Taloye. The danger radius was at least 10 km.

There have been so far no information on casualties among civilians. Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, the Maritime region's governor, has left for the site.

This accident has happened less than a year after the terrible explosions at the military depots in Novonezhinsk (Maritime region).

Explosions Stop in Maritime Territory

LD3003150995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1316 GMT 30 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Dmitriy Kashirin and Leonid Vinogradov]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Vladivostok, 30 Mar—According to reports from the civil defense headquarters in Maritime Territory, the explosions at the arms depots situated in the vicinity of Taloye village have stopped. [passage omitted]

Reportage, Commentary on Conflict in Chechnya

Scenarios for Future of Chechnya Viewed

MM3003130295 Moscow TRUD in Russian 29 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by State Duma Deputy Vladimir Lysenko under the "View of the Situation" rubric: "War or Peace? Scenarios for the Development of Events in Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The conflict in Chechnya can be described in various ways: the "Chechen crisis," an action to restore constitutional order, an operation to disarm illegal formations, or—in accordance with international legal norms—an international armed conflict. The terminology does not alter the essential point here. **This is a war.** A war in which not just not just the military but old people, women, and children are dying. A war which is causing devastation and countless calamities to hundreds of thousands of people.

And approval "from on high" of any further development of the situation in Chechnya which results in fresh casualties and devastation will constitute the continuation of a crime by the authorities **against their own people.**

Of all the scenarios which have been forecast three, in my view, can be regarded seriously:

1. The prosecution of the Chechen war to its "victorious conclusion," that is to say, the establishment of control over the whole territory of the republic by force—the sole option which clearly suits the leaders of the "war party." The latter are rightly afraid of having to accept the grim responsibility for their deeds, and this is the only way they will be able to postpone judgment day indefinitely.

At best, given such a development of events, Russia will end up with another Ulster in the North Caucasus; at worst, another Vietnam or Afghanistan. Plus thousands more casualties, unpredictable adverse consequences for the future of the Russian state system as a whole, and huge expenditure (billions of dollars) on both carrying out the actual military operations and clearing up the consequences of them.

2. The immediate withdrawal of federal troops and the granting of the right of self-determination to the Chechen Republic. In other words, open **recognition of one's own defeat,"** which is scarcely acceptable to the Russian leadership. Moreover, one can predict with relative certainty the political consequences of such a move. The unstable situation in the conflict zone could lead to a bloody civil war and the most acute problem with the hundreds of thousands of Russians living on the territory of Chechnya.

And, finally, the third scenario, the most humane and sensible scenario, but one no less difficult to carry out for that: the switching of the conflict **from the military to the political stage.** The Peace Initiative in the Caucasus Conference, which was held recently in Moscow, examined precisely the possibility of overcoming the crisis that way. Its participants were presented with a draft plan for the phased settlement of the Chechen crisis. It is obvious that movement in this direction does, given the current situation, enable peaceful life to be restored in Chechnya in the most effective way and offer a real chance of keeping the republic within the Russian Federation. The experience of resolving conflicts in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the Dniester region and the specific features of the Chechen situation have also been taken into account in the plan. The question of authoritative and neutral mediators between the participants in the conflict is tackled and clear arguments countering the attacks made by opponents of a peaceful settlement are adduced.

Unfortunately, it became clear almost at once from the speech made there by Sergey Shakhray that the plan approved by the deputies would be unlikely to suit the Russian high-ups because the government has its own document which is based on different fundamental considerations.

The two main stumbling blocks are obvious.

The first stumbling block is the question of **who** will conduct peace talks at the initial stage of the settlement of the crisis and **with whom.**

The second stumbling block is the question of **elections** in the Chechen Republic.

The plan proposed at the conference describes the **real** forces - - the plenipotentiary representatives of the federal Supreme Soviet and the armed formations controlled by Dudayev—and examines the mechanism for organizing the negotiation process and further steps.

The official document ("The List of Measures of the Russian Federation Government To Settle the Crisis in the Chechen Republic") speaks of "holding talks (between whom?—V.L.) on creating and constantly expanding mutual-nonuse-of-force zones" and "conducting talks with field commanders on the subject of a cease-fire and the surrender of weapons." Whose commanders, which subunits, and how many of them will there be? Ten? One hundred? Would it not be more sensible for the government to recognize at last the self-evident fact of Dudayev's existence and hold talks with him?

As far as the second question is concerned, the plan approved by the conference says that, after the achievement by all parties of an accord on the complete and conclusive renunciation of armed means of resolving the conflict in the Chechen Republic, elections will be held and, as a result of them, legitimate organs of state power capable of representing the whole population of the

Chechen Republic, including representing it in relations with the federal authorities, will be set up.

The official Russian Federation document regards the holding of elections in the Chechen Republic and the formation of its government as its **own** measures and continues to back solely the government of national accord under the leadership of S. Khadzhiyev, which is unlikely in reality to lead to national accord.

On the whole, the "List of Measures..." is yet another statement of the current situation and further confirmation of **the immutability of the coercive policy** pursued by the Russian Federation leadership in Chechnya. The Russian Federation government's list of measures includes, for example: "the seizure and destruction of heavy arms, the removal and disbandment of major illegal armed formations," "the control of strategically important positions," "the seizure of weapons from the population," and so forth. But what have the federal troops been doing since December last except that?

The war goes on. It must be stopped. And it is the civic duty of the leaders of the sides in conflict to embark on the search for sensible compromises, putting their political and personal ambitions to one side.

Government Issues Statement on Chechen Situation

LD2903184395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1812 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—The press service of the Russian Government issued the following statement on Wednesday [29 March]:

"According to reports from the mobile information centre, the Federal armed forces completely encircled the towns of Gudermes and Shali and started disarming illegal armed groups in them. As a result of these measures, 12 hostages were freed, five of whom were taken to Mozdok.

"The number of settlements in the Chechen Republic, where representatives of the clergy and authorities enter into an active dialogue with the commanders of military units in order to avoid the destruction of the settlements, continues to grow. Among them are the settlements of Alkhan Yurt, Kulary, Urus-martan, Alkhan Kala and others.

"Confrontation between militants and the residents of Shaami Yurt, who demand that Dudayev's supporters leave their villages, grows. At their meeting the villagers decided not to allow the militants to enter their villages and not to provide them with food.

"Interior Ministry troops continued to disarm illegal armed groups in western districts and intelligence and search operations in the areas under their control. They also strengthened the defences of facilities and districts in the towns of Groznyy and Argun, confiscate weapons from the population, create the conditions for normal operation of bodies of state power and self-government and commandant's offices, as well as to block possible routes of movement of militants.

"Today, the leaders of the federal and executive bodies of power in the Chechen Republic held their first joint press conference in Groznyy.

"Nikolay Semenov, head of the territorial administration, said that the complex political and economic situation in the Chechen Republic can be remedied only by joint efforts of the federal and local bodies of power. He also stressed the importance of an intra-Chechen dialogue. In his words, economic problems caused by the three years of Dudayev's rule are a top priority. At present, in Groznyy alone there are 1,300 pieces of hardware and 172,000 residents.

"Semenov also emphasised that the attitude of the people has changed in the republic, although the conflicts have not ended yet. Speaking about elections, he said that it is too early to speak about them, but just the right time to think about them.

"Also speaking at the press conference was Umar Avtukhanov, chairman of the Committee for National Accord of the Chechen Republic, who said that the committee monitors the check points and filtration centres and has begun work on a law on elections in the republic.

"Salambek Khadzhiyev, chairman of the Government of National Revival of the Chechen Republic, talked about the major problems connected with the restoration of the economy. He said that the Chechen people should be divided not by political views or likings, but by the profession."

Kulikov: Last Strongholds Will Fall Soon

LD2903182795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1740 GMT 29 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Mikhail Shevstov and Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok March 29 (TASS)—The last Chechen strongholds, the towns of Gudermes and Shali, will be taken by federal troops within the next few days without serious destruction, Colonel-General Anatoliy Kulikov, chief coordinator of the military operation in Chechnya, told ITAR-TASS on Wednesday [29 March].

The general confirmed that both towns have been completely surrounded by federal troops.

He also said that after the operation has been completed, the Russian armed forces will control about 80 percent of the republic's territory.

Kulikov said that illegal armed groups in Shali and Gudermes have sustained heavy losses and have lost practically all their heavy weapons and hardware. As of 23:00 March 28, six Russian troops were killed and 17 wounded.

According to Kulikov, since the beginning of the operation in Chechnya, 1,426 Russian soldiers were killed and 4,630 wounded. In addition, 96 people are still being held hostage. On Wednesday, Russian counterintelligence officers freed five hostages, he said.

The situation near the settlement of Samashki, in the southwest of Chechnya, remains tense, Kulikov said. He pointed out that Russian troops have so far refrained from using heavy artillery against the settlements of that region where the militants are believed to be staying.

Russian military commanders have been trying to persuade Chechen elders to use their influence with the militants to force them out of the villages. At the same time, Kulikov warned that if provocations against Russian troops continue, they will take "adequate measures."

However, the general assured that "there will be no partisan war in Chechnya." At the same time, he did not rule out the possibility that about 800 militants, former prisoners who have nothing to lose, will try to continue acts of terrorism and sabotage in Chechnya in the future.

Kulikov said that Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev's influence on the situation in Chechnya "was not felt" in the past 7-8 days. He added that he "does not have information about his whereabouts.

Kulikov Sees No Prospect of Guerrilla War

MK3003081095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 30 Mar 95 p 2

[Report from Mozdok by Yuriy Golotyuk under the "Chechnya" rubric: "Colonel General Anatoliy Kulikov: The So-Called Dudayev Army Has Been Crushed. A Chechen Guerrilla War Has Not Yet Materialized"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The federal troops completed their operation aimed at surrounding the towns of Shali and Gudermes—the last large pocket of resistance of the Dudayev formations in eastern Chechnya—by yesterday evening. Colonel General Anatoliy Kulikov, commander of the joint group of forces in Chechnya, told your SEGODNYA correspondent in Mozdok yesterday that "despite pockets of fierce resistance one may say that the so-called Dudayev army has been crushed:" heavy equipment it had in service has been destroyed, its rear reserves are nonexistent. By Gen. Kulikov's estimate, after the Gudermes and Shali groups are crushed, the federal forces will control 80-85 percent of Chechen territory. In the general's view, the definitive seizure of Gudermes and Shali is a matter of two or three days or, maybe, a week. The Army is trying to minimize its losses. So far, according to the military, the Shali-Gudermes operation has cost the Russian Army six men killed and 17 wounded. Col. Gen. Anatoliy Kulikov said the stage of large-scale military operations in Chechnya is drawing to a close. By the end of spring the situation in the conflict area will enter a "languid phase." Answering a question asked by your SEGODNYA correspondent, Gen. Kulikov doubted the prospects for a guerrilla war in Chechnya. "A Chechen guerrilla war, if it is seen as a people's war, has not materialized," the general said. Guerrilla war methods, terrorist acts, and sabotage will continue to be employed by the Chechens, who, as Gen. Kulikov put it, have nothing to lose. According to the federal troops' intelligence service, as of today there are about 800 such people.

Also yesterday, the military counterintelligence service carried out a successful operation to liberate a group of Russian servicemen held prisoner by the Chechens. A few privates and sergeants have already been moved to Mozdok. Another seven former POW's are expected to arrive in Mozdok today.

Federal Troops Capture Gudermes 'Without Losses'

LD3003143295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1345 GMT 30 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 30 Mar—Today at 1700 Moscow time [1300 GMT] federal troops captured the town of Gudermes (Chechen Republic) without losses or damage. Oleg Soskovets, first deputy prime minister of the Russian Government, reported this, citing a telephone dispatch from Anatoliy Kulikov, the commander of the joint group of federal forces in Chechnya. Soskovets reported the capture of Gudermes at a meeting of the state commission for restoring Chechnya's economy and social sphere.

LDPR Coordinator for Urals Ousted

954F1779A Yekaterinburg URALSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 4 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by G. Kayota: "The Parties That We Choose"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Bolivar Has Become Unnecessary

The conference was over. The hall watched as at the presidium, newly elected members of the oblast coordinating council hotly discussed the candidacy of the new coordinator.

While the previous one stood off to the side, by the wall, as if pressed there by an incident that had occurred. He somehow detachedly listened to his female supporter, glancing at the people sitting in the audience, those whom he had "borne and raised." What he was thinking about, I do not know, but I immediately recalled June 1991, a rally at the "Cosmos," the stirring speech of the never-before-seen Vladimir Volfovich. After it, someone yelled out, "How can one join your party?" To which the orator, not skipping a beat, decided: "Consider yourself a member from this minute onward, and tomorrow you will receive an office in the oblast executive committee building."

That is how, with lightening speed, a former technical service captain, the Afghan veteran Vyacheslav Senko became an authorized representative of the chairman of the Liberal-Democratic Party in the Urals and in Western Siberia—to be more precise, the coordinator. But before coordinating, a party organization had to be created. Senko, who was registered in Yelan, abandoning his family, posted himself to the oblast center, lived where he had to, and fed on the ideas of Vladimir Volfovich alone. Naturally, no one dreamed about giving him an office in the White House, and any petitions to grant him an office were shelved. Little by little, the coordinator accumulated supporters, but most of all, he gained a reputation in the power, social, and journalistic circles for his immoderate bull-headedness, ubiquitousness, and utter sociability. Whatever the day of the week, Senko was making calls. Whatever the political event you went to, he was there. One's head spun from his own press conferences. Truly, none of the oblast's other party leaders could compare to him in activity and capacity for work. And it seems to me that not a single journalist remained offended at him: More than enough occasions for criticism and mischief arose. Not possessed of political subtlety, Vyacheslav Igoryevich impetuously opened his heart before the likes of our "rancorous" selves, and to no less an extent tried to amaze us with his erudition and philosophical thought.

But it was not the journalists who clung to the LDPR coordinator. In proportion to the growth of Zhirinovskiy's fame, an attraction to Senko grew on the part of all kinds of people, from those barely literate to doctors of science. Advisers of high academic rank appeared by him after the creation of the Homeland patriotic association, in which the LDPR joined with several parties and movements, and at the head of everything stood Vyacheslav Igoryevich. His title broadened, and at all sorts of events it sounded "stronger" than those of the rest. However, his image did not bring him the desired dividends at the local and Russian elections.

By the way, I was surprised when I saw on the party list for the elections to the Federal Assembly of 12 December 1993 the name of the Urals coordinator "in the back seat"—after all, he had constantly asserted his faithfulness and closeness to Vladimir Volfovich. To my question about this, Vyacheslav Igoryevich's reaction was sanguine: Zhirinovskiy promised me a deputy position at the next elections.

The coordinator did not lose heart, stressing repeatedly that he worked for the party without compensation, living on a military pension. "Can it be that Vladimir Volfovich does not throw anything extra your way?" I tried to find out. "Not a kopek," he asserted. "But where does the two-room party office come from, and your own newspaper, and finally, the refreshments for the journalists?" "Assistance from businessmen." Whether this is so or not, Senko did more for his party organization than any other leader of any other oblast party organization. And then, up yours, the conference declares his activity unsatisfactory, and not a single delegate proposes his name even as a member of the oblast coordinating council, not to mention the position of coordinator.

I go up to the aloof Vyacheslav Igoryevich and without any malice ask:

"Does this mean that Bolivar has become unnecessary?"

Senko reacts without taking offense:

"Nonsense, these are apparat intrigues. I will go to Vladimir Volfovich; he decides everything, not the apparat."

Bolivar, Know Your Place!

It is hard to argue with the fact that Vladimir Volfovich decides everything. As the LDPR Rules dictate, "during the period between congresses, the supreme organ is the Chairman of the party and the Supreme Soviet." It would not cost the Chairman much to pronounce a "veto" on the decision of the conference of the North Urals Conference [as published], especially since it was conducted in violation of the requirements of the rules, with regard to time, form of conduct, and number of participants in the voting. However, the hopes cherished by Vyacheslav Igoryevich are unlikely.

A. Shemyakin, head of the LDPR central apparat, who participated in the work of the conference, did not say a single kind word about the first Urals Zhirinovskiyite. True, he did not criticize him directly, either, in general noting "the serious inadequacies and violations discrediting the party."

Senko has overstepped the bounds of "liberal democracy." What leader could be pleased that someone was competing with him, even at the local level? And Vyacheslav Igoryevich had everywhere asserted that he was a Zhirinovskiy on the Urals scale, and then he declared that he was a spiritual preceptor of the LDPR. There was more further on. Quotations from the "brilliant" thoughts of the leader gave way to postulates from the Bible; an icon occupied the sacred corner at headquarters, and together with the oblast organization's "spiritual adviser," A. Minakov, the coordinator sent the chairman of the party a proposal on the necessity of changing the rules in favor of religion.

Having "lulled God to sleep," Senko hooked up with "unclean forces." Suddenly his deputy became a certain S. Kukurin, advertised as "the director of the time laboratory." Vyacheslav Igoryevich hastened to support his idea to create under the LDPR a "Russian Scientific-Research Laboratory of Anomalous Phenomena and Extraterrestrial Civilizations," with which he wished to make his leader happy. During one of his visits to Moscow, he, together with Kukurin, handed V.V.Zh. a test tube with an "extraterrestrial substance"; Zhirinovskiy, in Senko's words, threw it in his desk. But since the chairman did not object to the innovation, the "laboratory" began to unfurl its activity. In the beginning of January of this year, it published a STRANNAYA GAZETA (STRANGE NEWSPAPER), with a "global sensation" in the spirit of the moods of the leader of the party. Under the headline, "1995—A Year of Reflections" was a map of the world... without North America, and beside it, in big letters, the dictum of time laboratory director S. Kukurin: "We are giving the Americans a chance to survive. Over the course of one year, they must change their policy and stop ruining Russia. If this does not occur, then their contingent will be completely destroyed!" There's a good-bye [previous word in English, transliterated] for you. President Clinton should not only prohibit the entry into the country of the chairman of the LDPR State Duma faction, but should also take preventative measures.

It would be funny to read and listen to the inventor of the "new theory of time," to whom "the mechanisms of the launching of global catastrophes are known," but after all, it was seriously supported by the doctor of philosophical sciences L. Klenov, another former deputy of Senko's. Moreover, the head of the party's central apparat, speaking at the above-mentioned conference, said, "There is little scientific content in it, although perhaps we do not understand."

The authors of the "information report" communicated to the editorial board state: Coordinator of the oblast organization V. Senko and his deputies S. Kukurin and L. Klenov, "in the opinion of rank-and-file party members and of the Moscow leadership, tolerated actions that are incompatible with the Program and Rules of the LDPR, and came out in the mass information media with declarations compromising to the party about the creation of a fantastic laboratory of 'time,' with contacts with extraterrestrial civilizations, and with God himself; have published several issues of STRANNAYA GAZETA, which not only bears no relation to the party, but, moreover, discredits the liberal-democrats with its absurd fabrications; have published the book 'The Russian Question,' which is discourteous with respect to V.V. Zhirinovskiy...." On the other hand, Vyacheslav Igoryevich declares, "Vladimir Volfovich liked the book 'The Russian Question' very much; only the apparat was against it."

Senko Is No Bolivar

The time has come to ask why I turn to the image of Bolivar—the horse from the O. Henry novella "The Roads That We Choose." He was prompted by Senko himself. At his last meeting with journalists before the conference, he announced as much: "I am no Bolivar, to carry everyone." From further explication, it transpired that he could in fact carry out this role further, but not for free. In his words, many LDPR coordinators receive the salary of aides to State Duma deputies from Zhirinovskiy's faction, and one of these—Ivanov—was commissioned by Vladimir Volfovich to take Senko. Ivanov addressed a paper to the name of the head of administration of Sverdlovsk Oblast, with the request to draw up the appropriate document, and the Urals coordinator himself was presented with solid certification as a deputy's aide. When the inspired Senko appeared at the oblast administration, there he was shown another letter by the deputy Ivanov: not to conclude the agreement with the previously recommended candidacy.

"If this question is not resolved before the conference, I will suspend my membership in the party," Vyacheslav Igoryevich told us.

However, as it seems to me, the given question was not the main one in the fate of the coordinator, for he spoke more about something else. About a conspiracy with the aim of seizing power in the oblast party organization: "There have been attempts at the removal by any means (up to and including the physical!) of true members of the LDPR. A. vanished from Bogdanovich; B. fled Kamensk-Uralskiy from terrorists; and K. does not make any contact from Artemovskiy because of pressure from known persons. There have threats of physical reprisals with respect to Senko."

Who can it be who is terrorizing the Urals Zhirinovskiyites? The coordinator answered: "Someone." ???

To tell the truth, my suspicion fell at that time upon S. Kukurin and L. Klenov. It was they who, in the absence of Senko, put together the press conference, where they spoke murkily about their leader, about the condition of his health, from which it became clear: Power had changed hands.

At the report-electoral conference, I did not see the one nor the other and then and there established the true conspirators in the person of the main dramatis personae of the Yekaterinburg city organization. Contrary to the rules, the oblast coordinator was seated in the back rows of the presidium, and the conduct of the conference was taken upon themselves by "former helicopter commander" K. Levinskiy and State Duma deputy aide N. Filyushchenko. They requested that Senko's report be made a bit shorter, and then they reprimanded him for "leader-mania," "conceit," "willfulness," "the breakdown of the organization," and so on. The coordinator's attempts to respond to the criticism were cut short after two minutes. E. Petrova, a "veteran of the party," rushed to resist. Upon hearing that there was not a single "veteran" among the nominations advanced for the coordination council, she railed even from her seat—what did I run around in the cold for with the party banner, when everyone was sitting warm inside. From the back rows was heard, "That will do, everyone has been patient with you long enough."

The Party Is Held Up By the Bolivars

Yes, if it were not for the Bolivars, there would not be a single party. On their backs they carry riders, whether good or bad, to the pinnacles of power. This is how it is done throughout the whole world. But since we started talking about the LDPR, we will stay with it, or rather, with its North Urals organization, in which somehow or other, as in a mirror image, the life of Zhirinovskiyites is reflected.

For three years I never succeeded in ascertaining its exact numerical strength; I thought they were concealing it on purpose. But no. As was revealed at the conference, no one—from the central committee to the city committee—knows how many party members they have. Three figures were heard: about 395, about 700, about 1,000. The last was named by V. Senko, trying to stress the fulfillment of the "specific instructions of Vladimir Volfovich" to have in every oblast by 1 January 1995 no fewer than 1,000 members.

The reason for such "stuff and nonsense" is the yearning of the supreme leadership of the LDPR to knock together in a compressed time period a mass organization. To become a Zhirinovskiyite is simpler than simple: Buy any issue of PRAVDA ZHIRINOVSKOGO, fill out the declaration and application form offered therein, and send it to the address of the central committee, together with two photographs and R500. And a membership card is guaranteed you. As for dues, they should be sent to the same place, to the name of V. Zhirinovskiy.

Thus have many of our countrymen done. In Nevyansk I was told that all of the city's upper-grade students had obtained party membership cards in this way. Perhaps this is a joke, but no one takes exception to the fact that many of the oblast's residents have acquired the document for the signature of V.V.Zh., for the sake of collection. In Kamensk-Uralskiy, for example, a considerable party organization must function; however, it appears only on the central committee lists. At the conference, the roll call of delegates from Kachkanar lasted a long time, but no one answered. Of the almost 200 Yekaterinburg Zhirinovskiyites invited to the conference, I do not know how many appeared, although I can make a guess based on the fact that in its work slightly more than 100 participated from the whole oblast.

Probably, some people are attracted into the LDPR by its ideas, but the majority, it seems, are fascinated by the figure of its leader. And the leader desires to have as many "subjects" as possible. In order at any moment to send them out as collectors of signatures for his nomination as a candidate for president of the Russian Federation, and his comrades-in-arms—as State Duma deputies. Before the elections, they become party agitators. "We," A. Shemyakin, head of the central apparat, said at the conference, "must at the next elections receive twice as many votes as at the last ones." Naturally, no lesser victory must be achieved at the elections to the local organs of government. And then all power will be transferred to the LDPR, and a little piece of it will be broken off for the most active Zhirinovskiyites. Someone, probably, dreams of such a thing, but I think back on the resentment of E. Petrova. Bolivar will be left with nothing but the banner in the cold. For power, a Shark Dodson will be found.

I am sure that my article will be perceived in LDPR circles as antiparty. That is for you to decide. I only wanted to share my observations with our readers. How to view this party is their business, but they should know about the life of the parties that they choose.

Police Official on Mafia Activity in Irkutsk

954F1834A Irkutsk VOSTOCHNO-SIBIRSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 2

[Interview with colonel of police Aleksandr Balashov by journalist Anatoliy Malyshev; place and date not given: "Kingpin Mecca"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The East Siberian Regional Office for the Fight Against Organized Crime is one of eight such centers operating on the territory of Russia. And the fact that the RUOP [Regional Office for the Fight Against Organized Crime] is located in Irkutsk is by no means fortuitous. East Siberia is rich in raw material and hydropower resources and is particularly attractive, therefore, to foreign investors. "And where there is money, there is crime," police colonel Aleksandr Balashov, acting chief of the East Siberia Regional Office for the Fight Against Organized Crime, opined. Another specific feature of Irkutsk Oblast is reflected in addition to this: the high concentration of correctional labor institutions and also the sole covered prison of its kind in Tulun, where all crime kingpins and persons who have committed the most heinous crimes are sent. It attracts criminal elements like a magnet.*

[Malyshev] You, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, have just spoken about crime kingpins. But there is another viewpoint also: There are no crime kingpins, they have been created by the press and police officers.

[Balashov] The crime kingpins emerged in the period 1918-1920, when the ruling class of tsarist Russia, well-bred people, generally, possessing an organizer's capabilities, ended up in places of confinement. They formed their own clans.

Subsequently, criminals availed themselves of this experience. Over the years they formulated their own rules, their own code of honor. A certain lull in the criminal movement was observed at the end of the fifties. This was connected primarily with the strong repressive measures. At the end of the seventies and the start of the eighties the influence of the clan aspect on the criminal environment was negligible. It flourished much later and was connected with the change in the economic situation.

But we can now speak of the existence of a criminal fraternity. The crime bosses collect money and create a "pot" for maintaining the material well-being of their brethren who are at liberty and also those doing time in correctional labor camps and prisons.

It is significant that whereas earlier the kingpins would make do with purely criminal matters, in the main—robberies, robbery with violence, larceny, and so forth—they have begun as of late to penetrate the economy. There is practically no commercial structure today that they have not gotten on top of. It is one thing when criminal groupings take tribute; when they create their own firms and companies, begin to extort raw material resources, and drive currency resources overseas, it is another. These are irreparable losses.

[Malyshev] But many people are saying that the crime bosses have left the Siberian expanses and are now getting fat in Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Baltic, Belarus, and abroad, even.

[Balashov] Criminals cling to money. And money circulates, as we all know, in capital cities. But the crime bosses left by no means in order to calmly look on from afar, but to direct their movement.

The facts: Various showdowns, encounters, and killings, testify to this. Last year a crime kingpin, alias Pata, was executed in the oblast center. This was the first assassination of a crime boss in our oblast. A further kingpin, alias Balda, was executed this October. All the examples that I have cited indicate that a constant power struggle and rivalry for spheres of influence are under way among the criminal groupings.

The operational situation is being seriously complicated here by ethnic formations based on area associations. Nine such groupings, which operate chiefly on the territory of the cities of Irkutsk, Angarsk, and Usolye-Sibirskoye, have been uncovered in the oblast. Each of them has a distinctly expressed specialization. The sum total of money illegally gotten by organized criminal groupings in the current year is put at over R30 billion. Criminals control over 600 state and commercial structures, a number of commercial banks, and all the markets. According to available information, 167 organized criminal groupings are laundering funds obtained illegally, and 53 of these have formed their own legal structures for this purpose.

[Malyshev] A little more than a month ago the Public Opinion Foundation conducted an all-Russian poll of the urban and rural population. Russians were asked: "If you had to choose between a lowering of the level of crime and the preservation of democratic rights and liberties, which would you prefer?" And 74 percent of respondents cited a lowering of crime. This testifies to the serious concern of the inhabitants of Russia. Would it not be better in this situation to return to the stricter, more repressive measures of the fifties, which you have already mentioned?

[Balashov] The law has to be strict. And it must be respected. But with us, either the appropriate law is absent or it is not observed. Just recently a criminal group took six-year-old Sasha Klevtsov hostage. What efforts it cost us to free him. But there were no such crimes earlier. And this is happening because there is no corresponding law.

The same may be said about the kingpin, alias Murash. Three times he has been arrested—once with a grenade, once with a pistol. And three times he has been released. What does this indicate? Primarily that criminals feel that they can operate with impunity.

[Malyshev] A recent issue of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY carried an interesting report to the effect that one out of every seven gangs was being helped to commit crimes by bribed government officials. From 30 to 50 percent of the income obtained from racketeering, financial swindles, fraud, robberies, robberies with violence, and legal business is spent on bribing officials of various levels. What do you think, do these figures correspond to reality with regard to our region?

[Balashov] We are getting information on the development of corruption in the oblast. It has gained a certain prevalence in the structures of power and administration, particularly those connected with the solution of questions of financing, the registration of commercial structures, and privatization.

As of today, 15.1 percent of organized criminal groups are taking advantage of corrupt connections, in the law enforcement authorities included. Operational data testifies that over 500 million rubles [R] have been spent on the bribery of officials. According to expert assessments, however, approximately 2 percent of all organized crime income is spent to this end.

[Malyshev] And one further quotation from ARGUMENTY I FAKTY: "Crimes in the sphere of the economy, the basis of which is the corruption of 'important and not all that important' government officials, have led to $50 billion to $100 billion, it is variously estimated, having been removed from the country since 1990." How does our region appear in this respect?

[Balashov] Were I to say that this is not happening in the oblast, you would not believe me. And you would be right. How many commercial structures here formerly obtained a duty-free quota for the exportation of raw material overseas in the expectation that foodstuffs for the same amount would be imported. But some acted differently. They exported the raw material and obtained the foreign currency and appropriated it, but simply never brought commodities into the region.

I would term very serious in this connection the case of the Chernyy brothers, which is being investigated in Bratsk by the Procurator's Office of Russia. There are similar instances in Irkutsk, Angarsk, and Baykalsk also.

[Malyshev] There was a discussion in the State Duma in mid-November of drafts of a new legislative act on the fight against organized crime. Despite the complexities, the law was, for all that, adopted in its first reading. What do you think, is this what you professionals need?

[Balashov] I am familiar with two alternative drafts of this law. Both have pluses and minuses. We shall wait for the completed law. But it will not resolve all problems. We still have no law on corruption, unfortunately. It also was considered by the State Duma and adopted, but the Federation Council rejected it because it was not tied in with another law on public service. You see the kind of chain that results. One is hooked up to another. In this situation the adoption of a package or code of laws is essential.

[Malyshev] There is talk about the regional offices for the fight against organized crime being closed down. What can you say in this connection? Have the RUOP's found a place for themselves in the system of the law enforcement authorities?

[Balashov] It is not a question of the closure but of the conversion of the regional offices into a federal service. We are under a dual jurisdiction at this time. As far as the second part of the question is concerned: Whether we have or have not found for ourselves a place in the system of law enforcement authorities, I can say that criminals fear only strength. And the strength thus far is on our side.

Novosibirsk Oblast's Procurator on Listyev's Murder

954F1891A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 22 Mar 95 p 5

["Exclusive" interview with Novosibirsk Oblast Procurator Vladimir Tokarev by VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK correspondent Irina Timofeyeva; place and date not given: "Trench Warfare..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"The murder of Vladimir Listyev demonstrated the law enforcement organs' impotence in suppressing organized crime. The current rate of solving contract murders is 5 percent. But if we look at the correlation of forces, this is a logical result. On one side are powerful crime groups, which exist among other things in the form of legal security services, which have their own intelligence departments. They quite professionally recruit their agents in law enforcement organs. And on the other side is the precinct policeman with primitive equipment and just as poorly equipped departments for combating organized crime. Since crime has changed dramatically with the rise of private initiative, methods of combating it need to be dramatically improved... The score-settling around Ostankino is just the beginning. Oil sales revenue of so-called special exporters approaches $5 billion a year due to differences in domestic and world prices. And these mind- boggling privileges are based on violence and bribery of government bureaucrats. These will be 50 times tougher than those doing business around Ostankino. Such criminal associations are capable of influencing decisions of state organs through their people. We cannot count on the police to rein them in. Only reforming at least the part of the law enforcement organs whose task is to combat organized crime can bring about positive changes..."*

I quote almost unabridged a letter to the editors from fellow city resident Viktor Ivlev. One can dispute some of his contentions and figures. For instance, the institution of special exporters was recently rescinded by presidential edict. The important point, however, is that the author's reasoning reflects the concern in society. I showed this letter to Novosibirsk Oblast Procurator Vladimir Vasilyevich Tokarev. He returned from the General Procuracy of Russia's collegium and was in Moscow on the day the television journalist was killed. This is where our conversation began.

[Timofeyeva] Vladimir Vasilyevich, according to the latest data in newspapers, more than 1,800 murders were committed in Moscow last year, and more than half of them have not been solved. What is the situation in our oblast?

[Tokarev] More than 500 murders and attempted murders, 50 of which have not been solved—these are the figures for last year. Over two months of the current year—46 murders, seven not solved. In terms of solving crime, as you can see, we are not at the bottom, but this does not make things any easier. Solving so-called contract murders—although the Criminal Code does not contain such a definition—is incredibly difficult. Their cause, as everybody realizes now, is big—and not always honest—money. We are living through a period of transition to a different socioeconomic formation, a redistribution of property, which dramatically changes the criminal situation. It is meaningless to blame the police and the procuracy for this. No global tasks were set at the collegium, as it used to be in the past: The emphasis was on directing every effort at maximum reduction of the criminal world's pressure on individual.

The acting general procurator's directive for the first time concentrates close attention on protection of victims' rights. The second item says: "...take all necessary measures to restore violated rights, redress moral and material damage, and ensure the victim's personal safety and that of his family members and close relatives."

[Timofeyeva] We have always started with the accused, God forbid their rights should be violated. While the claimant, the victim, was frequently ignored, if not worse, in particular by the police. Will this stop now?

[Tokarev] This is what the directive says, and it is our duty to carry it out. Although for objectivity's sake I would like to point out that it contains equally strict requirements regarding protection of the rights of persons charged with crimes. As to oversight of the legality of police activities, last year's figures are these. Procurators issued 452 notices to investigation and inquiry organs; 356 police personnel were disciplined. Also, almost 700 decisions to close criminal cases or suspend the investigation were reversed.

[Timofeyeva] Let us go back to contract murders. Depending on the source, between 2 and 5 percent of contract murders in the United States are solved. It follows that the quality of organization of criminal structures both there and here is higher than that of the law enforcement organs. Does not this support the contention of the letter's author?

[Tokarev] I will not argue because we have nothing to boast about. We believe that last year there were seven such murders in the oblast, and two more this year. There are more or less realistic versions. But I do not want to promise anything in advance. In one case there is a known suspect, and in another the executor apparently has been identified and put on a wanted list. In keeping with the edict on protection from banditism, we in the procuracy are working along two lines. First, on concrete cases with police operative groups. Second, we had to draft methodological instructions and help investigators, that is, what they should pay attention to in proving banditism or organized crime. You know how poor, overall, the investigative corps is. In carrying out oversight, our experienced personnel see how small shortcomings can nullify serious work.

[Timofeyeva] Murders and organized crime are closely interconnected. Since the summer, when the edict came out, we have learned how many groups have been identified and put on the operational watch list...

[Tokarev] Statistics are figures, which are put on paper. I cannot rule out the possibility of figures being juggled. In the procuracy, on the other hand, we are used to talking in concrete language. Over the past year, 17 criminal cases on organized criminal groups were referred to the courts. But there is a great distance from operational watch to court sentence. Take the case on the assassination attempt on Sabotinskaya and you will understand how difficult it is to prove. Not only are the accomplices on the run in this case. There was not enough objective evidence. The basis of proof rested to a large extent on subjective testimony. And the charges started to come unglued in court. Criminals are becoming more cunning. Essentially, what is going on between society and the criminal world is "trench warfare." I guess the courts will also have to learn to work with circumstantial evidence, which is indeed unfamiliar and difficult. It is not accidental that the draft law "On Organized Crime" says that such cases should be handled by judges specializing in such things.

[Timofeyeva] This means that what is acceptable as proof of a thief's guilt is not always applicable to a criminal group member. Over the past weeks, after Listyev's murder, there has been a great deal of talk about the criminalization of society and the authorities and the need for tougher measures. Opinions differ. Do you believe that all means are acceptable in achieving a goal?

[Tokarev] It is a waste of effort to pose such a question to a procurator. Legality is above everything. The courts are sufficiently independent now. Attorneys are working more astutely and more actively. The investigation process needs to catch up. And we need to strengthen oversight. Today a case that has not been properly investigated will simply not pass in court. The acting general procurator's instruction obliges us to check once a month on how citizens' complaints to the police are registered, and to analyze quarterly the application of measures to secure the appearance of the accused. This was done in the past as well. Another excerpt from the instruction. Some criminal cases used to be closed and referred for handling to the community. Everybody knows where it is now. Now the police first have to ascertain whether there is a realistic possibility of such community involvement, and only then close the case. And we will monitor it. The instruction emphasized another serious point. Now persons may be kept in detention just on grounds of the public danger of the action, under certain articles enumerated in the Criminal Process Code. No characteristics of place of residence or petitions will help if a dangerous crime has been committed.

[Timofeyeva] You mentioned the draft law on organized crime recently adopted by the State Duma in the first reading. It is a well-known fact that our legal acts hopelessly lag behind. God willing, the new law will be passed soon. Will it help?

[Tokarev] Of all the drafts, this one is probably the most acceptable. As the role of operational-investigative measures becomes elevated, the need for legality increases. There is, for instance, a much needed article on protection of witnesses, victims, experts, witnesses to a search, and other persons. Their data (name, address, etc.) are entered in a special protocol, which is not included in the materials made available to the attorney or the accused. Interrogation of such persons and personal encounters may be conducted while maintaining their anonymity. But this is all still in a draft. The law by itself is not going to solve the problem. We need to learn to work in accordance with it, and fast. A law on tax crimes had been adopted. But there have been only slightly more than 140 such criminal cases over the whole year...

Our conversation with V.V. Tokarev did not end on an optimistic note. On the other hand, it probably would be strange if it did...

Murmansk Political Parties' Activity Eyed

954F1737A Murmansk POLYARNAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Feb 95 p 2

[Interview with S.N. Popov, adviser to the head of the oblast administration for interaction with public organizations, by Ye. Denisenko; place and date not given: "Three Russians—A Party Cell?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Remember the political euphoria of the start of the 1990's? A demonstrating people strolled through squares and public gardens, the government permitted itself to be abused, and the appearance of each new party, an alternative to the "united and unshakable" CPSU, was perceived as a personal gift. The wave of political euphoria subsided. The people's leaders changed their democratic jeans for the customary "three-piece" and headed from the squares into parliament. And**

although, as before, there are more parties by the month, the interest in them is increasingly less. It is hardly likely that the people of Murmansk know precisely what kind of parties, movements, and political organizations are registered in our oblast today. And what has happened to the Democratic Union and Democratic Russia, whose "hooligan" actions used to be breath-taking? Which parties are among the leaders now?

This was the subject of our discussion with Sergey Nikolayevich Popov, adviser to the head of the oblast administration for interaction with public organizations. Having warned that he could be subjective in some respects—he himself has been a member of the Republican Party of the Russian Federation for four years now—Sergey Nikolayevich set out "shelf by shelf" the history of the oblast's party life.

Stage one—"intoxication with freedom."

At the very start of the 1990's the people went to demonstrations and declared their disagreement with the party's "general line." Four party organizations appeared in our oblast: the Democratic Party of Russia, which denied the CPSU's very right to exist, the Apatity and Murmansk organizations of the Social Democratic Party of Russia, fascinated by the "Swedish model" of socialism, and the Republican Party of the Russian Federation founded on the base of the Democratic Platform that had emerged from the Communist Party.

The favorites of the moment in the country and in Murmansk were the democrats: In its heyday the Democratic Russia movement had 200 members in the oblast. What is characteristic is that both the Democratic Party of Russia and Democratic Russia assembled beneath their banners not associates bound by a common idea but fighters against a common "enemy." One of the principal tasks inserted in their program documents had an aggressive ring—struggle against the CPSU.

Stage two—disintegration of the CPSU.

After August 1991 the Communist Party was banned "from above" and experienced a mass exodus "from below." CPSU membership no longer produced dividends. But the most loyal Marxists gave birth to new parties of a communist persuasion. The most radical members of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation came together in the Socialist Choice movement. The extreme radical Russian Communist Workers Party and the All-Russia Communist Party of Bolsheviks appeared beneath its banner and exist currently, managing successfully without registration in the "center" or the oblast. But there are also communists who are more loyal to the authorities. The Murmansk organization of the Socialist Workers Party, not having manifested itself with us in the least, registered in 1992 at the federal level. After the government "recanted," the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the sole officially operative party of those of a communist persuasion, reappeared in Murmansk Oblast.

Stage three—creation of parties "adapted to the leader."

The impetus for the start of this were the 1993 fall elections. A number of associations which had the structure of a party and which had been formed exclusively for the elections appeared. Movements became parties for the sole purpose of bringing a perfectly specific personality to power. The political passions of the capital were played out at the regional level also. Local organizations of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (Zhirinovskiy), the Economic Freedom Party (Borovoy), the Free Russia People's Party (Rutskoy), and so forth appeared here. It is interesting that the same thing happened at the local level also. For example, the Murmansk "Rutskoyites" grouped around V. Mamayev—a colorful political figure. After his departure, the party organization practically ceased to exist.

Every conceivable movement and union: of women, officers, Cossacks, the youth, in support of local government, and so forth, blossomed profusely at this time. At this same time, however, Democratic Russia—formerly a very ponderable political force of the oblast—broke up into its constituent parts. Some people attached themselves to the newly formed parties: Russia's Democratic Choice and the Democratic Party, some began to form committees, and some formed small businesses.

So, nine parties and approximately the same number of movements have been registered officially in the oblast. Is this few or many? In Russia as a whole there are now 20 movements and approximately 60 political parties. And this is not the limit: The miniature Netherlands permits itself 70 different parties.

[Denisenko] This, Sergey Nikolayevich, is about what we have. Now, if you will, tell us about what we do not have: There is no Beer Lovers Party?

[Popov] No. All these associations of bathhouse attendants, beer lovers, or Russian meatballs fans are being formed for the purpose of discrediting political parties. Someone is financing them, incidentally. And the press takes advertising with pleasure.

[Denisenko] At the start of the 1990's there was the Democratic Union—an extremely radical organization, to put it no more strongly. Some anarchists appeared also. Where are they?

[Popov] We have no anarchists (officially). And thank God. The Democratic Union also has ceased to exist, never having registered—it ignored power on principle. Such parties should not have a future. It is necessary to play by the existing rules and act constitutionally in a state based on the rule of law. Nor are there in our emotionally "moderate" region any parties of a nationalist persuasion either, incidentally, which I find gratifying. Although in connection with the events in Chechnya a nationalist mood has come to be manifested at the state and the everyday level. Have you seen the inscription at Detskiy mir—"Murmansk for the Murmanskers"? It is not that innocent. There are, it is true, some politicians who are using the idea of statehood in a way that smacks of nationalism and chauvinism. You have probably seen newspapers of the Officers' Union? Or the idea of Comrade Troshin (leader of the local Social Democratic Party of Russia) concerning political privileges for those born in the North.

[Denisenko] What about clerical parties?

[Popov] None as yet. Although of the dozen faiths registered here, some have begun to enter into political activity. I cannot rule out their aspiring to representation in the organs of power.

[Denisenko] Sergey Nikolayevich, and which party is currently the biggest?

[Popov] A few figures, if you will: The oblast Communist Party of the Russian Federation organization has, according to my information, approximately 300 members. It is followed by the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia with roughly 100 members in the oblast and the social democrats, who have now broken up into three parts. A figure of 134 was cited recently. The remaining parties have under 100 members. But I do not consider the size the main criterion of the efficiency of a party's activity. How enormous the CPSU was! But it split up in literally a single day.

[Denisenko] What is for you the criterion of political weight?

[Popov] Parties' social and political activity. Not demonstrations, not statements and appeals but primarily participation in elections. For the main goal of each parliamentary party is to come to power constitutionally. Two parties—the Russian Communist Party and the Republican Party—have in past years taken part in all elections. It is these that I consider the most substantive politically, the rest have as yet appeared unprepared for the discharge of their main function or are reluctant to work.

[Denisenko] Why?

[Popov] Various reasons. The former favorites of the masses—the Democratic Party of Russia and Democratic Russia—have lost their former popularity. The mission—struggle against the CPSU—was accomplished. The Murmansk organization of the Democratic Party of Russia disbanded last year, Democratic Russia simply quietly disintegrated. The "Gaydarites" simply cannot get going in Murmansk. Even on Chechnya they have expressed no position officially. Although their federal leader—Gaydar—has spoken out very actively. Unfortunately, the disease of chiefism is still alive. The Social Democratic Party of Russia has broken up into three parts in a power struggle, and they are still settling their internal matters, and they have no strength left over for policy as such. A great pity.

[Denisenko] Who are now joining the parties—ardent followers of ideas? Those who like involvement in politics?

[Popov] These also. But mainly those to whom the fate of Russia is not a matter of indifference. Party membership produces no dividends at this time. If you tell someone that you are a member of a party, it is immediately thought that you are, consequently, a careerist. You are considered, at best, simply odd—involving yourself in "rubbish" instead of making money. To run at elections on a party ticket is virtually to lose in advance. Everyone in our oblast Duma is "nonparty," except for P. Sazhinov, who at the March elections ran as a nonparty person, it is true, but who has now restored his Communist Party of the Russian Federation membership. Yes, N. Vvedenskaya came from the Women's Union. I am sure that the rest are not indifferent politically either. As soon as the appropriate conditions for the enhanced role of the parties in society have been created, those who are "indifferent" to power will flock to them. I refer primarily to the law on political parties, which has yet to be adopted, although it has been indicated as being a priority. Second, a proportional (by party slate) or mixed system of elections, as in all democratic countries, our northern neighbors, for example, should be introduced.

[Denisenko] Yes, but there are so few of you members of various parties, no more than 1,000 in the oblast. What kind of privileges for you at elections does this represent?

[Popov] A candidate from a party is answerable if only to the organization that nominated him. To whom is a so-called "independent" candidate answerable? And is he that independent? On whose money has he fought his campaign? It is harder to buy a party than a "loner." In addition, there is the deceptive perception that an officer deputy will defend the interests of the military, a sailor, the interests of sailors, and so forth. Trade union leaders know, for example, everything about the law on the "norths." But legislation encompasses all walks of life. The best prepared and most committed people should be elected to the organs of power, therefore. And these, I repeat, are the ones who are today joining the parties.

Murmansk Nuclear Fleet Chief on Goals

954F1736A Murmansk MURMANSKIY VESTNIK in Russian 7 Feb 95 p 5

[Interview with Murmansk Nuclear Fleet Director Vyacheslav Ruksha by V. Blinov; place and date not given; under the rubric "1995 Horizons": "Can the Nuclear Fleet's Fate Define the Fate of the Arctic?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The past year will go down in the history of development of the Far North and Siberia as unique. The harshest climatic conditions of the summer arctic navigation over the past half-century, exacerbated by our economic chaos, which forced the extension of the deadline for shipping cargo to the eastern sector of the Arctic, resulted in all the tasks being accomplished and**

loss of the fleet trapped in the ice being avoided only thanks to nuclear icebreakers.

Several inarguable facts became abundantly clear. It is meaningless to divide the Arctic into east and west, because successful development of high latitudes can only be accomplished through close interaction between the enterprises and authorities of the northern and far eastern regions, which needs to be coordinated by the center. And most importantly, we should not expect a reliable future for cargo transport along the Northern Shipping Route without the Murmansk Steamship Line's nuclear icebreaker fleet.

Thus, the prospects of the current activities and development of the nuclear fleet have unequivocally become part of the strategy in the development of the Arctic. But alas, these prospects too are largely foggy against the background of the continuing production decline in Russia. In search of an optimum solution under the circumstances of an excruciating shortage of money, the Murmansk Steamship Line has for the past half-year been discussing the fate of the nuclear fleet, with government organs joining in the discussion.

As fate would have it, a little before the steamship line arrived at this crossroads, a young manager, Vyacheslav Ruksha, became director of the nuclear fleet. Let us be frank—there are some who are not happy with the reorganization course he took, or with the pace of this reorganization. Well, even this may provide a subject for serious conversation, especially considering that right now it is important to learn last year's lessons.

[Blinov] Let us start right away with the main item: Will the nuclear fleet fight for survival alone, as a separate entity based on federal property, which nuclear icebreakers are, or should everything be left as is: The joint-stock company will continue to operate, shall we say, nuclear property it does not own as the state's agent?

[Ruksha] At the latest meetings of the AO [joint-stock company] Murmansk Steamship Line we arrived at a definite decision: We will stay together. I too support the idea of a single company. Nuclear icebreakers and freighters are like locomotives and railcars. If one person is in charge of the locomotive, and a different person is in charge of the railcar, they will never couple in real life. In general, increasing the number of entities to be managed in a single process results in decreased manageability of the structure. One can see this graphically in the example of the Atomflot [Nuclear Fleet] enterprise, which became independent. The quality of their maintenance of our vessels has not improved, but our expenses for this service have increased. Dividing us into two fiefdoms will do nothing good for either, because vessel-based nuclear technology is tied to shore facilities a thousand-fold more closely than to that of the regular diesel fleet. Therefore, in my opinion, there is a normal opportunity to unite the federal property of two enterprises and transfer it to the operational management of our steamship line. Actually, it was almost this way in the past. It is another matter how in this case to set up the optimum relationship with the state. But even in this we are going back to what had already been proposed. The idea of a general agreement between the steamship and the government emerged and was thoroughly looked into several years ago; now we have come back to it, and I hope we will sign an agreement in the nearest future.

[Blinov] But we have already been through a perestroyka; what do we do, however, in the environment of its consequences, expressed first of all in the production decline?

[Ruksha] I remain a proponent of the position of workers, not indigents. It is easy to ask for money, but it is not the best position in a country where there is nothing to give. Yes, the volume of freight transportation in the Arctic has declined sharply, but we have to realize that we have reached the limit and that freight traffic will not decline any more. But even in this negative fact there is a plus for the country: The North is shrinking to its proper "size." The North is an expensive undertaking, and it is very wrong to spend money there unnecessarily. The steamship line, however, should not be blamed for this—one needs to be aggressive in a good way in the Arctic. We should not concentrate our activities in nearby areas—we need to provide freight transportation from here, from the west, all the way up to the Bering Strait. Our capabilities are appreciated in the east—it is not accidental that the "chief of Chukotka" and other regional leaders are coming to Murmansk.

Today, however, the main basis of our activities is Norilsk nickel, that is, normal teamwork with the Norilsk mining and processing enterprise group, delivering cargo and taking out the product. As a result of an accident at a power station in Norilsk, nickel prices at the world exchange jumped threefold. By this I am saying that all this talk that Russia does not influence the world market is a bluff. The policy in relations with Norilsk partners is quite definite: We do not rob them with our freight rates, and they do not rob us with nonpayments. That is, we die together or survive together.

There is a lot of talk right now that the tight policy of economizing in the steamship line, including in the nuclear fleet, is resulting in declining nuclear safety in ships' exploitation. Well, I want to tell you straight—the foundation of safety today is money that enables us to do the necessary things. And in this respect I also have a clear policy idea: Government subsidies should be directed to dealing with precisely these state tasks: removal of spent nuclear fuel, handling of radioactive waste, etc.—in short, federal money should not be used for consumption. We can earn enough on our own for the fleet's current maintenance and salaries.

[Blinov] I agree with you, except that you are being criticized for the line you took toward personnel reduction in the nuclear fleet—also for the sake of economizing—which you began in the process of reorganization of structures...

[Ruksha] I would like to be understood correctly—I am not for personnel reductions—I am for eliminating the jobs of freeloaders. We should only pay money to those who do something useful. I do not want to hurt anyone's feelings. It is not his fault, but to keep on the rolls the "radio chief" of an inactive icebreaker is nonsense; the same goes for several security people on the shore...

There is also a lot of gossip on the subject of reorganizing the nuclear fleet's management, reorganizing departments into integrated technological services. This was done in connection with the work on extending icebreakers' useful life. This is no longer a matter of the competence of one crew, whether it be an icebreaker or a nuclear service vessel—this is a fleet-wide endeavor, and accordingly, the functions of people who organize this work are being expanded. Another option would be to create an additional structure for it, which we do not need.

[Blinov] But you are being accused of conducting reorganization in disregard of existing normative acts—for instance, regarding the aforementioned nuclear safety...

[Ruksha] Where are they, these normative acts? I came to this administration in January of last year and have not found a job description for the nuclear fleet director... And speaking of a serious normative base, in my opinion, it should be linked with the separation of property relations. If the state entrusts its property to this company, believing that its personnel has the necessary level of qualifications, it should stipulate full responsibility for its utilization. And then let the company management decide how many people to keep in the managerial structure—they may leave just one director if they wish. The same point, by the way, is made in the draft general agreement with the government, which contains the notion of full economic management of property. This is the position we take. If you look at the position of our opponents, who maintain that paperwork is more important than business, I respectfully disagree with it.

Maritime Kray Trade Unions Call For Mass Protests

954F1916A Vladivostok KRASNOYE ZNAMYA in Russian 25 Mar 95 p 2

[Appeal of trade union organizations of Maritime Kray to union members and the work force of the Maritime region: "All Measures Are Exhausted"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Maritimers! The authorities' assurances concerning the stabilization and improvement in the very near future of the socioeconomic situation in the country are a myth and deliberate deception of their own people.

The unchecked decline in production, the disintegration of all branches of the national economy without exception, and the universal growth of prices, unemployment, and crime continue in the kray, as throughout Russia. The elementary human rights to labor and pay and health and life are being flouted.

Immorality, irresponsibility, and impunity in a shareout of property in favor of criminal and corrupt bureaucratic structures are being implanted in earnest. What we have is the total bankruptcy of the socioeconomic policy pursued by the president and the government.

The Maritime area unions have throughout the reforms attempted consistently and insistently to influence the federal authorities for a change of course of the reforms and for a social focus to be imparted to them.

They have been sent dozens of appeals and statements containing demands and specific proposals for an improvement in the socioeconomic situation in the kray.

Unfortunately, the majority of our demands have been simply ignored. Nor have the mass protests of Maritime area inhabitants in support of these demands met with any success.

We believe that all possible measures of influencing the present president and government are exhausted. They are indifferent to the problems of the Maritime region.

Expressing the will of the work force of the Maritime region and guided by the decision of the all-kray public meeting of working people (of 30 September 1994), we call on the trade union committees to organize in April of this year mass actions of protest against the antipopular activity of the government.

We call on the employees of all enterprises and branches to participate most actively in the demonstrations and meetings of the work force and working people of the cities and rayons of the kray and to make at them a due appraisal of the productiveness of the current reforms and also to send on 12 April of this year to the city of Vladivostok their authorized representatives for an all-kray protest meeting.

Our purpose is the election of a popular president and the formation of a government of national trust capable of changing the course and social focus of the reforms.

Our strength lies in the unity and solidarity of all of working Maritime region and the working people of all of Russia!

[Signed] Chairmen of trade union branch and regional committees:

N.I. Bomko, shipbuilding, V.I. Grechko, Pacific Fleet, A.V. Kapustin, agro-industrial complex, P.T. Kiryasov, Coal Miners Union, M.F. Antipenko, Electricians Union, E.Ya. Drobot, construction, N.I. Volkov, Pacific Water Transport Workers Union Committee, V.A. Reksha, longshoremen, A.G. Nesterenko, fish industry, Yu.V. Poshivaylo, motor transport, A.G. Savkin, communications, V.F. Mitin, timber sectors, V.I. Nakhalov, mining and metallurgical branches, A.F. Burmistrova, chemical branches, V.S. Aleksandrova, textile and light industry, L.P. Ostrovskaya, local industry, N.F. Balychev, state institutions, R.N. Shabanova, public education, G.P. Yermoshina, health care, L.A. Kalinina, culture, V.G. Proskov, state trade, M.M. Brusilovskiy, geology, V.M. Grishakov, ground troops, A.A. Korolkov, servicemen, T.N. Turadzhonzoda, science.

Sverdlovsk Governor on Urals Association

954F1778A Yekaterinburg OBLASTNAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by Svetlana Dobrynina: "Too Much Politics in the Greater Urals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On his return from the scheduled Urals conference in Kurgan, Governor Aleksey Strakhov was not very optimistic in his appraisal of the activities of the Ural Oblasts Economic Interaction Association. At a meeting with journalists he explained that the idea of a regional union was not a bad one, but politics should not be constantly mixed into it. There is too much politics in the Greater Urals.

Let us recall that the association currently unites seven federation components. All are our next-door neighbors. And an eighth one is asking to be let in: the Komi-Permyak Okrug. Decisions in this organization are made by the "majority" method. And representatives of the largest oblasts—Chelyabinsk, Kurgan, and Sverdlovsk—consider this democratic principle inappropriate. First of all because when even one member of the seven protests, this puts in doubt the feasibility of implementation of any decision. In particular, at the conference in Kurgan Aleksey Strakhov did not support proposals to authorize the association to communicate with the central authorities and to create regional agencies for utilization of natural resources. Nevertheless, there is a benefit in joint meetings. We have almost come to an agreement, for instance, with Orenburg Oblast on buying grain from them. That is, if we can agree on a price.

Of no less interest for journalists also was the administration head's appraisal (political, naturally) of the results of Sergey Filatov's visit. The governor believes that the president made a wise and very tactful move by sending his man instead of a written reply to the duma and administration's inquiries. Sergey Filatov clearly explained that gubernatorial elections are unadvisable not only in the spring, but altogether in the foreseeable future. That is, this is something to think about until the end of 1995. Aleksey Strakhov completely agrees with this position, especially considering that the Russian law on gubernatorial elections has not yet been enacted and the current year is literally stuffed with events: from spring planting and Victory Day celebrations to harvesting and elections to federal organs of authority.

As to the intent interest on the part of the president's head of administrative organs to Sysert special facilities, the reason for this is inflation. It turns out that there is an acute shortage of money storage facilities. Even gold bullion storage is becoming a problem. And Sergey Filatov is traveling around the country looking for suitable secure facilities. Doing political work along the way.

Also present at the briefing was Vladimir Gantimurov, director of the administrative organs department. He told journalists about the shocking send-off of a special flight carrying our oblast's delegation to Chechnya. The MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] prohibited the crew captain to take on board any civilians regardless of the purpose of their trip. After many hours of negotiations with Moscow, Vladimir Yuryevich did get permission for administration and duma representatives, as well as all journalists, including women, to accompany humanitarian aid to the "hot" republic. The only permission he could not obtain was for soldiers' mothers.

Over the past three days, however, the oblast delegation has been busy carrying out requests from mothers. They met with servicemen from our parts. In a few days the delegation will return to Yekaterinburg.

Sverdlovsk Bankers Unite Against Moscow

954F1778B Yekaterinburg OBLASTNAYA GAZETA in Russian 31 Jan 95 p 2

[Interview with Petr Agafonov, president of Uralpromstroybank KURS, Valeriy Zavodov, chairman of the board of Uraltransbank, and Emma Finogenova, chairman of the board of Tagilbank, by OBLASTNAYA GAZETA correspondent Stanislav Vagin; place and date not given; under the rubric "Financial Twists": "Urals' Armor: Oblast Banks Fend Off Moscow Businessmen's Offensive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our newspaper briefly reported (see OBLASTNAYA GAZETA, 13 January of this year) that the largest banks in the oblast—Uraltransbank, Uralkib-Bank, Pervouralskbank, Tagilbank, Neyvabank, and Grankombank—had signed an agreement on cooperation and joint activities.

The document says that the banks "by joining efforts are carrying out joint activities in creating a specialized banking coordinating- financial association without forming a new legal entity, and providing the most effective utilization by the banks of scientific, production, and financial potential of the Urals region."

Our correspondent discussed the causes and goals that produced a "soul-mating" so unusual in our financial world with the president of Uralpromstroybank KURS [expansion unidentified] Petr Agafonov, and Valeriy Zavodov, chairman of the board of Uraltransbank, and Emma Finogenova, chairman of the board of Tagilbank.

Most of our readers probably do not know that there is a "cold war" going on between Urals and Moscow financiers—a tough war for survival. Muscovites offer our bankers "friendly" cooperation, or sometimes say openly: If you do not want trouble, become a subsidiary of ours (read: become subordinated). Of course, our events are not

comparable to Chechnya. By if we look, as K. Prutkov used to say, at the roots, the penetration of the Urals by capital from other regions may cause serious financial-economic damage to all of us. That is why the conversation with the bankers began with this particular subject.

"Do you think Muscovites are interested in the financial situation of Urals banks (although I cannot rule this out either)?" P. Agafonov analyzes the current situation. "Not at all. Today all normal people understand that 'buy-sell' operations have no future. There is no future for Russia without industry. And the Urals means a huge industrial complex.

"Naturally, capital city businessmen and bankers have concentrated their attention on us. Look at Uralmash [Urals Machine-Building Works] alone! It is capital, and substantial. That is why bankers from other regions are trying by all means to penetrate the Urals economy and financial affairs. And God forbid they succeed. Then the output of our enterprises, profit from sales, the money that is so needed for economic and social development of the oblast may leave the region."

"It is not accidental that we have created an association, signed an agreement," V. Zavodov took the subject further, "taking as partners (we are all independent legal entities) very serious, major banks. Today we can no longer fend off capital city financiers separately. After signing this agreement, it will be easier for me, for instance, to turn for help to my partners instead of leaning on Moscow's shoulder. Now we in the Urals are tied by common interests. By the way, any local bank may join our 'union'—provided, of course, it is wealthy and authoritative among clients."

"Our main task is to increase the competitiveness of each participating bank," V. Zavodov explains the purpose of the association. "Today each of us alone does not have the capacity to finance enterprises (our clients). Let us be honest, the bulk of funds are currently utilized in the sphere of circulation, because this where we make it. In the current inflationary situation, in order for money to flow from the sphere of circulation to the production sphere it is necessary to combine the capital in one fist. Perhaps I am repeating myself, but currently no bank alone can finance fast redirection of industrial and defense production (and our enterprises did mainly work for defense). In this case, as a rule, the latter turn for help to larger banks, which are located in other regions. As a result, the surplus product produced by our enterprises is being redistributed in favor of Moscow."

"Having created a bank association," E. Finogenova continues the conversation, "collectively we will be able to finance a particular local enterprise on preferential terms. Which means that the output produced by our plants and the money earned on it will remain in the oblast. In other words, in our lean times people will get at least something.

"The joint association of banks works as a universal bank, which services both the industrial and social spheres. Our goal is to somehow help enterprises to survive, to not go bankrupt. We should not forget that most enterprises in the oblast are our clients. Which means that we, as bankers, must do everything to keep both people and production from the negative consequences of financial dependence."

[Vagin] I have a question for you, esteemed Urals bankers. You will hardly solve the region's problems just by uniting. In order to become the Urals' armor, you need to have a footing in firm legislation. Do we have it?

"That is the problem—we do not," the rest of my interlocutors seconded Petr Agafonov. "For instance, there is currently no investment project in implementing which an enterprise could carry the interest rate set by the Central Bank. And what is happening with taxes? The state is robbing not just the banks, but you and I personally, all Russian citizens. The bankers have been simply pushed up against the wall. You cannot do this, you cannot do that. For instance, getting a license costs quite a bit. Or: If we try right now to set up a formal structure on the basis of an agreement, again, we need to obtain a license for check-clearing operations. And this requires a legislative basis. Besides, the Central Bank has already set tight conditions: By 1999 we must have a charter capital equal to 5 million ECU. By the way, 1 million ECU equals R4 billion. That is why when banks merge their capital today, they are not only helping producers to survive but are also fighting for their own survival."

* * *

Our conversation covered only a part of the region's sorest problems. We will try to discuss the rest later. Including whether the Urals' armor is holding off the Muscovites' offensive.

Tyumen Oblast Duma Session Reported

954F1835A Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Feb 95 pp 1, 5

[Article by Sergey Shilnikov under the rubric "In the Oblast Duma": "The People Will Get Bread. But There Are Bi-i-g Problems with Information...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] **It is said that the failure of the reforms being conducted in Russia is linked most of all to the absence of a generally comprehensible ideology. It is being said.... It has been said for a long time, and it seems that everyone agrees and that nobody objects. And so we will talk about this, especially because there is a reason—one of the questions being discussed at the 10th meeting of the Oblast Duma, which was held on 22 February, was the question about economic support of oblast, city, and rayon newspapers. But it was at the end, in "Miscellaneous." And we will still get to this. But now, first things first.**

As is customary, the deputies first discussed the draft agenda. I will report to you that they discussed it intently, inasmuch as an agenda is an important thing: If you do not include one or another question, you will also not get a decision. And various forces, firms, and people stand behind each of these. More often—people, inasmuch as lobbying for the interests of firms, and especially of groups, according to my observations, is in an embryonic stage here, although sometimes "gimmicks" also surface.

And so, the agenda. Vladimir Tretyakov, the deputy chairman of the Oblast Duma, would like the ninth question of the draft agenda—"On the Protocols of Agreement Adopted at the First Meeting of the Council of the Three Dumas"—to be the first question. None of the attendees objected. And, indeed, what is there to object to when the question concerns approval of that which was agreed to earlier with the Dumas of the okrugs. (I trust that the reader will remember that our oblast is an intricately built territory, consisting of the oblast as such and two autonomous okrugs, which according to the Constitution are components of the Federation that are equal in rights to an oblast. Such are today's realities. Whether anyone likes it or not.)

Fuat Sayfitdinov, another deputy chairman of the Oblast Duma, asked for the removal from the agenda of the third question of the draft agenda—"On the Budgetary System and a Forecast of the Socio- Economic Development of the Oblast for 1995." The attendees also did not object, inasmuch as deputy commissions had conducted a parliamentary hearing on this question the day before and were left quite dissatisfied with what the oblast administration had proposed.

Thus, "dull" economics slipped away at the next meeting of the Oblast Duma in March, and politics advanced forward in all of its glory—a discussion of the charter of Tyumen Oblast. And this already promised a certain spectacle. And although in contrast to the Russian Duma, the Oblast Duma was completely filled with industrialist pragmatists, and its meetings are held, as a rule, rather correctly, one can count on "something" happening now and then.

They waited. And it became faintly perceptible. Vladimir Tretyakov, the deputy chairman of the Duma, took the floor once again and explained to the deputies that there were two points of disagreement on the question of the Tyumen Oblast charter (more exactly, regarding the general chapter of the charter, the oblast and the two okrugs decided to raise questions concerning joint jurisdiction in the general chapter). Whether the okrugs are or are not in the oblast system—this is first and foremost, and, second—whether or not the authority of the oblast authoritative structures applies or does not apply to the okrugs.

Stepan Kirichuk noted here:

"For me, such a statement of the question is just as wild as whether the ear is part of the head. The question is not whether the territories are a part of or not a part of the oblast—they never left it—the question is about the mutual relations of the authoritative structures of the oblast and the okrugs. Thus, it is necessary to approve that which was agreed to earlier with the okrugs and not to stir up the question more."

Tretyakov, like the majority of those present as well, did not agree, apparently, with such a statement. But he had another purpose—to report on the work that was done. The work consisted in the fact that a commission was established on the instructions of the council of the three Dumas that jointly with the okrugs worked on the general chapter of the charter. And, in fact, they came to an agreement about everything except for the two points raised by Tretyakov: "They are a part, or they are not a part," and "it applies, or it does not apply."

The chiefs of executive authority of the okrugs approved this matter, but Yuriy Konev, a representative of the oblast administration, refused to affix his signature. Thus, the representative authority did its part of the work, and as for the executive authorities, then "let them sit down and come to an agreement, and we will wish them success in this."

It was necessary to come to an agreement, as was also noted by S. Kirichuk, on only one single point: "It applies—it does not apply," since it was obvious to everyone that "they are a part—they are not a part" of the okrug was not recorded, because they are afraid to be influenced by the oblast authoritative structures. In short, the representative authority bypassed the executive authority. And this, apparently, did not raise any doubts in anyone's mind, inasmuch as, together with the practice of visiting meetings of the Dumas of the okrugs, which was established by Nikolay Baryshnikov, chairman of the Oblast Duma, the oblast representative authority made a visible spurt forward, which it is impossible to say of the executive authority.

A few things were left—they had to be fixed somehow. Toward which V. Tretyakov was also inclined. And it seemed that everything was forming in this way, but it was here that Valeriy Pervushin, the secretary of the administration, took the floor. The sense of his short speech was that something was contemplated in the council of the three Dumas. But, after all, the council of the three Dumas was a consulting organ and, consequently, its decisions still had to be approved. The Dumas of the okrugs approved. But the Oblast Duma has not done so to this day.

An exclamation point is placed after such a move in chess. But if it is about substance, then Leonid Roketskiy, the chief of the oblast administration, who refused to affix his signature to the general chapter of the charter, which was coordinated with the okrugs, sent his vision of this question to the okrugs, and they are studying it there now. But the dates are being postponed once again.

And this, perhaps, was the only outbreak of a spectacle that those present enjoyed completely. I have in mind both the deputy corps itself and those who were invited as well. As for the rest in this, in the generally "heated up" question, everything took its normal course. There was an opinion about publishing the general chapter of the charter before it was coordinated. There was the opinion not to do this and not to show the kitchen, especially since "it is not very tidy." There was once again the opinion about publishing it. "Publish everything and conceal nothing from the voters!"

The point of view "to publish and not to conceal" won out. Of course, a laudable effort. Only there is one trifle: Fifteen sheets are already a newspaper page. However, such sheets in the folder submitted by the deputies make up more than one newspaper page. But who, pardon me, will read such a newspaper? And the main thing is, where is the paper to be gotten that is quite a substantial expenditure article for any editorial office? There is, of course, a way out—a contractual relationship in which the authorities pay both for the site and the labor of the journalists, but for some reason I did not see such an inclination.

However, this is so, by the way. The second question on the agenda—"About the Draft Law of Tyumen Oblast Concerning Local Self- Government"—was passed immediately. A key role here was played by Leonid Roketskiy, the chief of the oblast administration: "Local self-government is not that which can be adopted by October or May. There is the Constitution, which considers global problems. And there is the individual. Local self-government should also regulate his life."

"But what is it—local self-government?" Valeriy Bugayev, chief of Tyumenskiy Rayon, asked from his seat.

"Well, I am explaining to you, I am explaining what I myself have already understood, but you still do not understand," L. Roketskiy parried jokingly.

There is no clarity on this question in either Moscow or Tyumen. But it must be said that Tyumen, not without Roketskiy's help, has succeeded on the question of self-government, and people come here for the experience.

"Thus, it is necessary to confirm everything that there is and somehow to move further," Leonid Yulianovich summed it up seriously.

Here the meeting was interrupted for dinner. And after fortifying themselves, the deputies went on to the budget. But not head-on, as was planned earlier, but somehow "casually." But this "casually" was by no means naive. "On the Implementation of the Statute on the Procedure for the Development, Approval, and Control over the Use of the Oblast Budget and the Budget of the Oblast, and Off-Budget and Currency Funds" was reported by Pavel Plavnik. The essence of his report can be reduced to the Russian proverb: "Things are not always what they seem!" Pavel Garevich reminded the representatives of the oblast administration that there is a statute that has to be implemented. Understandably, no one objected. Moreover, they asserted—it is necessary! But what is to be done with the fact that the oblast administration is submitting information requested by the Duma for the second and third time?! "Thus, the statute has not been fulfilled, and the dates are already too impractical." "But you yourselves compiled it. Make changes, and we will eagerly meet you halfway," P. Plavnik parried.

The question on the procedure for distributing tax payments between the budgets of the territories according to enterprises that have insolvent branches started simply, it would seem. There are enterprises and there are branches that do not pay into the budget of the territories in which they are located. (The question concerns the tax on profit and the income tax.) But while the mechanism for tax on profit has been more or less worked out, which was reported by Karametdin Fazleyev, the first deputy chairman of the finance committee of the oblast administration, the question about the income tax has already "been hanging" since 1987, and it is entirely within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.

"Then why is it put on our agenda at all?" asked Nikolay Baryshnikov, chairman of the Oblast Duma.

"We acknowledge that the question has not been made ready, and we will look into it," answered Fazleyev. "I reported the gist of it to you."

But the discussion already took on a very serious turn—concerning the economic security of Tyumen Oblast. Deputy Viktor Gorodilov recalled that the finances go from the oblast to Moscow, and that the practice has become predominant where the head of one or another company and, consequently, the payments also, remain in Moscow. But we have neither analyses, nor even information on the financial flows!...

The next question—"On Granting Tax Exemptions to Enterprises That Are Producers of Bread and Bakery Products." Yuriy Kuznetsov, the chairman of the Tyumen regional department of the Russian Union of Bakers, gave a report. He cited the dynamics of the increase in the price of bread and the ingredients for its production, from which it became clear that without subsidies, bread will not be seen. But Kuznetsov did not ask for subsidies; he asked to be exempted from taxes. They were exempted from taxes last year also, and owing to this they were able to do something (a list was given—where and what). In a word, the exemptions "gave tangible results." The cost of the question for 1995 is 2 billion.

No one objected to exempt, inasmuch as it is necessary to eat bread every day, and if 2 billion is spread over 365 days, then it amounts to on the order of 5 million per day. It is a bearable sum. In this connection, S. Kirichuk noted that if there are exemptions, then everyone should be exempted who produces bread in the city. And exempt only the production of bakery articles. Otherwise, it will be possible to push a lot of things through under this matter.

Information about the preparation and conduct of measures dedicated to the 50th Anniversary of the Great Patriotic War was taken into consideration, and it did cause some debate. Rather, a heavy feeling that, alas, we are unable to give the people what they deserve. "To see one time how they come to a reception and climb the stair—and this is enough for the rest of one's life!" Sergey Sheregov, the chief of administration of Leninskiy Rayon said, sighing.

Finally, the deputies got to the last question on the agenda—Miscellaneous. The first question under Miscellaneous was the question about a social chamber attached to the Tyumen Oblast Duma. Aleksandr Cherepanov gave the report. The reaction to the report was the following: "They abandoned the 'little kitten' at our doorstep—to increase the number of deputies by a factor of two—for the last time. It did not pass, inasmuch as this would have completely put all of the work of the Duma out of action. Now this question was approached from another angle—there is talk about some kind of a social chamber!"—Viktor Gorodilov said in a fit of anger—"the Duma is a very important 'roof,' and to organize some kind of one's own preelection gimmicks under it is an unworthy task!"

The second speaker, Aleksandr Verkhovskiy, a representative of the regional department of the Russia's Choice Party, was on the whole chased from the podium. One thing or another, but I personally did not expect this. One can treat this or that idea, or this or that person in different ways, but it is necessary to hear the person out. They once again shifted from politics to economics. Supplements to the plan of draft law work of the Oblast Duma were considered (there were more or less 12 of them) that were submitted by Pavel Plavnik. They stopped on the fact that many things can be proposed, but how all of this is to be worked out....

Well, and the ending—the question about granting tax exemptions to newspapers—suddenly provoked a sharp controversy. Ivan Knanik, the chairman of the press committee of the oblast administration, gave a report:

The one-time circulation of all daily central newspapers in the oblast is 55,000. TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA—46,600. Thus, the center of information has shifted from Moscow to the oblast, city, and rayon newspapers. Everything has changed, but the newspapers are living as they lived! The editorial staffs are getting old and decrepit, and there is no end in sight to this.

The controversy on the report went on in this kind of key. "It is not necessary to grant exemptions. What, will only plants pay taxes?" (A. Korelyakov.) "No, it is necessary to grant them, and it is necessary to give everything they ask for!" (S. Sheregov.) Necessary, not necessary, and how necessary, the question, of course, is interesting. As a result, they gave half. They gave exemptions from the tax on profit and property and from the tax on the needs of general education institutions that were being allocated to the oblast budget by oblast, city, and rayon newspapers who were being subsidized by the oblast budget. They rejected the second point of the draft statute—"On Exemptions for Municipal Services and the Lease of Premises in Buildings Owned by the Oblast, and for Tariffs and Rates for Postal Services and Telegraph and Telephone Communications at the Level of Budget Organizations."

Well, as the saying goes, at least it is something. But I would like to remind the deputies of this trifle: A person not only has to eat bread every day, but also to read something, to get information, or, if he wishes, at least to have this opportunity. But the trouble is that he is not in a position to pay in full measure either for bread or for a newspaper. It seems they have found the money for the bread, and there will be bread. But there are big problems when it comes to information. At least for the time being....

Yekaterinburg Citizens Polled on Media

954F1778C Yekaterinburg OBLASTNAYA GAZETA in Russian 31 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by Dmitriy Garanin: "The Record of 'Wild Rose'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The Urals information-sociological agency Ural-INSO has published the results of research of the Yekaterinburg mass media's audience. The review prepared by the agency have finally given us an idea of what the results of professional sociological work ought to be like.**

The data obtained in the course of the research provides a glimpse not merely of which television channels and radio stations Yekaterinburg residents prefer to watch and listen to. Advertisers, advertising agencies, and everyone who by nature of their job is involved in placement of advertising can now track how the audience changes depending on the day of the week and the time of day; how often people turn to a particular medium; and the distribution of viewers and listeners by age, education, and material situation.

The study of the television audience showed that most Yekaterinburg residents, as before, remain loyal to Ostankino and Rossiya. Practically everyone finds a program he likes on these channels at least once a week. St. Petersburg television's Channel 4 has a lot of fans. Somewhat fewer city residents watch the programs of the Sverdlovsk state television and radio company and Channel 51. ASV [expansion unidentified] and VEK ["Century"] boast approximately equal audiences.

Prime time—the air time most desirable for advertisers—begins at 1930 and continues until 2200. During this period of time almost half of all Yekaterinburg families watch television almost nonstop. During the morning hours peak interest falls in the time period between 0930 and 1000.

It is interesting to look at the distribution of television viewers by different television channels in different time periods. On weekdays Ostankino gets the largest audience from 1930 to 2000. This is the time slot of "Wild Rose," which remains the unchallenged leader of the television hit parade.

Rossiya moves to the top at 2030. "Soap veterans" can explain this without even glancing at the TV guide: During this time slot the entire Russia is one big "Santa Barbara."

Local television channels so far do not have the resources to score such points, but they also have their own achievements. Channel 4's "star hour" begins at 2130 and continues almost until midnight: The "Nine-Thirty News" and the evening movie at 2200 have the best ratings.

Channel 10 gets the best score from 1700 to 1900. During this time VEK as a rule shows old Soviet movies. Our Yekaterinburg television viewers like them very much and are willing to watch for the hundredth time "The Eternal Call" and "The Irony of Fate..."

After midnight, air time is ruled by St. Petersburg and Channel 51. Night owls of both genders and all age groups prefer these two channels.

On weekends it is noteworthy that between 0900 and 1100 Ostankino and Rossiya get rather stiff competition from Channel 4 ("Telebom," "Lassie"), and from 1200 to 1400—ASV.

A special part of the study concentrated on the audience of information television programs. It turned out that the most popular source of news is Ostankino with its 2100 news. One in five Yekaterinburg residents watch it daily. "Vesti" at 2000 gathers an audience approximately one-third smaller.

Among local information programs the leader is Channel 4's "Nine-Thirty News." "Channel 7" (at 1900) and "9 1/2" (at 2100) have a slightly smaller audience. The next trio is "Channel 7" (at 1700), "Six-Thirty News," and the repeat of the "Nine-Thirty News" after midnight.

It is interesting to compare the sociodemographic composition of the audience of local information programs. The male part is represented more among viewers of "Channel 7" and "Nine-Thirty News," while the fair sex comprises the majority of fans of "9 1/2." Pensioners prefer "Channel 7" and hardly watch "9 1/2." The unemployed ignore the "Nine-Thirty News" but love "9 1/2." Students, on the contrary, prefer the Channel 4 news. This program also has the most financially secure viewer.

Lately, sociology as a way of making a living has become as popular as sorcery and psychics. There are a great many "specialists" who can produce any result depending on the fee. Therefore, we can only rejoice that there is now an agency in the Yekaterinburg sociological market that works according to a universally accepted methodology.

International Affairs

Supreme Council Officials Comment on Europe, Crimea, CIS

LD2903131295 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1040 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 29 Mar—Not only a good and mobile army, not only borders and customs, but also good relations with all countries can guarantee Ukraine's security, Borys Oliynyk, chairman of the Supreme Council Commission for Foreign and CIS Affairs, told a news conference.

Oliynyk said that Ukraine's membership in the Council of Europe [COE] would signify the country's recognition in all spheres, both democratic and legal. He said almost all of the COE membership requirements had been met, including free and democratic elections. "Our laws and declarations on international affairs are virtually exemplary, and the drafting of the constitution is under way," he said. At the same time, the commission chairman declared: "We are not beggars, but a major European state. Europe should have interest in Ukraine's entry to the Council."

Commenting on the situation in Crimea, Ivan Zayets, deputy chairman of the commission, said that Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs and Ties with Compatriots, who had been visiting the autonomous republic, should be declared persona non grata in Ukraine. While someone is playing the Chechnya card in Russia, Zatulin is playing the Crimea card in his own election campaign, he said. Zayets described Zatulin's statements in Crimea and Lugansk as "an attempt to provoke Ukrainian authorities and ultimately disrupt the Ukrainian-Russian negotiating process."

Commenting on the Russian State Duma statement on Crimea, Borys Oliynyk said such sensitive issues should be treated with care. If the parliament's foreign affairs commission responds to the Duma statement, it could be concluded that we recognize Crimea as a foreign territory, therefore, it is up to other commissions to react to it, he said.

With regard to Ukraine's membership in the CIS interparliamentary assembly, the commission chairman said the Ukrainian parliament had been studying the issue for a year and the commission would examine it in due course. Deputy chairman Zayets opposed Ukraine's membership in this supranational body, but did not rule out Ukraine's participation as an observer.

First Trade Mission Opened in ROK

LD3003111395 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0840 GMT 30 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Seoul—On 29 March, Oleksandr Moroz, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, met Korean President Kim Yong-sam. The president of Korea said he favors the quickest possible development of an information and telecommunications network that will promote the establishment of economic relations between the two states. A UNIAN correspondent reports this from the Korean capital.

On the same day, an official mission of Ukraine's Chamber of Commerce and Industry was opened in Seoul. The Korean company, Meond Keum, was the official sponsor of the opening and will also ensure the chamber's future financing. In 1993, trade turnover between Ukraine and Korea was worth almost $8 million, reaching $14 million in 1994.

In his speech at the opening ceremony, the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council stressed that the arrival of a Ukrainian chamber of commerce and industry mission in Korea became possible thanks to assistance from the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and he expressed the conviction that the information which the representation will disseminate about Ukrainian enterprises will promote the development of cooperation between the two states.

Russian Consular Group Leaves Simferopol

WS3003075895 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0726 GMT 30 Mar 95

[From the "Current Events" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] As reported by UKRINFORM's correspondent, the consular group from the Russian Embassy in Ukraine has left Simferopol.

The leader of the Russian consular group, Aleksey Molochkov, told journalists that the group's decision to abandon its mission to Crimea was not connected with the note sent to the Russian Foreign Ministry by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry.

According to Mr. Molochkov, the group is now reviewing the documents gathered on the mission.

Mr. Molochkov further told journalists that the consular group will grant Russian citizenship, based only on Russian laws and legislation. He, however, declined to disclose the number of Crimean citizens who have applied for Russian citizenship, claiming it is a confidential information.

Polish Military Delegation Visits Kiev

WS2903131695 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 1116 GMT 29 Mar 95

[From the "Current Events" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] As the Ukrainian Defense Ministry's press service reported on Tuesday, March 28, a delegation of the Polish National Defense Ministry led by Deputy Department Chief Ewa Troscinska visited Ukraine for meetings at the Ukrainian Defense Ministry with Major General Volodymyr Sytnyk, chief of the Main Education Agency and other high-placed ministerial officers. The visit's schedule also provides for the delegation's familiarization with the Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Culture, Education and Recreation and the Kiev Military Humanitarian College.

National Affairs

Safety Problems Disrupt Rovno, Zaporozhye Nuclear Plants

LD2903134195 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1150 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—The capacity of Rovno's nuclear power plant generating set No. 1 has been reduced to 85 percent, the information center at Ukraine's former state committee for the supervision of work safety in nuclear power engineering informed UNIAN. The reduction in the plant's capacity, at 0700 on 29 March, was due to a fault in the reactor safety system and was implemented in accordance with operational guidelines. The cause of the fault is being investigated.

At 0900 on 29 March, an emergency pump failed to start in the course of routine tests of the safety system equipment at Zaporohzye's nuclear power plant generating set No 3. Although the fault was detected during a test, the regulations dictated its classification as an irregularity, as safety systems, that are subject to particularly stringent requirements, were involved.

Officials on 'Offensive' Over Chernobyl Report

WS3003103495 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0014 GMT 30 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, March 29—Ukraine's State Nuclear Energy Committee went on the offensive today, formally presenting its case against a report alleging the imminent danger of another Chernobyl core meltdown.

The furor started on Sunday [26 March], when the OBSERVER, a London weekly, published excerpts from what it said was a report kept secret by the European Commission. The document said that pillars supporting the Chernobyl sarcophagus—as the emergency containment structure erected over the remains of the reactor that exploded in 1986 is called—"are in imminent danger of bursting" and raises the possibility that their collapse could send debris into nearby reactor number 3, "triggering another core meltdown."

State Nuclear Energy Committee Chairman Mykhailo Umanets, in a Wednesday press conference organized because of the international controversy, questioned the credibility of the OBSERVER report, calling it "technically and politically illiterate."

"At first this publication worried me before I read it. But the article is so illiterate in technical meaning, that if the reference made in the article were true, it can be an insult for any author of such technical project, regardless of his nationality," he said. "I didn't expect it from Englishmen," Umanets added.

The Nuclear Committee official, responding to questions regarding the source of the report, deflected speculated over whether it may have been leaked by Alliance, an international consortium that inspected the plant earlier this month and may have had access to the data in question.

"I deeply doubt that it was Alliance. We will ask the European Union and if it is so, Alliance will leave Ukraine", said Umanets.

Although Umanets denied the possibility of another Chernobyl meltdown, he admitted that the poor condition of the sarcophagus could lead to increased emission of radioactive particles into the environment.

He also noted the impossibility of verifying the condition of the inside of the damaged reactor or controlling the processes occurring there due to the excessive radiation level of 10,000 roentgen/hour.

"But it is in the least case amoral to frighten Europe that a dusty cloud can appear, even over Kiev or within a 10 kilometer zone," Umanets said.

The official also said that the dire prediction could prove true if nothing is done to reconstruct the facility in the next 10 years.

"That is why we have prayed for the West for nine years to help us build a new sarcophagus. We received only ECU [European Currency Unit] 3.6 million and the article in the OBSERVER," he said. "It would be better for the OBSERVER to point out a source of money for the construction of a new sarcophagus. Ukraine doesn't have the money for this," he added.

According to Umanets, atomic power is one of the stabilizing factors for the Ukrainian energy system and for economy of Ukraine as a whole and "somebody doesn't like this."

"Today a lot of decisions are made not because of the safety, but because of the desire to conquer a market. The demand of the West to close Chernobyl is not well-grounded technically," he said. "We exploit Chernobyl station just because we have to exploit it."

Nuclear Commission Chairman Views Ecological Problems

AU2903162695 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 25 Mar 95 p 3

[Interview with Academician Valeriy Pavlovych Kukhar, chairman of the Commission for Issues of Nuclear Policy and Ecological Safety subordinated to the head of state, by Andriy Chyrva; place and date not given: "The Two-'Eco' System"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently, a Ukrainian presidential edict appointed Academician Valeriy Kukhar as head of the Commission for Issues of Nuclear Policy and Ecological Safety subordinated to the head of state. In view of the extreme importance and topicality of the Commission's work, our editorial board asked the scientist to comment on the decision.

[Chyrva] Valeriy Pavlovych, who is there among your associates?

[Kukhar] Highly qualified scientists and specialists in nuclear and ecological problems are members of the Commission. I think that this group is capable of solving most complex problems. There are many contradictions, for example, the fuel and energy complex is a notorious main polluter, but in the present crisis the role of nuclear energy has substantially increased. In the past, it accounted for between 10 and 13 percent of the total energy produced, but today, its share exceeds 30 percent. In addition, Ukraine has uranium reserves, which may provide the state with nuclear fuel if the task is handled properly. However, there are quite a number of problems here....

[Chyrva] In other words, you share the opinion that we cannot do without nuclear energy generation?

[Kukhar] Here, the safety problems of nuclear power stations and in particular Chernobyl are the main ones.

[Chyrva] Does the commission deal exclusively with civilian matters?

[Kukhar] Military matters are no longer relevant: We are a nonnuclear state.

[Chyrva] However, there remains the problem of nuclear waste....

[Kukhar] It requires a whole complex of work, associated with the attitude on the part of the state, science, and practice toward the waste issue. Incidentally, not a single country in the world has found the ultimate and totally safe option yet. I think that the most acceptable option is to have temporary storage facilities until the active research produces a reliable and safe option. We will rely upon the experience accumulated in the world and will also take into account our knowledge and expertise.

[Chyrva] You started your new mission after visiting Chernobyl. What are your impressions?

[Kukhar] I could see for myself how much has been done at the station to ensure the safety of the available reactors. The young collective, the patriots of the station and the town of Slavutych, has put the main emphasis upon the safety of the facility. This is very good, because a healthy team carries out healthy work.

[Chyrva] Ecological issues are also among those that your commission is in charge of. What policy will be pursued there?

[Kukhar] I am a follower of the concept of steady social development. Its system rests on two "ecos." Vigorous ECOnomic [upper case as published] activity, based on the achievements of scientific and technological progress, is coordinated with well- considered ECOlogical [upper case as published] principles. The world abounds in such examples.

The most difficult problem for Ukraine is one of waste material, in particular, highly toxic waste. More than 12,000 metric tons of pesticides have accumulated and the conditions of their storage are not always ideal. We have much waste, which may and must be put to use: Secondary raw materials are real wealth.

I believe that the main task of the Commission is to offer recommendations that would help our state to build up its economy in an ecologically friendly manner. We have already become convinced that it is much more difficult, if not impossible, to rectify the situation.

Minister Views Black Sea Fleet, NATO, NPT

WS3003080095 Kiev VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 24 Mar 95 p 3

[Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko by Elina Nesterenko; place and date not given: "Kostyantyn Hryshchenko: 'It Is Too Early To Talk About Total Expansion of NATO'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **By virtue of a Ukrainian presidential edict, Kostyantyn Hryshchenko has recently been appointed to the office of deputy foreign minister. The scope of his new responsibilities is extremely vast—international aspects of control over armaments and nuclear power engineering, military cooperation, the problems of the Black Sea Fleet, the establishment of export controls in Ukraine, accession to existing treaties on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other issues. Mr. Hryshchenko jocularly said: "The minister convinced me that this workload is too small, so now I am overseeing another two departments." This situation is, however, temporary—another office of deputy minister is vacant, and once it is occupied, responsibilities will be more rationally divided among deputy ministers. Mr. Hryshchenko agreed with pleasure to give VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI his first interview in the new office.**

[Nesterenko] **What is your prognosis for a decision on dividing the Black Sea Fleet?**

[Hryshchenko] This is a complex problem, and it is in our long-term strategic interests to resolve it as soon as possible. However, we will only be able to dot the i's and cross the t's in this regard, if our position is based on Ukraine's national interests and precedents drawn from international practice. Unfortunately, we have so far been proposed to invite something new, and that new thing, perhaps, does not comply with our fundamental national interests. This process is, therefore, so protracted. We will adhere to positions vitally important for

Ukraine, as an independent state, as well as for our relations with the Russian Federation.

[Nesterenko] **Do you think that the negotiations on this issue will speed up due to the Russian president's visit to our country?**

[Hryshchenko] As a whole, Boris Yeltsin's visit should become an important stage in arranging what we call a special partnership with the Russian Federation. Naturally, such relations are impossible without resolving this possibly last fundamental political problem inherited from the former Soviet Union. We hope that the Russian political leadership will give a Russian delegation all the required directives concerning a real compromise, which would conform to both sides' long-term interests. We cannot accept a resolution convenient for only one state. Of course, we must meet one another half-way, but not by reducing our sovereignty or creating a mechanism for the deployment of the Russian Navy on our territory, which would generate new conflicts and, as a result, would preserve tensions instead of establishing cooperation.

[Nesterenko] **Do you think that the Ukrainian parliament's resolution regarding our country's nonaligned status was a long-term decision?**

[Hryshchenko] If the Ukrainian parliament considers it necessary to revise this decision, it will have to take into account all factors effecting both security in the broader sense, and the security of Ukraine itself. That is to say that our country's internal situation, including the economic situation, as well as a degree to which our participation in any blocs would preserve our sovereignty and independence, should be taken into account—whether this would contribute to our economic prosperity, or could it lead to the appearance of new threats and impediments to the development of reforms. In my opinion, factors allowing us to conclude that the decision on our nonaligned status should be corrected have not yet "ripened." This decision so far fully conforms to the political situation in our country and the protection of its security.

[Nesterenko] **A movement toward expanding NATO with countries from the former socialist camp has recently appeared. How could this effect Ukraine?**

[Hryshchenko] Thus far there is no talk about NATO's total expansion—it has only been decided to examine the issue of what criteria the countries willing to join the bloc should meet. There has so far been no sign of NATO's large-scale expansion. Obviously, any expansion of this organization should not increase the security of certain countries by weakening other countries. This is not a simple question. Many political activists, as well as political and military experts from both West and East are cudgeling their brains over this issue. We cannot stand aside either: We are analyzing this issue and projecting it onto the situation in Ukraine—how this could affect our security. This is one point. On the other hand, it is hard for any country to state that it has the right to deny other states the possibility of searching for more acceptable methods of ensuring their security. The most important thing is that this will produce the opposite results. It is important that all participants in this process proceed from the principle of ensuring the security of all European countries. There is a trend toward using this very method. We are trying to ensure that our efforts contribute to this, and that Ukraine's factor is always taken into account in all possible options.

[Nesterenko] **Nevertheless, will it not prove that Ukraine serves as a particular buffer zone between West and East if our closest neighbors—for example, Romania—join NATO?**

[Hryshchenko] Your question could be expanded in the following way: What will happen if Russia also joins NATO? Romania's accession to this organization is so far not very likely. The same thing could be said about other countries "waiting in line." After all, they have been requested to resolve an entire range of problems, which exist in many East European countries, including Romania. And it is not so easy to resolve them. I thus believe that the issue of Ukraine's location is somewhat premature—I do not think that the group of countries willing to join NATO will be admitted to this bloc in the near future, regardless of any reaction from Ukraine or other countries. They will not be admitted to this organization until they meet fundamental membership requirements. We should participate in the establishment of a collective system of European security. The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe is such a structure. There are ideas of attracting NATO and the West European Union toward practical aspects in ensuring security, supporting stability, and resolving controversial issues and conflicts. One must use an entire range of methods. There is currently no confrontation in the world, certain problems have become simpler, and the threat has diminished. On the other hand, the situation has become more complicated, since interests are no longer diametrically opposed, but somewhat polar. There are completely different assessments of possible developments.

[Nesterenko] **As everybody knows, U.S. Vice President Al Gore has recently asked the Ukrainian president to support the U.S. proposal to indefinitely extend the Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]. How would you comment on this?**

[Hryshchenko] The treaty is a very important factor in maintaining security. Of course, it has repeatedly been criticized by various sides, and we are perfectly aware of its shortcomings. Nonetheless, it has become an instrument which makes it possible to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. There are currently five officially recognized nuclear states and three countries that are at least close to becoming such states, which, by the way, are outside the framework of the treaty. Almost 170 states have already signed the treaty. If this treaty did not exist, the situation could destabilize, the number of nuclear countries could grow uncontrollably, the nuclear factor could be introduced in regions of conflict, and the risk of using nuclear weapons could increase. It is thus understandable that, despite all the shortcomings, we are advocating its indefinite extension. There are, however, a number of issues, regarding which it is hard to not agree with the critics of nuclear states' approach toward their responsibilities, including those concerning progress toward complete nuclear disarmament. A number of developing countries, including Ukraine, have stated that a decision on indefinite extension of the NPT treaty would make it possible to reach an agreement on drafting a convention on halting production of weapon-grade fissile materials. Although talks on this issue are already under way in Geneva, they are not proceeding very smoothly. The same thing can be said about a treaty on full suspension of nuclear tests (the 1963 treaty on nuclear tests in three environments—atmospheric, under water, and surface— is currently in force). The aforementioned convention and treaty will virtually become the first step toward full prohibition of nuclear weapons. If France, Great Britain, and China announced their readiness to join Russia and the United States in reducing their strategic arsenals, this would contribute to this cause. We would also like Russia and the United States to at least move closer toward ratification of the START II treaty. At the April summit of NPT members, the Ukrainian delegation will agree to extend the NPT treaty if nuclear states take real steps rather than confining themselves to empty promises. Otherwise, a majority of states may vote against this decision, regardless of Ukraine's opinion.

Kuchma Legal Counsel on Crimea Events

954F1899A Simferopol KRYMSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by P.B. Yevgrafov, deputy permanent representative of the president of Ukraine on questions of law and statehood, supervisor of the legal department of the mission of the president of Ukraine in the autonomous Republic of Crimea, and candidate of juridical sciences: "The Stability of Law and Legality Is the Foundation of the Vital Activity of Any Normal Society and State Authority"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Today, many of us have learned just what a state is and how tragic the consequences of its dissolution can be for a once united people; and, how complicated and difficult the creation of one's own sovereign statehood can be, with all of its inherent attributes and institutions of authority. However, despite some progress in the development of political consciousness and culture, legal and state nihilism and neglect of the fundamental norms of law continue to dominate in society. On 17 March 1995, the Supreme Council of Ukraine passed a package of legal acts directed at the stabilization of the political-legal situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the consolidation of constitutional legality. The significance of the indicated acts in the resolution of the crisis of authority in Crimea and also in the development of the sovereign statehood of Ukraine is discussed by P.B. Yevgrafov, deputy of the permanent mission of the president of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea on questions of law and statehood, and supervisor of the legal department of the mission.**

The adoption by the Supreme Council of Ukraine on 17 March of a number of decrees and the law "On Repeal of the Constitution and Some Laws of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea," of course, could not help but evoke a corresponding reaction not only in Crimea, but also far beyond its borders. It would seem that the world has started "to get accustomed" to the unstable situation that has already become permanent in Crimea, causing great damage to the economy of the republic, contributing to a further drop in the standard of living of the people, and aggravating an already very difficult crime-conducive situation on the peninsula. I would like to emphasize in this connection that the first cause of all of this is the obvious and frequently simply cynical neglect of the law and laws that issue from the higher organs of state authority of an autonomous republic and their officials. There are more than enough examples of this, but they are not the main point. Simultaneously, there was an increase in the ambitions and excessive complaints of Crimean potentates against the president and parliament of Ukraine, which became a permanent source of tension in the relations of organs of state authority and threatened the state unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Such a development of the process in Crimea became demoralizing and prolonged, and it caused great alarm and concern to the president of Ukraine, to whom the Constitution entrusted the responsibility for guaranteeing the security of the rights and freedoms of citizens, state sovereignty, and the laws of Ukraine. Therefore, the decision made on 17 March by the Supreme Council of Ukraine concerning the activity of the higher organs of state authority of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, their powers, organizational-legal forms, and legality are a logical conclusion and answer to those events in the autonomy that occurred during the last two years. After all, the stability of the law and legality is the foundation of any normal society and state authority. In those places where laws are in force, the people are also strong, said our ancient ancestors as far back as 2,000 years ago. The reaction of a large part of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to the indicated decisions, which is reflected in the statement of the Crimean parliament of 18 March 1995, was in fact immediate. It would still have been possible to understand the feelings of the people's elect, but it is not possible at all to agree with their assessment and behests that were already based on reason. It is very important to dwell in more detail on these points and to explain what is what and what happened in the life of our republic.

"Through the diktat method," it is said in a statement of the Supreme Council of the autonomous republic, "the higher legislative organ and the president of Ukraine deprive the citizens of the Republic of Crimea of the basis of statehood, abolishing the Constitution itself and state symbols." First, the authorities of the autonomy began to operate by means of the "diktat method," starting with the end of 1991 and the spring of 1992, which more and more began to recall the characters of the story that is familiar to all concerning the golden fish. Second, that which is understood under the statehood of the republic continues to exist in the same form and with the same legislative guarantees, but in the strict constitutional-legal space of Ukraine. In this connection, the decree of the Supreme Council of Ukraine "On the Procedure for Putting Into Effect the Law of Ukraine 'On the Repeal of the Constitution and Other Laws of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea'" confirms the competence of the functioning Supreme Council and the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

The repeal of the constitution of an autonomy, naturally, arouses certain feelings of bitterness, vexation, and possibly even anger. But, after all, such a measure cannot be interpreted as one that is unexpected by our legislators, the leaders of the Crimean parliament, and serious politicians, at least because it was preceded by a whole series of decisions of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, including in particular the decrees of the Supreme Council of Ukraine "On Stopping the Action of the Law of the Republic of Crimea 'On the Restoration of the Constitutional Principles of the Statehood of the Republic of Crimea'" of 20 May 1994; "On the Political-Legal Situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea" of 22 September 1994, and "On the Implementation of the Decree of the Supreme Council of Ukraine 'On the Political-Legal Situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea'" of 17 November 1994.

Unfortunately, not one of the cited decrees of the higher representative organ of state authority was the subject of serious discussion either in the permanent commissions of the Supreme Council of the autonomy, or in the Crimean parliament itself. What is more, the organs of legislative and executive authority of the republic continued their law-making activity, crudely violating the Constitution and the existing legislation of Ukraine. And, as is known, the president of the autonomous republic particularly "distinguished himself" this time, repealing in September 1994 the Constitution that he himself, together with other deputies of the Supreme Council of Crimea, approved on 6 May 1992.

How all of this ended at that time and what the consequences were for the president of the autonomy himself are well known far beyond Crimea's borders. It is also a fact that owing to constitutional measures of the president of Ukraine and of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, the usurpation of power in Crimea and arbitrariness and lawlessness were stopped in time, but the main thing is that the situation was stabilized and the state-legal institutions of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea were preserved. Moreover, in that confrontation of the legislative and executive authorities in Crimea, the president and the Supreme Council of Ukraine displayed not only the highest sense of responsibility for what was occurring in the autonomy and for the fate of the people, but also that delicacy and tact that were shown in mutual relations with the leadership of the Supreme Council of the autonomous republic.

Therefore, the adoption by the parliament of Ukraine on 17 March 1995 of legal acts on the restoration of the constitutional legality and stabilization of the situation in Crimea is directed first of all at protecting the rights and interests of the people of the peninsula, normalizing the activity of all organs of state authority, and increasing their responsibility for observing the Constitution and laws of Ukraine on the territory of the autonomous republic. In this connection, the principal role is to be played by the law of Ukraine "On the Autonomous Republic of Crimea" of 17 March 1995, whose content in fact is not very different from the law of Ukraine "On the Status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea" and the law of Ukraine "On the Demarcation of the Powers Between the Organs of State Authority of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea."

The cited law strengthens the real legal basis of the state-legal status of Crimea and the very large and wide powers of the autonomous republic in the sphere of economics and the socio-cultural sphere to enter into cooperative relations with other states and international organizations, etc. The present structure of the Supreme Council and the government of the autonomous republic have very much to do to implement the law "On the Autonomous Republic of Crimea," including work on questions of state-legal construction in the autonomy. The provision of the law that "the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is an organic part of the legislation of Ukraine and must not contradict the Constitution of Ukraine" increases the legal force of the Basic Law of the autonomy, whose implementation after adoption is guaranteed by the state authority of Ukraine.

The 18 March statement of the Supreme Council of the autonomous republic is evidence of excessive politicization of the deputy corps of the autonomy and the adoption by it of very crucial decisions on the basis of emotions, moods, and easy excitability. This concerns not only what was already mentioned above, but also the provisions of the statement concerning the conclusion of "a large-scale treaty between Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea," and "not to conclude a treaty between Russia and Ukraine without taking into account the interests of the Republic of Crimea and its citizens"—this is blasphemous in general, and those interests that are talked about here are also not comprehensible; finally, "concerning the readiness to remove the moratorium on the general Crimean referendum on the status of Crimea," which is indicative of the obvious backwardness of the politicians of the legislative organs on this question who do not take into account the absolutely new epoch in relations between countries, including the Commonwealth of Independent States, and that great road that we all took on 20 January 1991 and after 1 and 8 December of 1991.

Ex-Agriculture Minister: 'Dual Power' a Reality in Crimea

LD2903194395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1921 GMT 29 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lev Ryabchikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Simferopol March 29 (TASS)—It seems that dual power in the Crimea has become a reality, while the government crisis continues to sweep the republic, despite Crimean parliament chairman Sergey Tsekov's assurances that it has been overcome.

On March 22, the parliament passed a vote of no-confidence in Prime Minister Anatoliy Franchuk. However, Franchuk, who is now in hospital, said that he has no intention to resign. He is currently being substituted for by his deputy Arkadiy Demidenko, who left for Kiev earlier today to attend a session of the Ukrainian government as the acting Crimean prime minister.

Former Minister of Agriculture Anatoly Drobotov, appointed by the Crimean Parliament as a new prime minister, set off on a business trip to the Chernomorksy district of the Crimea today.

Franchuk's office has been sealed pending his return from hospital, while Drobotov moved in one of the empty offices in the same building.

That Franchuk's government actually supports Kiev has been borne out by Ukrainian Vice-Prime Minister Vladimir Plitin's statement published by the newspaper Pravda Ukrainy. Asked if the Crimea's new prime minister has already introduced himself to him, Plitin said that "i do not know him yet."

Asked if Drobotov may share the fate of ex-interior minister of the Crimea Valery Kuznetsov, Plitin said that "very soon."

Official Urges State of Emergency in Regions

AU2903142395 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 25 Mar 95 p 7

[Interview with Major General Leonid Vasylyovych Borodych, first deputy minister of internal affairs, by Mykola Chevelcha; place and date not given: "The Force Capable of Protecting Our Values"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Three years ago, Ukraine's Supreme Council adopted the law "On Internal and Escort Guards Troops." This law has become a legal basis for the activity of special subunits tasked with guarding important state facilities and corrective labor and other institutions. They are affiliated with Ukraine's Ministry of Internal Affairs and, in fulfilling their tasks, cooperate closely with Internal Affairs bodies.

[Borodych] We are accountable before the people for maintaining order in the state. That is why we must take all the necessary measures to improve the situation regarding crime and neutralize and eliminate the numerous criminal groupings—to an extent that regions, particularly problematic in that respect, may be taken under control of special law enforcement troops. Precisely for that reason, the Ministry of Internal Affairs needs its own forces, which may be relied upon when it comes to protecting the law. The president has supported the request on deploying new operational special-purpose regiments within the ministry structure.

[Chevelcha] Leonid Vasylyovych, what is their pattern of subordination and structure? The point is that ill-wishers are already now saying that forces for suppressing democracy are beginning to form within the Ministry of Internal Affairs....

[Borodych] The Internal Affairs troops are a constituent part of the state apparatus, which carries out in the framework of law armed protection of the entire country on the basis of combining the principles of humaneness and law....

The forces and means at the disposal of the troops in oblasts and towns are subordinated to heads of main administrations at the Ministry of Internal Affairs who are senior operational chiefs. Operational and special units and their means of combat actions may only be used within the limits of their jurisdiction. This means that operations conducted by the troops will only be equal to the threat posed to law, order, and security, and the means to be used by them will also match the form in which the threat will emerge: provocation, natural disaster, organized crime, armed attack, technogenic risk, and so on.

[Chevelcha] On the road toward building our state, from declarations to actual practice, our society has become confronted by numerous problems. Our mentality formed in conditions when the Union superstructure itself administered superpower and took upon itself, so to speak, moral losses. Today, sovereign Ukraine must take the sword of law and not just its shield into its own hands. Will it have sufficient spiritual strength for that?

[Borodych] Of course, the problem of spiritual and moral sources of power is not simple at all, since this is a matter of right and duty to administer, so to speak, justice and punishment. Let us consider the problem in its complex. At the same time, a host of factors influence the state of law and order. Here, only about 30 percent depends upon the law enforcement bodies. The rest are economic, political, social, and spiritual factors. The role of the latter is enormous. It is difficult to establish order in a society with disorganized spiritual values. This burdened legacy is the source of criminal cynicism, which manifests itself in the increase in crimes against the individual, in particular, in contract murders. The statistics is quite alarming. However, our efforts in combating this evil also grow. That is why protection of human values is a moral justification for using weapons in the name of the law. That is why our sword is exclusively a means of law enforcement, but in no way a lever for political intrigues.

Thus, reborn spiritual values must become an effective factor in the prevention of crime.

[Chevelcha] However, spiritual means of counteraction will produce their effect later. What will help us today?

[Borodych] Corresponding forces and means. There is no substitute for that. The criminal world has taken maximum advantage of all the negative consequences of the crisis in the economy and in the army to an extent that it poses a threat as a real military formation. Therefore, the only possible response to that may be in the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and their operational assault force.

[Chevelcha] In fulfillment of the presidential edict of 21 July 1994, the troops have already made a weighty contribution to strengthening law and order. However, life demands that the legislative foundation, which determines their functions, be further improved. How do you see the main points of the future state document?

[Borodych] Full guarantee that the troops be depoliticized is the first and most important of them. This is first. The nation's global interests and the need to prevent the state from falling into the abyss of the crisis are above all political considerations. Second, acceptable safety guarantees for the personnel. In other words, our equipment must be at the level of world standards. Proper combat, physical, and spiritual training must be provided. There must also be adequate provision with weapons, hardware, and so on. This army does not necessarily have to be very large, but it must be combat ready, mobile, and protected with armor. It may be smaller, but better. For this, regular army service by contract must be used as much as possible.

One last point. The future law must foresee all cases of putting the Ministry of Internal Affairs Troops into action. Strong power cannot leave the question of who issues the order open. It is a matter of honor for the legislators to take the bitter experience of Chechnya into account. Otherwise, weak law-enforcement may provoke criminals to break the last border, beyond which bloodshed and war will prevail.

[Chevelcha] Which of the Ukrainian regions may already today be listed among those that require introduction of the state of emergency in one form or another?

[Borodych] I would name Kiev, Donetsk, Luhansk, Odessa, the Crimea, and even Lvov. I am sorry about the ancient city of Lvov. I have every respect for the customs and traditions of that part of our state, but law is law. A few days ago, "Sokil" [Falcon—a special-purpose detachment] seized the premises of one of the rayon councils. Failure to use certain measures of counteraction would mean failure to fulfill the law. For example, 111 roads lead out of Kiev. In order to block them, at least 1,500 law enforcers a day may be necessary. This requires special troops. To counter an evil force, we must have our own forces capable of protecting our values and people.

National Guard Edict Said Caused by Generals' Plea

WS2903141895 Kiev SILSKE ZHYTTYA in Ukrainian 23 Mar 95 p 3

[Report by Anatoliy Smetanin: "Four National Guard Generals Made an Ultimatum to the Supreme Council Leadership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As we know, the president of Ukraine issued an edict on 20 January 1995, subordinating almost half of the Ukrainian National Guard units [NGU] and subunits to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This was done without notifying the NGU commander or the Supreme Council leadership, to which the NGU is subordinated in accordance with the law. This resolution stirred up emotions within the NGU's ranks, and made the issue of the expediency of the NGU's existence—discussed in society for a long time—even more urgent.

Being concerned with such a turn of developments, four NGU deputy commanders: General Majors Ihor Valkiv, Volodymyr Mokhov, Valeriy Makarov, and Mykola Melnyk presented Leonid Kuchma with an official note, in which they described their standpoint and specific proposals regarding reform of the NGU. There was also a clause about the expediency of subordinating this military formation to the president, who is commander in chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. There is common sense in this proposal: What kind of commander in chief is he, if the NGU is not subordinated to him? So to speak, the commander in chief should be everybody's chief.

On the other hand, in what other state does the parliament have military formations under its command? This paradox occurred three years ago, when the presidency did not exist in Ukraine.

Things have changed since then, and this mistake should be corrected. The four NGU generals raised this issue in their letter to the head of state. Nevertheless, they did not inform the NGU commander (although they later presented him with a letter) or the Supreme Council leadership. Incidentally, the generals have received no response from the president until now, and meanwhile, they are facing dissatisfaction and biting criticism on the part of lawmakers.

The problem is that People's Deputy Yuriy Kryzskyy, chief of the Supreme Council's Subcommission for Border and Customs Issues, and the NGU, found out about the letter only on 7 March, and Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz even later—on 9 March. They both had the same reaction and requested that the initiator of the letter be identified. The generals were asked this question directly, like pupils in school. Naturally, Yuriy Oleksiyovych [Kryzskyy] received no answer, and the generals told him they would rather resign than answer those kinds of questions.

The generals' reaction forced the lawmaker to seek advice from the legislative speaker. Having heard that in response to the pressure the generals are ready to resign, Oleksandr Oleksandrovych [Moroz] did not hesitate to make the decision: Tell them to write applications for dismissal. The commander passed the news on to his deputies.

So, what do we have now? The NGU commander is appointed by the Supreme Council, and his deputies by the president!? Consequently, only the president himself can dismiss them. However, how can the president accept this? The point is that it was the president who issued the edict on the division of the NGU, and he did not inform those who, according to the law, should have been informed. The generals, we can say, were only following his example.

At present, there is disorder and wavering within the NGU: The generals feel ill-at-ease, their subordinates are confused, and tomorrow does not have anything good in store for them....

Economic Issues

Lugansk Delegation Visits China, Discusses Joint Ventures

WS2903131495 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 1116 GMT 29 Mar 95

[From the "Current Events" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] As UKRINFORM's Beijing-based correspondent reported, on March 29 a Lugansk Oblast Council delegation led by deputy chairman Cholok will wind its visit to China, which involved trips to Dalyan and Shenyan.

An agreement was reached on a visit to Lugansk on April 13 to be paid by Chinese experts and officials, who will probe for setting a joint venture in the Lugansk region for soya processing into pharmaceutical products and foods, and another one for secondary aluminum treatment based on Ukrainian materials and technologies.

Kuchma, Cabinet Discuss Gas Debt

WS2903131895 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 1116 GMT 29 Mar 95

[From the "Current Events" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On Monday, March 27, President Leonid Kuchma attended a Cabinet session, which was chaired by acting Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk and which focused on the critical issue of Ukraine's settlement with Russia and Turkmenistan for natural gas these nations supply to Ukraine.

As was repeatedly noted at the session by many speakers, Ukrainian insolvent natural gas consumers, primarily enterprises under the Ministries of Industry, Power Industry, Engineering, MIC [military-industrial complex] and Conversion, were the underlying reason for Ukraine's mounting external debt for fuels.

Barely 19.2 trillion karbovantsi have been remitted to the national budget's revenues since 1 January 1995, which was only 13.8 percent of the indebtedness sum, which Ukrainian natural gas consumers owe for natural gas piped to them.

As was noted at the session, some of the involved ministries have failed to submit their respective lists of debtor-enterprises to be cut off from natural gas supply lines.

Individual natural gas consumers were said to be normally charged the three times lesser price for natural gas than its actual value. Much of the talk was reportedly about the government's expected moves to cushion the tariff raise's impact on the population.

The session instructed Deputy Prime Minister Ihor Mytyukov together with the National Bank board to develop a clear-cut and reasonable scheme for natural gas settlement, which should be submitted to the government on March 30.

The session also analyzed the state of preparedness for the upcoming Victory Day celebrations together with bonuses and social aid to WWII veterans.

Belarus

IMF Official Confirms Delay of Stand-By Credit

WS3003112295 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1000 GMT 30 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The IMF has delayed granting Belarus a $250-million stand-by credit for an indefinite period of time due to a sluggish pace of reforms in this Republic, [name indistinct], IMF official representative in Minsk, has told INTERFAX. According to him, the country's government has failed to perform functions, which were defined by the government itself in a program for macroeconomic stabilization, and approved by the IMF leader at the beginning of February. In particular, the Belarusian Government has not reduced the inflation rate to 10 percent per month, and has increased municipal tariffs by only 20 percent of their costs, and not by the 40 percent as was envisioned in the program.

Conference Opens on EC Assistance to CIS Countries

WS3003094095 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1400 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On March 29, the fifth annual conference of the TACIS [Technical Assistance to CIS Countries] interstate leading group started at the CIS Headquarters in Minsk. The conference is attended by representatives of all the New Independent States and Mongolia to the TACIS Coordinating Bureau, as well as representatives of the main organs for the CIS—the CIS Executive Secretariat, the Interstate Economic Committee and the Central Asian Interstate Executive Economic Council. The aim of the conference is to discuss the implementation of the TACIS interstate programmes for the previous years and proposals to the programme for 1995. The discussion will cover four specific spheres where the European Commission renders assistance to the CIS—power engineering, the development of transport and telecommunications and the protection of the environment. Mr. Joannes ter Haar, head of division for the Directorate-General for External Relations (DG I) of the European Commission is in the chair of the conference.

Government Fails To Allocate Money for Election Campaign

WS3003090395 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1800 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] As known, at the end of last year the Belarusian parliament voted for the allocation of 68 billion rubles with the indexation of the sum in view of inflation rate in the period before the elections. On March 23 the Supreme Soviet passed a resolution "On the financing of the arrangement and holding of the election of deputies of the Supreme Soviet" which obliged the Cabinet of Ministers to transfer 10 billion rubles on March 25 and 10 billion rubles on March 27 to the Central Commission for Elections and National Referendums.

It became known that the government had transferred 10 billion on March 27 and 6 billion rubles on March 28. This sum is far from being enough to meet election requirements. According to the chairman of the Commission Alyaksandr Abramovich the printing of ballot-papers alone will cost 9 billion rubles. The chairman of the Supreme Soviet Myacheslaw Hryb declared that another 28 billion rubles should be spent on the preelection campaigns of candidates to MP's. According to Mr. Abramovich, taking into account inflation rate in January and February, another 50 billion should be added to the 68 billion rubles.

Prosecutor's Office To Examine Lukashenka Actions

WS3003092995 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1800 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In reply to an appeal by a group of MP's the Prosecutor's Office will draw up a report on the lawfulness of presidential decree number 113 according to which the editor-in-chief of NARODNAYA GAZETA Iosif Syaredzich was relieved of his post, the Attorney General Vasil Shaladonaw declared. However the conclusions that will be contained in the report can only be taken into consideration by the Constitutional Court and judicial organs as the Prosecutor's Office has no right to exercise supervision over presidential decrees and appeal against the decision of the court if a decree is declared illegal. The Prosecutor's Office supervision over the executive power is restricted to the level of ministries and government committees.

As for the opinion that President Lukashenka decided to replace a court when he alleged that in NARODNAYA GAZETA's heading "Letters to President" there were calls for violence and civil confrontation, the Attorney General said: "I cannot tell the president what statements he should make, and what wordings he should use." In general, according to Vasil Shaladonaw, "if a decision is taken by an organ which has no right to do so, the decision is illegal." Incidentally nobody sought advice from the Prosecutor's Office when this famous decree was being drawn up.

Trade Union Demands Signing of 1995 Trilateral Agreement

WS3003093495 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1800 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Independent Trade Union demands the immediate signing of the trilateral General Agreement for 1995. If it is not signed in the near future the Executive Bureau of the Independent Trade Union will urge all trade unions and strike committees to start labour disputes with the government. Assessing the government's activity, the Independent Trade Union leaders pointed out that while the present Cabinet of Ministers was in office the economic crisis was aggravated. The president's initiative to hold a nationwide referendum on the national symbols and languages are defined by them as an attempt "to distract people from economic problems and failure in carrying out the government anti-crisis programme".

Lukashenka's Actions Seen Polarizing Society

WS3003073095 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1251 GMT 28 Mar 95

[Article by Vintsuk Vyachorka, secretary of the Belarusian Popular Front Board: "A Referendum in the Form Suggested by the President Will Disrupt Belarusian Civil Society, Which Is Only Just Forming"; from the "Analyses, Commentaries, Forecasts" feature No. 24, 20-27 Mar 95]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Having accidentally ascended to the summit of Belarusian power, Alyaksandr Lukashenka is an unfavourable object for prognosis. If he was really under the sole influence of a quite reasonable and intellectual team, his behaviour and declarations might be analysed from the point of view of common sense. But each Belarusian television viewer knows that the speeches of Lukashenka come in two forms: those read out from papers and those improvised, which usually start with the words "And now from myself." Probably the president's inspirers and speech writers clutch at their heads listening to these brave improvised passages. But the two last significant speeches of Lukashenka, televised on March 15 and in the Supreme Soviet on March 21, formed a whole in the premeditated campaign, which is pursuing several aims at the same time, and they contained few "from myselfs." Naturally, the aim of his speeches was to frighten the Supreme Soviet, to urge it to self-dissolution for the two months until the election of the new parliament and prepare the public opinion for this. Until self-dissolution the parliament must, according to the idea of the president, ratify the agreements already signed by him with Russia.

The contradiction between the president and the Supreme Soviet as in Russia is impossible in principle in Belarus: our parliament is obliging, MP's were in advance put in a state of dependence by the former and current executive power. Furthermore, both the president and the majority of parliament are under the influence of the Russian leadership and monopoly, even if only their various groups. But every time parliament hinders the president. Besides the not numerous BPF [Belarusian Popular Front], which, as an organised force, sometimes manages to mould the amorphous parliament for the defense of statehood and democratic freedom, the Supreme Soviet speaker Myacheslaw Hryb has begun to realise himself as a politician, who armed himself with the image of the father of the Constitution and therefore has to stand on a self-sufficient, and even independent position.

The presidential team and Lukashenka himself are convinced that the time will come to "turn the screw." The arrival of Yeltsin assured them of the full support of the East. The trips of Lukashenka to Europe, where he fulfilled the political instructions of Moscow, but was given a cordial welcome and even made happy with credit, allowed the presidential team to think that it has a carte blanche from the West as well. The president is intimidating the Supreme Soviet with threats contradicting the Constitution, but quite understandable for each "homo sovieticus"—like that the Law on the President passed by parliament will not come into effect, or promises to use the 100th article of the Constitution (which gives the president a certain authority in the case of a threat to statehood or the like). Intimidating speeches are directed at those MP's who are not interested in the executive power's good graces and are a reserve, let's say, for the collection of the 70 signatures necessary to initiate an alternative referendum. The planned reprisal with the Supreme Soviet in the internal political field seems to be a non-risk enterprise to the president because parliament practically has a rating of nil. The public supported the idea of its self-dissolution and pre-term elections as far back as 1992, when half a million votes were collected for such a referendum by the Popular Front (and MP Lukashenka, incidentally, then championed the Supreme Soviet).

Terror in the mass media, heart-rending intonations and the mentions of legislative documents unknown to the average citizen, but very frightening to the ear (Article 100!) also create uncertainty in society. The Popular Front collectors of signatures to the appeal "Nation against war" which was directed against the Belarusian-Russian military agreements and to which the signatures of 60-80 percent of those asked were placed, say that after the broadcasting of the president's speeches some people began refusing to sign due to fear of repression though they agreed with the wording of the appeal. In its turn the team of Lukashenka with fear is observing the extreme fall in the ratings of the president (according to various estimations, to 25 percent and below). Half a year of the presidency has passed, problems arose with the fulfillment of the preelection promises, and there are no new outlooks. The fall in Lukashenka's popularity, however, does not mean that the sympathy of his electorate is transferred to other figures or political forces. Lukashenka's voters (and these, as a rule, are ignoramuses of various kinds, who now, strange as it may seem, make up the majority of our population) have emerged in a state of total mistrust and are looking to justify themselves or their previous choice.

So here one of the aims of the propagandist volley is to give the electorate of Lukashenka grounds for such a self-justification. The speech of the latter is modelled on the image of the enemy who is hindering the "people's president." This enemy is not the corrupters and the Kebich nomenklatura, which already occupy their former posts in the government of Lukashenka. The enemy was known long ago, as far back as Soviet times—it is the "nationalists," and this means the Belarusian Popular Front. The invitation of the well-known "press-colonel" Zamyatalin—chief propagandist of Kebich— to the post of the chief presidential propagandist is surprising only at first glance. His characteristic temper together with his manner of speaking which in the most various of people invokes identical historical associations with other famous masters of propaganda, it seemed, had disappeared for ever from our television screens after the defeat of Kebich in the elections. For the ambitious Lukashenka to overstep his own pride, evidently, was very difficult. For it was Zamyatalin who directed the most odious propaganda campaign against the opponents of Kebich, including Lukashenka. It is not worth taking the explanations of Lukashenka seriously that he was impressed with the faithfulness of Zamyatalin, in this case to Kebich. That was a premeditated phrase for the public. Evidently, the candidature of Zamyatalin was thrust upon Lukashenka. Zamyatalin is a proved Russian propagandist, and he was necessary for the current regime in exactly this capacity. With the arrival of Zamyatalin an intensification of the anti-Belarusian, pro-Russian propaganda should be anticipated, with the deliberate humiliation of the Popular Front and repression of the press.

Not long ago the initiative of a referendum, which generated from Lukashenka, looked like a political game with no chance of realisation: there are no Constitutional grounds for the holding of a referendum on such questions. But, evidently, it "heated up," and Lukashenka began to exert every effort to realise the idea of a referendum, which undermines the foundations of society. Questions are suggested on the equalising of the status of the Russian and Belarusian languages, on the return to the Soviet state symbols, on economic integration with Russia and the granting of the president authority to dissolve parliament. First and foremost the motives for Lukashenka's behaviour are: to distract public awareness from the failure of economic policy; to speculate on the communist-pro-Russian sentiments of the older generation once again; to be free to take the next step in the surrender of the sovereignty of the country, first the economic independence; to indirectly reinforce the trust of the nation in him.

In addition the referendum is designed to actually disrupt elections to the Supreme Soviet. Its establishment of the day of elections on May 14, which the president is striving for, confirms this. Firstly, the holding of a referendum will destabilise the situation. Before the referendum there will be (and there already is) a sharp increase in social tension. Questions linked directly with the self-determination of Belarus as an independent state, a guarantee of the preservation and development of the Belarusian nation and Belarusian culture, cannot, according to the law, be put to a nationwide referendum. The minority of society who are nationally aware will not submit to the fact that the president is speculating on democratic mechanisms (as known, democracy is not a mechanism, but the state of a civil society, from which we are still a long way). Secondly, the holding of a referendum at the same time as the elections will polarise the positions of all political forces involved in the elections. The electorate will now base its choice not on the grounds of the proposals of candidates, for example, economic programmes or suggestions on a local scale, but the attitude of the candidate to the questions contained in the referendum.

In other words, Lukashenka has struck a double blow on the elections: on one hand, the relevant sum of budget resources is not paid for election purposes, which destabilises the work of election commissions of all levels and creates uncertainty in the members of the commissions, especially at lower levels. On the other hand, the elections shield the referendum. Moreover there will be the subsequent—step by step—restriction of freedom of expression and the intimidation of journalists. The president and his press- colonel Zamyatalin are even trying to frighten the non-state newspapers. In this way, there will be no question of the real freedom of choice of well-informed voters. And, finally, when the referendum takes place and when the question of the expansion of the authority of the president yields a positive result, then Lukashenka will be able to neutralise the results of the elections whatever they are, as he will be granted the right to dissolve parliament. The referendum in the proposed form will disrupt Belarusian civil society, which is only just beginning to form.

To sum up, one can say that the policy of the presidential team is intended not for creation, but for destruction from all sides, after which the next step—and this is not dependent on the political will of Lukashenka— will not be the strengthening of his power, but the incorporation of the country into Big Brother.

Attorney General Presents Crime Report to President

WS2903131295 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1900 GMT 28 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On the basis of statistics on the struggle against organised crime and corruption in 1994 the Prosecutor's Office of Belarus has worked out a report and submitted it for consideration by President Lukashenka. This was announced by the Attorney General Vasil Shaladonaw at a press conference on March 28.

In the report it is pointed out that last year on the territory of Belarus 96 organised criminal groups were revealed, which is two times the number in 1993. Tendency to the appearance of stable gangs that have been acting for 1-5 years is to be observed. The gangs are frequently headed by non-Belarusians. Last year in Minsk alone three such gangs consisting of Ukrainians, Russians, Georgians and Azerbaijanis were registered.

The report also informs the president of crimes in various branches of the national economy and the banking system, of the results of inspections in investment funds and on the market of non-ferrous metals. It contains an analysis of the structure of criminal groups, lays bare the nutrient medium for them in society [sentence as received].

The Prosecutor's Office, according to the Attorney General, draws the president's attention to the necessity of toughening punishment for crimes committed by organised criminal groups. This is emphasized in the draft law on the struggle against corruption and organised crime which was approved by the parliament on its first reading. "We hold that the punishments stipulated by the current Criminal Code are vague and do not give us the opportunity to carry out an effective struggle against crime," Mr. Shaladonaw declared. According to him, it is necessary to raise the lower limit in the established periods of imprisonment as regards quite a number of offences and especially murders. The draft law has more strict determinations to the notions of "gang" and "stable organised group".

Moldova

Students Reiterate Demand for Constitutional Amendment

AU2903191295 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1530 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 29/3/1995—Wednesday morning [29 March], students of higher and secondary educational establishments and their teachers filled the Central Square again, thus having marked the 11th day of their protesting.

At yesterday's press conference, the chairman of the Students' League, Oleg Cernei, failed to name the more or less precise number of young people taking part in the strike, actively or passively. He only said that the strikers are the students and teachers of all 12 higher educational establishments of the Republic, of many colleges, gymnasia, vocational schools, as well as "numerous enterprises and organizations, pensioners and the unemployed who showed their solidarity with the strikers."

The chairman of the Strike Committee, Professor Anatol Petrencu, has stated that due to the growing scale of the protest action, the students' strike committee had been transformed into All-Republican Strike Committee, and new members were included into it. With a due account of their opinion, the Committee has introduced corrections into strikers' demands.

They are insisting, in today's order of priority, to alter Article 13 of the Constitution and to re-name the official language from Moldovan into Romanian. The protesters do not consider this to be a political demand, but just believe this will be a guarantee "that no attempts will be taken in future to change study programmes to meet political interests of those who are at power."

When a Romanian journalist proposed to transform the demands into a political programme, Oleg Cernei has stated categorically that the students are not going to do that, because they consider all their demands to be socio-economic ones.

Anatol Petrencu answered your correspondent that negotiations with the government commission have been stopped, because the Strike Committee cannot agree with the commission's chief condition: to negotiate only after the street manifestations are over.

Snegur Halts Changes in History, Language Curriculum

AU2903191895 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1530 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 29/3/1995—Moldovan President Mircea Snegur signed an edict Wednesday [29 March] by which a moratorium shall be imposed on taking the Education Ministry's decision concerning changes in history and language studies in Moldovan education establishments.

As explained by the Presidential Press Service, the edict was signed "to prevent further aggravation of socio-political situation in the republic with regard to the students' and teachers' strike which began on March 21."

By another presidential edict, a special commission has been set up headed by Alexandru Scerbanschi, presidential adviser, to study the economic demands of the strikers.

Sangheli: Student Unrest Causing 'Irreparable Damage'

AU2903193895 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1530 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 29/3/1995—Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli has appeared with a statement containing government's appraisal of the protest action by students and their teachers that has been taking place in Chisinau for 11 days already.

"It is a great pity that a part of youngsters have become a card in the opposition's anti-state gamesmanship. The evidence for that are the statements made at the rallies, slogans, presence of foreign flags and foreigners at the square," Sangheli said.

Having remarked that "burning books at the square are an action unheard-of in Europe since 1933," the prime minister has stated that "the scenario of the unrest was elaborated long ago, when the anti-state opposition had felt that its authority among people was declining, and that the idea of unification with Romania was rejected by the nation."

In government's estimates, "the Chisinau opposition cannot be satisfied that the new Parliament has solved the southern problem in practice, and that the Dniester dispute was advancing to its settlement. There are no doubts that the protesters' actions are targeted on slowing down and then on stopping the fast process of our integration into international structures, first and foremost into the Council of Europe and European Union. An attempt is being made to damage the prestige of the Republic of Moldova as an independent state conducting, consecutively and irreversibly, democratic reforms in political and economic fields," Sangheli said.

Commenting the opposition's demands to unify the Republic of Moldova with Romania, the head of government said that "these demands will only cause discontent and indignation of the Moldovan population with regard to the neighbour country, will cast doubt on the possibility to develop cooperation between the two states, which is not desirable."

The protest actions have inflicted irreparable moral damage on schoolchildren, too, who, owing to the reckless behaviour of their teachers and school directors, had to be present in the streets. "What teacher's honour can we speak about if children are being threatened with low grades in case they refuse to go to the rally?" the prime minister questioned.

Sangheli said that even if the government have satisfied all the strikers' demands, "the scenario authors will not stop fighting until they have achieved their ultimate goals, or until the law-enforcement bodies have cut their actions in accordance with law in force. It is quite evident that the opposition is trying to provoke the police, and to split the population into two antagonistic camps."

The government has appealed to all participants of the strike, to teachers and parents of the students and schoolchildren to think over possible consequences of the manifestations, and to give them up.

'Measures' Called For Against Opposition Leaders

AU2903193995 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1530 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 29/3/1995—The government is ready to defend the statehood and Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli stated in Parliament Wednesday [29 March] evening.

In his words, hiding behind the students' backs are those political forces who, like in 1992, are trying to ruin the Moldovan statehood.

The prime minister voiced an opinion that the Parliament should take measures against the opposition parliamentary factions of Peasants and Intellectuals and of the Popular Front—namely Iurie Rosca, Alexandru Mosanu, Valeriu Matei, Mihai Ghimpe, Valentin Dovganiuc, Sergiu Mocanu—who had taken active part in the unsanctioned rallies at the Central Square.

The executive power is capable to defend the statehood and public accord in the society, the prime minister emphasized.

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev: New Parliament Should Have Two Chambers

LD2903132295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0756 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Almaty, 29 Mar—Kazakhstan's new parliament must have two chambers. President Nursultan Nazarbayev said this today at a regular congress of the country's trade unions which opened in the republic's capital. Nazarbayev believes that if this happens "the upper chamber could concentrate on legislation and monitoring functions, whereas the lower chamber could concentrate on representative functions."

The head of state has no doubts about the difficulty of achieving such a radical reform in the legislature. This is why he has named constitutional reform as the republic's top priority. Without this, the country "will end up with the same parliament as the previous one, since Kazakhstan's constitution, which is based on a compromise between Soviet power and the institution of the presidency, has already become an obstacle of sorts on the path toward market reform."

The Kazakh leader sees improving the legal system as his priority task, since postponing this until the election of the new parliament "would be harmful to the state and people." The president has made a list of the basic legally binding draft decrees and legislative acts which the former parliament has no time to deal with, using the additional powers granted to him by law. Nursultan Nazarbayev intends to sign these decrees and acts in the very near future. He believes that the economy and enterpreneurial culture—which is just finding its feet—will go under without them. First and foremost, the documents include tax and customs codes, laws on bankruptcy, the civil service, banks and licensing.

The head of state criticized those who consider the Constitutional Court ruling on the illegitimacy of the former Supreme Soviet to be wrong. Nursultan Nazarbayev stressed that these people "fiercely opposed totalitarianism at the dawn of perestroyka, and demanded that the principle of the division of powers and of real independence for the judiciary be confirmed. They have suddenly made a U-turn. They are trying to revive totalitarian methods and put pressure on the Constitutional Court."

Nazarbayev To Continue Constitutional Reform

LD2903142595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1331 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ALMATY, Mar 29 (Interfax)—Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev plans "to continue economic changes, start a constitutional reform and prepare for parliamentary elections" if the majority of republican citizens vote for the extension of his powers till the year 2000. A statement to this effect was made by Nazarbayev today at a congress of the Kazakh Trade Union Federation.

In the words of Nazarbayev, the referendum "will spare society a power struggle at this difficult time" and will help to consolidate statehood and order in the republic.

He thinks that Kazakhstan is "living through the most difficult period: firstly, this is the decisive stage of socioeconomic reforms, secondly, a major anti-crime campaign has been launched and, thirdly, the country is having a parliamentary crisis."

The head of state stressed that "the situation demands a confirmed popular vote of confidence in the President elected in 1991. That is why I agreed with the proposal of the Assembly of Kazakhstan Peoples to hold the referendum."

"If the people say 'yes' at the referendum, I will carry out reforms for the sake of better living standards, make laws to ensure the equality of all people, consolidate integration on the basis of the draft Euro-Asian union with all neighbors, carry out the peace policy inside and outside the country and take anti-crime measures," said Nazarbayev.

He described as a prime necessity the adoption of a taxation code, laws on bankruptcy, mortgage and securities, and a legal reform.

The president stressed he has no ambitions for power. "God has already given me lot. You have known me for years, all of my policy has been held before your eyes," he said.

Nazarbayev called on citizens to attend the referendum on April 29 and voice their opinion. "This is needed by all Kazakh citizens, every family who does not want Kazakhstan to repeat the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya or Tajikistan. This is needed by those who believe that we are able to overcome the crisis," stressed Nazarbayev.

Nazarbayev's 'Foreign Adviser' Moskovich Profiled

954F1904A Almaty KARAVAN in Russian No 14, 24 Mar 95 p 4

[Interview with Alex Moskovich, foreign adviser of the president of Kazakhstan, by Maksim Makarov; place and date not given: "Who Is Advising Nursultan Nazarbayev?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **His fervor is enviable. His loquacity and obstinacy are irritating. He is an inveterate debater and he is as inquisitive as a woman.**

His biography is a firework of sensational events and names. A politician and businessman, he was for many years by the side of General de Gaulle. He has met Nikita Khrushchev and Andre Malraux, Leonid Brezhnev and Chaban-Delmas, Boris Yeltsin and Vittorio de Sica. He

has been deputy mayor of Paris, made money in the USSR and the United States, and has put his hand to European policy.

He was born in Kiev, but he made a brilliant career in France, and fought fascism in Africa (an officer of the Order of the Legion d'Honneur), but only in 1966, having come to the Union, did he learn that his mother had in the war years met her death at Babiy Yar.

He has apartments in Moscow and Paris and he is a welcome guest in European capitals and across the ocean (he has friends everywhere), and he stays in Almaty and smokes cigarette after cigarette....

Aleksey Aleksandrovich (Alex) Moskovich is a foreign adviser of the president of Kazakhstan. He receives no compensation. He does not need the money.

What sort of man is the president's adviser?

Let the man himself answer this question.

[Moskovich] He is a man who has squeezed out his life like a lemon and drunk the juice to the last drop.... Of course, life has hit me both in the mug and in the ass and as best it could, but it has not gotten the better of me.

[Makarov] You are a fighter?

[Moskovich] My credo is two eyes for one eye, for a tooth, the whole mug.

[Makarov] Are you fighting here also, in Kazakhstan?

[Moskovich] Yes, I am fighting stupidity, incompetence, and two-bit interests. Against our officials....

[Makarov] You said "our?"

[Moskovich] I work for Kazakhstan, consequently, I am entitled to say "our"!... Well, then, I want our officials to be competent and to understand how to defend the interests of their state in a professional dialogue with people who have come to Kazakhstan from another planet, it may be said. I want our officials to know how to choose their partners. For it is not what but with whom that is the more important.

[Makarov] What does Kazakhstan need today? The most important thing?

[Moskovich] Order and stability. Kazakhstan needs an iron fist in a velvet glove.... You know what kind of man I am?

[Makarov] Listen... you are an old man. Eighty-four....

[Moskovich] Eighty-three and a half.

[Makarov] So be it. But at your age people are thinking about their soul, sitting on the outside wall, growing flowers.... Surely you understand that your time has passed. Irreversibly. Or have you nothing with which to occupy yourself and have come to Kazakhstan today out of boredom to portray a serious economist?

[Moskovich] Had I nothing to do, I would have expired from boredom long since because I simply have no interest in growing flowers or taking part in veterans' meetings. I am interested in thinking and acting. This was why I came to Kazakhstan.

[Makarov] To think and act?

[Moskovich] Yes! Since the start of perestroyka everything here has gone other than it should have.

[Makarov] How should it have?

[Moskovich] First, the economy, then, glasnost. But you did everything the other way about, which immediately led to a lack of discipline and screw-ups.

[Makarov] But you could just as successfully have gone to Colombia, for example, or Zimbabwe....

[Moskovich] No, I would not go to Colombia. I was born in a country which at that time, before 1917, was called Great Russia and then the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan was a part of this country.

[Makarov] And now you, a patriot of Russia, a Jew by birth, and a Frenchman by upbringing, sit here in Almaty, in a robe with the Kazakh national design....

[Moskovich] Please understand.... I am a person who must in life rely on some other person. I need a person whom I admire. Once this was General de Gaulle. We, his associates, looked on the general roughly as the knights of the Round Table looked on King Arthur. The sole person of those in power following the disintegration of the Soviet Union whom I admire both as a politician and as a statesman is the president of Kazakhstan. This is why I am here. Otherwise I would not be. I did not, after all, know in 1990 what Kazakhstan was or where Kazakhstan was. My interest in Kazakhstan is primarily in Nazarbayev.

[Makarov] Do you tell him unpleasant things?

[Moskovich] At my first meeting with President Nazarbayev we agreed that I would have the right to think out loud. And since then I have told him everything that I think. Because no one else will tell him this.

[Makarov] You have spoken about an iron fist in a velvet glove.... What, then, in your view, is democracy? What is Gaullism and what is enlightened despotism?

[Moskovich] A splendid question! Democracy is government of the people by the people for the people. But nowhere in the world does this exist because oligarchies rule throughout the world. Financial, industrial, and so forth. Gaullism is the simultaneous use by the state of three priorities—independence, the authority of the state, and social progress. De Gaulle was an enlightened despot, and his power was approximately the same as that of Louis XIV. But the goal was the good of the people.

[Makarov] So you are proposing that we live under the conditions of despotism?

[Moskovich] Just a minute, never use the word "despotism" without having added "enlightened," this would then be dictatorship and terror, but enlightened despotism is the authority of the state, that is, the presence of a master, but a master who does not abuse power. This is the difference between de Gaulle and Louis XIV.

[Makarov] What have you advised President Nazarbayev?

[Moskovich] I?...

[Makarov] The people do not have it good....

[Moskovich] Just a moment, first, General de Gaulle taught me that if I want to understand something, I must look at it from a star. Then much becomes more comprehensible and clearer.... For the peoples of Kazakhstan to enjoy better lives, colossal foreign investments are needed. And order and stability are essential for this. And the corresponding conditions. We will now, I hope, alter taxation policy. This will afford Kazakhstan's industry an opportunity to develop. Our heavy industry needs to be reserved to the state. Plants cannot be given away to some if the well-being of others depends on them. What else? Private ownership of the land is needed. Rules of the game are needed. Permanent rules, not ones that change by the day. The state should determine the main priorities within whose framework unrestricted private initiative should develop. For example, if there are too many doctors in the state, the orientation should be one of sending fewer students to the medical faculty, more, for example, to the economic faculty.... This is how everyone, in France included, lives.

[Makarov] You have spoken about private ownership of the land. There is no parliament currently, the president has all the power. Why should he not....

[Moskovich] I understand you. The president will never agree to arbitrary decisions, not having consulted the people. He has a splendid method for this, it is called a referendum. He may adopt a "despotic" decision, but it must correspond to public morals.

[Makarov] And who is preventing him holding a referendum?

[Moskovich] From where have you learned that he will not be doing so in the very near future?

[Makarov] And the question of Russian?

[Moskovich] Well, first, I have noted with pleasure that in a splendid moment the president decided to print money in two languages. I believe that if Kazakh is the state language, and Russian, an official language, the problem will disappear. Yes, bilingualism is needed, of course, but account also has to be taken of the cherished aspirations of the Kazakh people, who mistakenly considered themselves colonized.

[Makarov] Mistakenly?

[Moskovich] Yes. I am studying the history of the Kazakh people, it is a very interesting history.

[Makarov] Does Nazarbayev heed your advice?

[Moskovich] Sometimes, yes, sometimes, no. Understand, he has assumed the fullness of responsibility. And it is always easier to advise than to make decisions.

[Makarov] Were you to feel that your thoughts were meeting with no response in him, you....

[Moskovich] Would go.

[Makarov] Let us return to the iron fist in the velvet glove.... Are you sure that the president will not want to remove this glove one day?

[Moskovich] I am not sure, I am convinced. It is something else that I fear....

[Makarov] Namely?

[Moskovich] I fear his excessive humanity. It is simply essential now to display toughness to achieve results.... We should not stand in his way. He must create the conditions for serious foreign investors. And he will do so. Because he understands that you do not catch flies with vinegar, you catch them with sugar.

[Makarov] This is the economy, but there is policy also. Our age is frequently called the age of nationalism.

[Moskovich] Racism, nationalism, purity of blood—this is just rubbish.

Everything has been mixed up like this since man has existed. If you believe the Gospels, we all have one great grandfather—Adam—and one great grandmother—Eve—but I do not believe this.

[Makarov] You do not believe in God at all?

[Moskovich] No, I am not an atheist, I am an agnostic, that is, I do not say that there is no God, and I do not say that there is a God, I admit that I do not know. The most intelligent man—Einstein—put it this way: "However strange, the world has, in all probability, some meaning." There is, in all probability, a meaning to life, which is beyond our grasp. But a divine Being as such had to have been omnipotent and good, and if not good, then not omnipotent. Why all the sufferings borne by children? I cannot agree with this. As far as religion is concerned, I believe that we need to submit to some set of morals, and man should formulate his own morals himself, what is more.

[Makarov] Have you sinned much in your life?

[Moskovich] I do not know, most likely....

[Makarov] Women?

[Moskovich] If this is a sin.... I was always a ladies' man, and I had many women. I would fall in love often.

[Makarov] And they with you?

[Moskovich] This was of no interest to me. I view this as being like a well-roasted chicken that is brought to me for dinner. I do not ask it whether it loves me. The main thing is that I love it. I do not think that this is a sin. A sin is when you feel ashamed. And this has been the case with me repeatedly also....

[Makarov] Do you remember everything?

[Moskovich] I had a dog, for example. It took ill, and we treated it. But it was already quite old, it had gone blind, it could barely walk and it was living with me at the dacha for the summer. I loved it very much. And before leaving for Paris, it had to be given a shot. I called it—when the vet came, it had gone into hiding—I called it, and it came, stumbling, it could no longer see anything. I fed it some meat and gave it some sugar, it was put to sleep and then given the injection, and this, in all probability, was the most dreadful moment in my life....

There was another moment also, in the war. I had taken 60-70 Germans prisoner, brought them to our barracks, and had gone up to see the colonel, who was commander of the brigade. I was speaking with him for about 15 minutes. When I came down, I heard shots: a captain, with whom I was on very friendly terms—he had been a lawyer in London before the war—a very humane man, had gone out to our soldiers and was asking for three volunteers. Five offered to go, and they executed these prisoners.

[Makarov] They probably had personal scores to settle with the Germans?

[Moskovich] We had lost many people during the attack. This captain had lost his best friend.... I could not sleep at nights following the execution of the prisoners.... Yes, I had hunted the enemy, and there were 14 notches on my carbine—these were fascists whom I had killed personally—I am not counting those whom our tanks killed. I am counting those whom I killed with my own hand.

[Makarov] Are you a wealthy man?

[Moskovich] Perhaps. Even if I live another 20 years, my daughter will have enough for her life. But this is not the point.... I always told her that money could be stolen from her—by people, the state, revolution—but what a person has in his head—no one can steal it from him. She is a lawyer, she works like a horse, and everything with her is fine.

[Makarov] What do you fear most in life?

[Moskovich] A difficult question.... I am afraid of needless physical suffering.

[Makarov] You want an easy death?

[Moskovich] Yes, I ask God for an easy death.

[Makarov] You are not tired of living?

[Moskovich] No, but I have loaded revolvers everywhere. If I feel that I have no further interest in living, I will immediately put a bullet in my brain.

[Makarov] Are you afraid of death? Some old people say that they are not afraid.

[Moskovich] Everything living fears death, but I am a very inquisitive person, and I have a dual attitude toward death: It is unpleasant for me to think that I will someday not exist, but at the same time I am very curious—what if there is something there.

[Makarov] De Gaulle said that if you want to understand, go to a star. What does Moskovich see from his star?

[Moskovich] I see the Kazakhstan of my president. He will achieve his ends, and life will become better.... You want to know when? I do not make forecasts. I am not Moses, Jesus Christ, or Mohammed. Not even Karl Marx....

Former Supreme Council Deputy on Court Ruling, Veto, Referendum

954F1906A Almaty KARAVAN in Russian No 14, 24 Mar 95 p 7

[Interview with former Supreme Council Deputy Marash Nurtazin by Yelena Poluyanova; place and date not given: "Referendum Is Needed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Marash Nurtazin is a deputy of the previous "self-disbanded" parliament, a member of the commission on the current new constitution, and a candidate for deputy in the disbanded parliament who ran in the elections by presidential list and did not get enough votes. In short, a person whose political fate reflects all the peripeteia of the development of the institution of parliamentarism in Kazakhstan.**

[Poluyanova] Marash Mukhamediyevich, political scientists interpret the current situation as a parliamentary and at the same time constitutional crisis. Only a year ago it apparently seemed clear to everybody that there had been violations of the law during the elections, but everybody looked the other way.

[Nurtazin] This is not true. Immediately after the nomination, Marat Ospanov and I contacted the Central Electoral Commission [CEC] several times, pointing out the violations of Article 111 of the constitution, which says: "Each voter has one vote; candidates participate in elections on an equal basis." I was a deputy of the previous parliament and had a rather high political rating. However, subjectivism in vote counting permitted the commission to automatically count the votes cast against me as those in favor of my opponent. This created a broad field for abuse by the electoral commission.

The CEC, guided by bureaucratic ambitions, ignored our communications; in Karaganda, the oblast electoral commission, having realized that the CEC decision was unconstitutional, prepared a protocol with the decision "one ballot—one vote," but the CEC ignored their decision.

[Poluyanova] How do you feel about the Constitutional Court's ruling?

[Nurtazin] The Constitutional Court did the right thing. But no less correct is the veto imposed on this ruling by the president and the Supreme Council chairman, because in issuing a ruling on the unconstitutionality of the elections, the court violated the law on the constitutional court, in particular, Article 14, which sets a six-month time limit on issuing rulings.

I do not think that the jurists on the presidential staff are less qualified that those in the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, the popularly elected president and the Supreme Council found themselves helpless in the face of the legal special case into which the Constitutional Court plunged them. By violating the law, the Constitutional Court placed itself in a stronger position than the executive and legislative authority. Nobody could have envisaged that the Constitutional Court would decide to act as described by Saltykov-Shchedrin: "If nobody permits us, we will permit ourselves." The justices' excuses—valid reasons and lack of financing—sound unprofessional, to put it mildly.

Imperfections in the constitution brought the parliament to its knees before its own child—the Constitutional Court. The consequences could be even more grave. The current legislative base does not give the president the right to interfere in the Constitutional Court's activities, despite the fact that in this case the court itself violated the law. This legal special case showed that there are still serious shortcomings in the constitution.

[Poluyanova] That is, it is the court that won, not the law?

[Nurtazin] Yes, in defending the constitution, the court violated the law.

After the Constitutional Court issued its first ruling and the president vetoed it, the situation still could be saved. But over the year of its work the parliament discredited itself so much that it could no longer count on voters' support.

[Poluyanova] We are talking about two forces in the political arena—judicial and legislative. But there was also a third...

[Nurtazin] Yes, the president. The parliament tried to force the president to violate the law, but it would be a fair guess that afterward that this violation would be turned against the president.

[Poluyanova] There is an opinion, however, that having declared the parliament illegitimate, the president got rid of the opposition that had begun to actively form within its walls. And its core consisted of precisely state list deputies.

[Nurtazin] The idea was for the 42 deputies nominated to the parliament through the state list to form its intellectual core, to "pull" the parliament up to a professional level. Instead, they created politicized chaos in lawmaking.

[Poluyanova] In your opinion, what will happen next?

[Nurtazin] The new era begins with the additional powers delegated to the president. We have a temporary vacuum of representative authority, which the president, as guarantor of the constitution, must fill. I think we will now encounter the practice of adopting truly fateful decisions. And the first one should be the law on the referendum, a direct expression of the will of the people. Questions of the language, private ownership of land, and others will be decided by the people, not two or three politicians. By the way, one of the referendum questions could be the question of confidence in the president. In the environment of a society without a parliament, this would become an affirmation of the democratism of the authority.

[Poluyanova] If the law on referendum is adopted...

[Nurtazin] It will be; otherwise, a democratic principle will be violated: that the people must decide on, and arrange, their own destiny.

[Poluyanova] What is your vision of the new parliament?

[Nurtazin] I think it will have two chambers. The upper chamber—the intellectual core, consisting of heads of administrations and appointed deputies and with right of veto over the lower chamber's decision; and the lower chamber—what is called deputies from the people. You may say that it is undemocratic to appoint deputies from "above." But let us not reinvent the wheel—this is precisely what is done in the countries of developing democracies.

A deputy elected according to the "one of us" principle cannot always bring his outlook up to the level of state interests. By the way, we recently had an example of this. The first thing former parliament members did was deal with the questions of their own material support. And something else. We are used to citing American experience. Well, over there people do not get into the parliament from street rallies.

Karaganda Nonpayment, Extraction Problems Detailed

954F1867A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent Vera Galaktionova, with commentary by Vladimir Klyakin, chief of the coal and nuclear industry department of the Republic of Kazakhstan Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry: "The Experiment Is Becoming Increasingly Dangerous: In the Karaganda Coal Basin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Karaganda—The Karaganda coal basin is continuing an experiment unprecedented in world practice—underground coal extraction without subsidies. Previous strikes by the Karaganda miners drew a line under the long and fruitless wait for the state to take part in preservation of the republic's coal sector.

The actual state of affairs in the region today is this: The many-thousand-strong miners collective is being split into mini-productions, losing in the process various "auxiliary" spheres, including social and scientific. Since 1 March the basin has been implementing a transition to the full economic independence of the Karagandaugol [Karaganda Coal] association's enterprises, which are now opening their own operating accounts. The new economic mechanism being put into effect will no longer permit a mine or strip mine to properly maintain, with the proceeds of coal sales, specialized and auxiliary coal production units. How it will affect, for instance, mining rescue services is not difficult to predict. In order to have a more or less decent life, miners will have to sharply increase the volume of production, utilizing worn-out mining equipment and no longer paying particular attention to safety. An increased number of production-related accidents, directly proportional to the increase in coal production in new conditions, is quite predictable: The quantity of coal produced is the quantity of money the miners have not seen for a long time.

The distribution market is guaranteed today only for mines producing coking coal used in metallurgy. Those who produce steam-generating, and cheaper, coal now have complete freedom of action in searching for buyers. Miners producing steam-generating coal find themselves among people without a certain future.

The inglorious end to the strike brought an end to the "common kitty," which enabled the basin to keep the situation level by redistributing income. But general leadership is still necessary, since it is now implementing a reorganization aimed at strict accounting for every kopek earned and cutting off everything that is considered a "side-line," which later perhaps will have to be resurrected at the cost of great effort—after many unrecoverable losses.

* * *

The question of preserving the coal production sector and, accordingly, the vitality of the Karaganda region, while remaining unresolved, has at the same time become more burning.

After the last strike did not achieve its goals, spontaneous miners' walkouts, unsanctioned by workers and trade union leaders, followed at the imeni Bazhanova and Kirovskaya mines. At the imeni Kostenko mine a group of tunnelers declared a hunger strike and demanded access to air time on oblast television. Wives, mothers, and sisters of those on hunger strike underground spent nights on the surface of the mine after adopting an appeal to the authorities.

I will remind readers that KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA has written about the inevitable transition from organized forms of miners' struggle for their rights to spontaneous actions whenever strikers' demands are ignored. The prognosis has begun to come true. And still, how did the situation at the mines escape out of the control of the miners trade union's territorial committees?

Nikolay Bandaletov, instructor of the territorial committees' organizational department, replies: "Following the trade unions, the miners observed legality, but after being on strike for more than a month had achieved nothing. This means that the laws they abided by did not serve their purpose. Now the miners do not want to think about what they should and should not do. They will no longer put up with the lawlessness of the legalistic leadership incapable of helping the miners defend their human rights. People are on the brink of dying from poverty, and all they have is the gloomy prospect of mines closing..."

An expanded session of the coordinating workers committee of the miners trade union was held in Karaganda, which ended in new elections. Vladimir Salanin became the new chairman of the coordinating committee.

The expanded session also made a decision to urgently implement structural changes in the organization of the trade union movement in the region, namely, to create workers committees at all mines. These committees will now jointly implement leadership and coordination of the struggle for miners' rights.

The editors asked Vladimir Klyakin, chief of the coal and nuclear industry department of the Republic of Kazakhstan Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry, to comment on the exacerbation of the situation in Karaganda mines:

"The situation that is developing in the republic's coal sector, first and foremost in Karaganda, is indeed serious and requires solutions that should fundamentally change attitudes toward miners and their labor. I can tell you with certainty that the questions they are raising are justified.

"Take the aforementioned subsidy problem. This is not merely what the miners want—this is a practice that has been established over many years in the coal industry all over the world. States and governments everywhere subsidize underground coal mining. Here are the figures. Fixed costs comprise about 65 percent of the production cost of one tonne of coal. These are expenses that are practically independent of the total volume of production and are needed to maintain mine faces in working conditions and ensure the safety of the people. It is impossible to discount these costs in underground mining. Well, according to our researchers, in 1992-1993 in coal- producing EEC countries total subsidies amounted to more than $6 billion, or $35 per tonne on average. In England this indicator measured $13, in Germany—$70, and in France—about $100. The Russian Government provides the same support. And only in Kazakhstan, after the sector's transfer under republic jurisdiction, underground coal production lost state subsidies.

"From our viewpoint, this resulted in a 13-15 percent decline in coal production in Kazakhstan over the past three years. We are working on this key question and I believe that very soon our government will change its attitude towards subsidizing coal production.

"Now about the position of Karaganda miners, which is being expressed in strikes, and now also in hunger strikes. This is the logical reaction of tired and desperate people, an extreme form of standing up for their rights. Sad as it is, even such extreme forms of protest do not always bring the desired results anymore.

"The stumbling block is nonpayments on the part of coal consumers, which to a great extent slows down all work and necessitates delays in paying wages. As of 1 March, arrears in wages in the Karaganda coal basin had reached 3.5 billion tenge. Not all enterprises and collectives have yet been paid wages for last November, not to mention wages for subsequent months. And not only the mines: Other enterprises acting as general subcontractors of the Karagandaugol state holding company [SHC] are in the same situation. In particular, a similar situation exists in militarized mining rescue units responsible for safety, and in the leading sectoral institutes Kazniiugol [Kazakhstan Coal Research Institute] and Karagandagiproshakht [Karaganda State Institute for Mine Design], which have not received a single tenge this year for their work on contracts with Karagandaugol, and hence also owe a lot of money to their employees.

"Government Decree No. 74, dated 24 January 1995, did of course play a role. I want to remind you that it postpones until 1 January 1996 repayment of the debt by the SHC Karagandaugol and the GAO [state joint-stock company] Ekibastuzkomir, which they accumulated during 1994 after they took credits for wages, as well as their debt to the budget. A decision also was made to accept shipments of coal to state reserves from July 1995 to July 1996 as a means of repaying the debt to the state budget. In keeping with the decree, consumers began to repay their debts to the coal industry. All in all, about 1.5 billion tenge of this debt has now been repaid.

"I will repeat, however, that these measures are not enough to fundamentally correct the situation. Now the main efforts of both coal-producing enterprises and the ministry must be concentrated on resolving the nonpayments problem, and on quickly resolving at government level the question of subsidies to underground coal mining. These are the two main problems. Until they are resolved, no serious recovery of the sector should be expected."

Tajikistan

CIS Forces Launch Combat Exercises

LD2903140095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1329 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] DUSHANBE, Mar 29 (Interfax)—On Wednesday [29 March] morning the CIS collective peacekeeping force launched combat practice in Tajikistan's mountainous Shaartuzskiy District, some 280 kilometers south-east of Dushanbe.

Colonel-General Valeriy Patrikeyev is commanding the troops, who are focusing their attention on coordination between their elements and "the growth of their fighting potential."

The commander-in-chief of Russia's ground forces Colonel-General Vladimir Semyonov is watching the exercises. He told journalists that the exercises can "to a certain extent be seen as a show of force meant to impress those who may be cherishing plans to destabilize the region."

Units representing all arms of the Commonwealth peacekeeping force, including the Air Force and artillery, are engaged in the exercises. They total 1,500 men. Elements of Russia's 201st motorized rifle division, based in Tajikistan, Uzbek elements in the peacekeeping force and part of the Russian border guards in Tajikistan are also taking part in the action.

Tajik troops are not taking part in the exercises because of the inter-Tajik ceasefire agreement bans, until April 28, all troop movement and combat drills by Tajik military.

The president and defense minister of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan's defense minister, the head of the UN military observers in Tajikistan and the Russian and U.S. ambassadors to Dushanbe are watching the exercises.

On Wednesday evening the exercises will be over and the high-ranking Russian, Uzbek and Tajik military will discuss the results.

Russian Border Guard Chief Holds News Conference

LD2903141495 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Radio Network in Russian 1330 GMT 28 Mar 95

[From the 'Youth Channel' program]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is no doubt that the Russian border guards will keep their word, as they have done before without sparing their own lives in previous years. Meanwhile, the situation on the border has become more tense. And it is obvious that the visit by Andrey Nikolayev, director of the Russian Federal Border Service, as Russia's border troops are now called, to our republic was not accidental.

At an improvised news conference at Dushanbe airport, he answered journalists' questions about the purpose of his visit, and said in particular:

[Begin recording] [Nikolayev] First, I want to say that some time has passed since the meeting of CIS heads of state in Almaty. As you may know, documents were published, some of the issues dealt with in Almaty concerned the regulation [word indistinct] of Tajikistan.

There are some tasks put to the military and non-military structures, including the border guards. In the course of a month roughly, preparations were carried out with the aim of being ready to implement the tasks set by the heads of state and by Russia's readiness to solve these tasks. A major inspection was held, a complete inspection of the group of troops. And so, to review the results of the inspection and to solve the tasks along with the leadership of the republic of Tajikistan, which must to be carried out as quickly as possible in the interests of ensuring the security of borders: This is the purpose of my visit. I have a number of major considerations which must be conveyed on the orders of the Russian president.

[Unidentified correspondent] And how do you assess the situation today on the southern borders of the CIS countries?

[Nikolayev] It is abnormal. Unfortunately, there have been no radical changes in this situation. We, in principle, see the prolongation of the cease-fire as satisfactory. But, unfortunately, the decision on prolonging the cease-fire at the political level is not being supported by actions on the border. Well, that is our analysis. On average, every seven or eight hours there is either an exchange of fire or an attempt to violate the state border. And the gangs and groups of guerrillas number from two people to 34 people, depending on the direction they are moving in.

If there is a readiness from the Tajik armed opposition's side to provide security for the citizens of Tajikistan and the citizens of Afghanistan on the both sides of the border, then we are ready for this. There is an appropriate agreement with the Republic of Tajikistan on fulfilling our obligations in the CIS.

[Correspondent] Tell me please: The opposition is insisting on Russian border troops taking part in the inter-Tajik talks as a third party.

[Nikolayev] Well, first, as you know, inter-Tajik talks are the talks between the Tajiks themselves. And most likely, the presence of the border guards, [pauses] well, you know, Russia has been attending the talks as an observer and, together with other countries, it is taking an active part in preparing and holding these talks. So, in principle, they cannot do without Russia there. But we are not a party to the agreement, the inter-Tajik agreement. Our function is based on agreements signed between the Russian Federation and the Tajikistan on ensuring border protection. And in this sphere in particular a relevant agreement was signed within the CIS framework. So, I think, as for the inter-Tajik dialogue, we welcome it because we are linked to it directly. And as for our own participation, I think our participation would not be relevant. [end recording]

And so, maybe Andrey Nikolayev is right to say that the fate of Tajikistan is in the hands of the Tajiks themselves. And the success of the inter-Tajik dialogue will depend on the negotiating sides.

Uzbekistan

Karimov on Referendum Result, Future Tasks

LD2803154195 Tashkent Uzbekistan Television in Uzbek 1630 GMT 27 Mar 95

[Interview with President Islam Karimov by four unidentified correspondents; questions asked in Uzbek and Russian, Karimov answers in Uzbek and Russian—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent in Uzbek] Islam Abdughaniyevich, yesterday's referendum showed what our people's attitude is to the policy and work currently being pursued in our country. Please could you speak today about your impressions and thoughts on this referendum? [passage omitted]

[Correspondent, in Russian] Islam Abdughaniyevich, let me congratulate you on the successful conduct of the referendum. I say congratulate because I regard it as a brilliant appraisal of the activity and policy which is now being implemented under your leadership. And the highest appraisal is made by the people themselves.

We journalists saw the warmth of the people's support for the new parliament's initiative and the energy with which they came to the polling stations to give their appraisal of the reforms and express a preference for what is now being implemented here today and for the course which is being pursued in our state.

How do you assess the fact that we need stability in all respects, and what would you like to say to the citizens of our country today?

[Karimov] The referendum as such was held with only one aim in view: Above all else to create a basis for legislative power and executive power, including presidential power, to work along the same lines and to insure joint work to guarantee and implement the expression of the people's will.

In other words, the artificial problems which were created by the disparity between the terms of the executive and legislative authorities themselves created artificial obstacles and difficulties which threatened to create a certain amount of tension in the future. So we had to resolve this problem anyway, if not today then tomorrow. All the more so since the state is only just forming its statehood, the state is starting along the road of independence, the political structures of power are developing. Moreover, it is now more important than ever for all the branches or forms of power to work in harmony. And that above all else was the reason for holding the referendum.

At the same time, it is natural that when people express their will in a vote, in addition to the principal objective of the referendum they express their attitude and will with regard to the policy which is being pursued, say, in Uzbekistan today. Most importantly, people express a positive or negative attitude to what is being done generally in this country, and express their attitude to what the policies of the president, the government, and all state organizations are really aimed at.

I knew where I was living. I know how wonderful our people are. I know that conditions of peace and stability are the main things we have achieved over the years of independence, and that this is the main basis on which all our plans and all the reforms are built.

But to be honest, I can say quite frankly that I have been amazed by the unanimity, the unity of the expression of will, and the support of the people for the policy which is being pursued in Uzbekistan.

I know how many difficulties people are experiencing. I know how many problems every family has, and I know about those sections of the population who find it very hard to get through all the difficulties of the transitional period, and I know all about what implementing these reforms really entails.

I can see these people, families, the old people, the young people before me now, and I can find no words to express the sense of gratitude to everyone who expressed their attitude to the state's policy and to me personally.

I know how many eyes are now on me. I have always had a very good and responsible sense of this. But today this sense of responsibility to those people who are watching me and the hopes placed in me has increased a hundredfold. In such a short interview I just cannot express my feelings, all the feelings I am experiencing. I do not know if there is anyone in the world who after such [a vote of] confidence, such an attitude, would not—well, how would such a person feel? But for myself, I can only say that I am happy I live among these people. I am happy that people of whatever ethnic group—Russian, Tatar, Kazakh, and all the rest; the members of the 100 nations and peoples who live here—are so unanimous about one thing: that this home is our common home.

There must be peace in this home, there must be stability in this home, and most importantly, there must be a common aspiration to make this home more beautiful and richer so that every family that lives in this home can have a decent life, in both material and spiritual terms. And most importantly, people of any ethnic group, faith, or conviction should live well in this home. In short, so that everyone lives well and all people feel that they are in their own home where everyone lives well—big and small, young and old, and—and I would like to stress this particularly—those elderly people who are experiencing great hardship today and are above all in need of support from the state.

I shall use this opportunity because I want to say that I see the main task of the state and of state policy in general as not being how to organize reform in manufacturing—that is very important, too—but what is most important is how to maintain social stability and how to support people who have toiled all their lives and are now experiencing hardship. I even feel some sense of guilt toward these people. And I will feel even more guilty because people have such hope—faith, if you like—in me as a person capable of solving all these problems.

And I ask you to understand the state I am in today from just that point of view. Of course I have always done everything I could, but now I must do much more to insure that there is stability and peace in Uzbekistan, and most importantly, so that everything that is done is done for the sake of the people. Reforms not for the sake of reforms, but reforms for the sake of people's well-being and happiness. I would like people to envy us. I would like everything in Uzbekistan to be OK, and everyone who lives in this home to never want to leave. And if they do leave, then only to visit relatives and to return as quickly as possible to this blessed land which we call our common home, Uzbekistan.

[Correspondent, in Russian] It was announced recently that a similar political event is to take place in Kazakhstan [reference to the referendum on prolonging the president's term in office]. It looks like Uzbekistan is becoming the place where the most far-sighted decisions are made and where others look at and learn from our experience.

[Karimov, in Russian] I want to say that we never try to borrow anyone else's experience, especially to take advantage of it. I mean that presently, in the period of transition, when one system is changing into another, I am convinced and hold firmly to the view that every country must choose that path which answers its own deep interests, the mentality of its people, the traditions of its people, and the philosophy of its people.

So although we are located alongside each other, the social structure of Kazakhstan and the other republics which surround us—and not only the social structure but also the other, let us say, aspects of life in this state and of this people—are different from ours. And I have to say that the path which each country chooses is above all the internal affair of the country itself. And no one has the right to dictate or define what path one country or another should move along toward progress.

So I would not like our path which has justified itself in practice over these three or four years... [Karimov pauses] And when the will which the people expressed yesterday is the greatest confirmation that the selected course is the right one, and that path is acceptable to people, because there is no other way of confirming that the course is the right one other than a referendum, the expression of will. There is simply no other way.

And if people in Kazakhstan, too, view the referendum which has been announced in Kazakhstan with the same unanimity, support, and hope then I think that only this assessment can justify the referendum. I repeat yet again that a referendum can only be justified by the people's attitude—that of one's own people.

That is why I am sure that someone will start various kinds of conjecture and talk about our referendum in Uzbekistan. They will say that this is a repetition of that period which we have long outlived.

However, I am convinced that this is not the case at all. I am convinced that the free and democratic expression of people's will has always been and will continue to be the most, let us say, concrete proof that the policy of any given state—Uzbekistan in this case—is right.

And I am glad—forgive me, I am proud—that I am living in this country. I am proud that I am making a contribution to the stability, peace, and tranquillity which prevail in this home.

I want to say something. I would like to make a contribution, and I will do everything to insure that as well as what I have said—peace, tranquillity, and well-being—a decent standard of living for our population is attained, so that, I repeat, everyone has a decent life and can take pride in the fact that he lives in the wonderful land called Uzbekistan.

Karimov Dismisses Scepticism on Referendum

LD3003104695 Tashkent Uzbekistan Television in Uzbek 1600 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today, Qudratulla Akhmedov, chairman of the Central Referendum Commission of the Republic of Uzbekistan, presented to President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov a certificate stating that his term has been extended from 1997 to 2000.

[Unidentified correspondent] When he received the certificate President Islam Karimov of the Republic of Uzbekistan expressed his cordial gratitude to our people for their confidence in him.

[Begin Krimov recording] [passage omitted] At today's meeting with representatives of foreign diplomatic missions and journalists I said again that if anyone has any doubts I cannot do anything about that. If you want to understand this, go to local areas, to distant places, to rural places, go into the big factories and enterprises and speak with people and look into their faces and eyes. Then you will understand why such high results were obtained at the referendum. You cannot understand this by sitting here. For goodness sake, go to the people, to distant places, to Kashkadarya, Surkhandarya, Karakalpakistan, to the [Ferghana] Valley, and even to the mountainous areas of Tashkent. In general, only thus can one understand why such high results were obtained.

That is why I have said that I'm lucky to have been born into such a family; I mean the family of the Uzbek people, whole Uzbekistan. I am lucky to have been born at a time when we are constructing a great edifice for a great aim, and it is my good fortune that God wished me to be the leader of my people at such a historic moment.

To justify this great confidence one needs, above all, to be with one's people and, above all, to try to ease their burden at times of difficulty. In general, whoever he is—old or young, man or woman—he will only gain their confidence if he is aware of his people's troubles and pains at times when they are facing difficulties, and if he is able to get through to their hearts.

These words are not empty ones. I would like to repeat yet again that people are facing difficult times in some places. When I was in Kashkadarya and in local areas the people living there were so noble that if you ask them about their lives they never say: Comrade president we have troubles, we are facing great difficulties. They all only raise their hands to pray—they invite me, too, and say let there be peace in our country. If you yourself are steadfast everything will happen in our country.

And at such moments everything becomes clear. But I fully understand what they feel deep inside. I am lucky that I have always been with these people, and I would like to take this opportunity to repeat that I consider it my happiness to be with my people until the end of my life. [end recording]

Armenia

Bilateral Ties With Japan Expand

NC2903204795 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 1319 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 29/03/95 NOYAN TAPAN—Close cooperation was initiated between the Armenian Academy of Sciences (AAS) and the scientific centers of Japan. This was reported by the AAS president Fadey Sargisyan after his working visit in Japan. Ten-day-long visit of the AAS delegation was organized on the request of the largest scientific and cultural establishment of Japan.

According to Sargisyan, the AAS delegation visited dozens of scientific establishments of Japan, including the University in Kitazato and Matsomato, Physical and Chemical, Food institutes which expressed willingness to cooperate with the scientific establishments of Armenia. According to Sargisian, the directions of joint works will be soon specified and sent to Japan. In particular, astronomy, researches in the sphere of solar energy, neurochemistry and biophysics may be the possible directions of cooperation with the Physical and Chemical institute.

Sargisyan pointed out the meeting with the Chairman of the Scientific National Council of Japan, professor Ito among the results achieved by the delegation. The AAS delegation also visited several companies, including the worldly-known one "Sharp".

Parliament Adopts Law on National Assembly Composition

LD2903220595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1455 GMT 29 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yerevan, 29 Mar—The Armenian parliament has adopted the law on the National Assembly of the republic. In accordance with the document published here today the Armenian parliament will be elected every four years and will be called a National Assembly. It will have 190 seats. One hundred and fifty deputies are to be elected from single-mandate constituencies and 40 by a proportional system in which the entire republic represents a single constituency. This gives each elector a right to vote twice.

The law stipulates that candidates to Armenia's legislative body may be nominated by citizens with a right to vote, by their associations, and public and political organizations. Members of government cannot be deputies. Also, judges, members of the republican procuracy and the state national security directorate, and people serving in internal affairs bodies or internal troops are limited in their right to be nominated and elected deputies.

Finally, the document stated that the Armenian Constitution should be adopted by the parliament or by referendum with a prior approval by the parliament. The Constitution currently in force, which was adopted in 1978 during the Soviet period, stipulates that the Supreme Soviet alone had the right to adopt a new basic law.

In addition, the Armenian parliament adopted the republic's draft budget for this year submitted by the government and an economic reform program drawn up with assistance from the IMF and the World Bank.

Dashnaktsutyun Not To Participate in Elections

NC2903205495 Yerevan ARAGIL ELECTRONIC NEWS BULLETIN in English 1051 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan ("Lragir" daily - Past), 03/29/95—As it has already been reported, the Supreme Council rejected the proposal of deputy Kim Balaian to consider the problem of Dashnaktsutyun, which was to clarify the mechanisms for overcoming suspension of party's operation based on the Supreme Court decision.

Armenian service of Radio Liberty has presented the opinion of RA [Republic of Armenia] Minister of Justice Vahe Stepanyan, who believes there are three possible ways out: Either Dashnaktsutyun should call an assembly and get rid of foreign citizens among its members, or the Supreme Council should change the law and allow participation of foreigners, or Dashnaktsutyun should change its charter and establish that leadership of the Armenian structure belongs to Central Committee. According to Mr. Stepanyan, the way how suspended party may implement these changes should be defined by the Commission on Legality Problems of the Supreme Council. But it has not been ordered to develop mechanisms for adjusting the constitution to the Armenian legislation. Thus, Dashnaktsutyun will not be able to participate in the Parliamentary elections since its operation is suspended till July 13, whereas elections will be carried out in July 5, Armenian service of Radio Liberty commented.

Azerbaijan

Russia's 'LUKoil' Expands Role in Country

MK3003104095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 30 Mar 95 p 9

[Report by Aleksandr Tutushkin: "'LUKoil' Expansion in Azerbaijan. 'LUKoil' Will Invite Western Companies When All Is Lined Up and Ready"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The reputation of "LUKoil" as the more wide-ranging of Russian companies in the oil world is supported by its behavior in Azerbaijan. With the biggest (10-percent) share in the International Consortium for the development of the Azeri, Chirag, and Gyuneshli shelf deposits, this company is claiming for itself the role of an informal hosting side. "LUKoil" has now created there a subordinate financial infrastructure which consortium participants will, in all likelihood, have to make use of, lacking anything else. The Russian oil men's interests in Azerbaijan, however, are not restricted to this project alone. As early as this year, perhaps, "LUKoil," together with the Azerbaijani state oil company SOCAR, will proceed to develop the other oil fields, where its share will be no less than the one it has in the consortium.

One of the problems of foreign-participation oil projects in CIS countries is the absence of financial infrastructure. In Azerbaijan's case, plans call for producing 70 million tonnes of oil four or five years from now. This large-scale production will undoubtedly call for organizing powerful financial flows on an international level, something none of the republic's existing banks is equipped to do—including the biggest state bank, the International Bank of Azerbaijan, which is currently in roughly in the same boat as the USSR Foreign Economic Bank was in 1991. In this situation, taking advantage of its knowledge of local specifics and as a former "next-door neighbor in a communal apartment," "LUKoil" got its act together and set up a bank that it would be able to suggest to its foreign counterparts to service the consortium. The choice fell on the commercial Azakbank, which has correspondent relations with Deutsche Bank, the Chase Manhattan Bank, and Barclays Bank. Opening their accounts there, in addition to "LUKoil," are Shell, Exxon, and Agip. Yesterday, representatives of the Russian company and the bank signed an agreement on "LUKoil's" purchase of a big block of Azakbank shares. Its size is not being made public, but according to available information, this block, together with the shares owned by structures "friendly" to "LUKoil," will enable the company to control the bank. The condition of the deal was that Azakbank should pass an international audit finally carried out by the Price Waterhouse firm. Thus the consortium now is not going to have obvious reasons for rejecting this bank's services. The consortium will be developing the deposits in accordance with international standards, and this involves large volumes of insurance of equipment, vessels, and oil transportation. Anticipating this, "LUKoil" has already "planted" in Azerbaijan its own insurance company by absorbing a small local insurance firm. Precisely this company will supposedly be the operator for the insurance of the consortium.

The described structure is intended to serve not only the consortium alone, however, but "LUKoil's" own projects in Azerbaijan as well. The key one being the exploration and development of the Kyapaz and Karabakh oil and gas deposits together with Azerbaijan's SOCAR state company. For that, the partners will create a "Azeri-LUkoil" joint venture to which the Azerbaijan authorities intend to grant the rights to these deposits and have already tasked the cofounders to draft, before 1 July, an agreement on their exploration and development based on dividing products between the authorized state structures of Azerbaijan and the joint venture. The assumed recoverable deposits there amount to 150 to 190 million tonnes, and it is expected that the project participants' shares will be equal. Thus, "LUKoil" is going to receive there, all in all, approximately the same amount of oil it is going to get in the consortium. Yet another project is supposed to be carried into effect by the same participants with the Italian Agip company, but there is no concrete information on this yet.

Anti-Bolshevik Bloc Protests 'Political Terror'

AU2903165795 Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU in Ukrainian 22 Mar 95 p 1

["Statement by the Ukrainian and Azerbaijani Committees of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations: No to Pro-Moscow Repressions!" issued on 20 March 1995]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 17 March 1995 in Baku, the Azerbaijan authorities, having turned down an offer of mediation by the Democratic Congress—the "round-table" of 32 political parties—resorted to military force allegedly to disarm the Special-Purpose Police Detachment [OPON]. There were casualties on both sides, many civilians were killed, and residential buildings were destroyed. The Azerbaijani authorities took advantage of the tragedy to unleash political terror against anti-imperialist opposition forces in an effort to get rid of the leaders of the large political parties and prominent figures in the Caucasus.

Hundreds of people allegedly involved in the OPON "affair" were arrested. These are primarily activists of the "People's Front of Azerbaijan" and the "Musavat" and "Boz Gurd" [Gray Wolf] parties. Among those arrested is Iskander Gamidov, deputy of Azerbaijan's Supreme Council, chairman of the "Boz Gurd" party, and former minister of internal affairs. He is a well known and dedicated champion in the fight against the domination of the Russian empire in the Caucasus and a personal friend of Dzhokhar Dudayev. When Russia started its military aggression against Chechnya, Iskander Gamidov and the "Boz Gurd" Party were in the forefront of rendering political and humanitarian assistance to the Chechen people. With this activity, they enraged Moscow.

The Ukrainian and Azerbaijani committees of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations regard the arrest of Iskander Gamidov and other well known political figures of Azerbaijan as a reprisal against those people, who are waging an ongoing struggle against attempts to restore the Russian empire. We demand that Iskander Gamidov and others subjected to unjustified repressions be immediately released. We call upon the political parties and public organizations of Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and other states to protest these political repressions, which are being carried out in Azerbaijan under the pressure of the Russian special services.

Azerbaijan Committee of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations

Ukrainian Committee of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations

Baku Residents Polled on Upcoming Election

954F1889A Baku ZERKALO in Russian 18 Mar 95 pp 1, 7

[Survey of Baku Residents conducted by the Sociological Service of the Association Forum, on requisition of the newspaper ZERKALO: "What Can We Expect From the Coming Elections?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **To what degree are people really interested in politics, parties and party blocs, the parliament, and, finally, elections? The spectrum of social views on these problems and level of political involvement are outlined in the following population survey, conducted 24 February through 4 March 1995 upon requisition of the newspaper AYNA—ZERKALO, by the sociological service of the Azerbaijan Association for the Development of International Ties—Forum. Sociologists attempted to clarify the picture with respect to the real quantitative and qualitative indices of political activity of the populace. Some 500 individuals from various segments of society took part in the sociological survey. They stated their point of view regarding the elections to Azerbaijan's new parliament, how the elections would be conducted, and the further development of events in the country.**

1. What in your view will be the consequences of the upcoming parliamentary elections?

The present authority will consolidate its position—53.6 percent;

The opposition will consolidate its position—18.4 percent;

Hard to say—28.0 percent.

As can be seen from the survey results, more than half of the respondents believe the present authority will consolidate its position. At the same time, for almost a third of these individuals this in no way will entail stabilization of the sociopolitical situation. On the average, one out of every five respondents believes the opposition will be the winner in the elections and will increase its influence.

While 28.0 percent of the individuals surveyed found it difficult to respond to the question concerning soon-to-come consequences, 46.1 percent could not express their opinion regarding stability in society.

When the responses are categorized within social segment, the results are more indicative. For example, whereas responses from the intelligentsia correspond more or less to the average index (A: 54.8 percent, 12.9 percent, 32.3 percent), the expectation of further consolidated position is far greater among laborers (A: 42.1 percent, 36.8 percent, 21.1 percent). A minimal majority of office workers believe that stability in society will solidify all the same in society (B: 32.0 percent, 33.3 percent, 34.7 percent). [passage omitted]

2. For whom will you vote?

For the pro-presidential bloc of parties—27.3 percent;

For the national-democratic opposition as embodied by the NFA [People's Front of Azerbaijan], PNNA [National Independence Party of Azerbaijan], and other parties close in orientation—12.2 percent;

For left-oriented parties (Communists, Social-Democrats, and other parties close in orientation)—27.8 percent;

Hard to say—32.7 percent.

As is evident from the figures, only tenths of a percentage point separate the response for the presidential bloc of parties from that for left-oriented parties. The separation indicated here is conditional since the survey did not deal with provincial populations. If we analyze the percentage ratios, it becomes clear that whereas the pro-presidential bloc of parties (PNA [New Azerbaijan Party], etc.) is supported mainly by the authority of the country's president, G. Aliyev, the increased standing of left-oriented parties—Communists, primarily—can be explained through skillful propaganda and the presence of a good organization.

When we examine the breakout of responses to this question by social segment, the following situation emerges. Nostalgia for the old days is most noticeable among the intelligentsia and laborers—31.2 percent and 42.1 percent, respectively. Office workers, pensioners, the unemployed, and businessmen show a preference for the pro-presidential bloc of parties (37.3, 50.0, 37.5, and 35.4 percent, respectively). Most students and some businessmen are oriented on the national-democratic opposition, as embodied by the PNNA, NFA, and others. The percentage of individuals who found it difficult to respond was fairly high in virtually all social segments, reaching 43.0 percent among students.

3. Do you intend to take part in the elections?
Yes—48.0 percent;
No—31.5 percent;
I have not decided—20.5 percent.

These figures may serve as an impulse for action—for one out of every five individuals has not yet made up his mind, and it is the task of the various parties to grab these votes "lying on the ground" as soon as possible. The outcome of the elections depends on this unknown quantity.

Then we have responses to the following question:

4. In your view, is expression of the free will of the people guaranteed?
Yes—25.6 percent;
No—54.6 percent;
Hard to say—19.8 percent.

In the opinion of more than half of the respondents, expression of the free will of the people is not secured. This is related to a great extent to the stereotypes that have been formed over many years during the course of election campaigns both in the USSR and in the post-Soviet period. When we examine the breakout of responses here by social segment, a differentiation of the populace becomes apparent with respect to degree of trust in the elections. A more skeptical than average view was expressed by the intelligentsia (58.1 percent), businessmen (72.7 percent), and housewives (60.0 percent). Less severe were the assessments of pensioners (42.6 percent—"no") and the unemployed (37.5 percent—"no"). The skepticism of the intelligentsia and businessmen is related to the fact that it is these segments of the populace that will be competing for deputy seats—hence their greater interest in the democratic aspect of the elections.

5. Do you believe the elections will have a significant effect on the situation in the country?
Yes—27.3 percent;
No—60.0 percent;
Hard to say—12.7 percent.

As these figures graphically indicate, the majority of those surveyed have a tranquil view of the future parliament. It will not disturb them at all. The distribution by social segment is as follows: Businessmen (81.8 percent), office workers (64.0 percent), laborers (63.6 percent), and housewives (70.0 percent) show a greater-than-average negative index with respect to any serious affect. Only half of the pensioners see the future after the elections without trepidation. The most appreciable apprehension factor was registered among students (37.6 percent) and pensioners (35.7 percent).

6. Will the elections bring about a change in the sociopolitical situation in Azerbaijan?

The elections will lead to increased democracy and law and order—22.8 percent;

The elections will lead to a curtailment of democracy and the strengthening of authoritarianism—25.6 percent;

The elections will plunge the republic into chaos, anarchy, and lawlessness—21.2 percent;

Hard to say—30.4 percent.

Anxiety and responsibility of the individual for the destiny of his country can be clearly seen in the correlation of these percentages. The main idea contained in the proposed responses is order in the state. How this should be established? Through democratic means (the first response), or through the curtailment of democracy by force (second response)? Or do we acknowledge that no one is able (or desires) to institute order at this time, and that the country is hurtling into an abyss? Then we see what is most surprising—the proportion of support for these alternatives regarding the development of events is almost the same. People's desires, especially in our world, do not always coincide with their capabilities and with reality.

7. What influence will the elections have on the course of economic reforms?

(a) Supporters of reforms will be victorious in the elections—37.6 percent;

Opponents of reforms will be victorious in the elections—13.4 percent;

Hard to say—49.0 percent.

(b) Economic reforms will be implemented more intensively—14.0 percent;

Matters will not get past the stage of statements and aspirations on the conduct of reforms—44.5 percent;

Reforms will be curtailed—12.8 percent;

Hard to say—28.9 percent.

This seventh question has an economic basis in addition to its political import. Today everyone from big to small is interested in the fate of economic transformations in Azerbaijan. It is clear from Part (a) of the question that almost half of respondents were unable to answer the question. And as previously noted, the populace of our country has not been parading its political and economic views in public in recent times. In the opinion of most businessmen (54.5 percent), pensioners (57.1 percent), and military personnel (50.0 percent), proponents of reforms will obtain the parliamentary seats. Laborers (21.1 percent) and businessmen (18.9 percent) believe opponents of our current transformations in the economy as well as in politics will predominate. Of no small importance is the fact that a great many of the students (54.8 percent) and laborers (47.4 percent) surveyed were unable to answer this question.

Part (b) of the question overlaps with Part (a) and also provides concrete expression to the issue. In the opinion of a majority of those surveyed, nothing other than a desire to conduct reforms will result from the efforts of the new parliamentarians. Some 63.3 percent of businessmen, 52.0 percent of office workers, 46.2 percent of the intelligentsia, and 28.6 percent of pensioners believe that following the elections, reforms will proceed in more intensive fashion. The same view is held by 16.0 percent of office workers and 15.8 percent of laborers. In the opinion of 18.4 percent of laborers and 15.1 percent of students, the reforms will be curtailed.

From the editor. It should be noted that the results of this flash survey are quite contradictory, and the percentage of individuals who find it difficult to respond is high in practically all areas.

While 53.6 percent of respondents are convinced that the authority will consolidate its position, only 27.3 percent are prepared to cast their vote for a pro-presidential party. Some 18.4 percent believe that the coming elections will bring success to the opposition. But only 12.2 percent are prepared to vote for the opposition as embodied by the NFA, PNNA, and organizations of similar orientation, while 27.8 percent would vote for the "left" bloc, as embodied by the Communists, Social-Democrats, and like-oriented organizations—a half percentage point greater than the index for the pro-governmental bloc.

No single party can be absolutely certain of victory, however, since the greatest number of respondents (32.7 percent) still have not decided for whom they will vote. Moreover, the figures cited here do not characterize the distribution of public opinion throughout Azerbaijan, but only in its capital. We may assume that on the whole throughout Azerbaijan, the standing of Communists, Social-Democrats, and organizations of similar orientation will turn out to be significantly lower. The main segment of the neo-communist electorate—so-called "Russian-speaking" laborers and the intelligentsia "established" under the socialist order—is concentrated in Baku. While the results of agrarian reform—a "watershed" for rural localities—have virtually no effect here.

We must not fail to take into account the openness of respondents as well. It is entirely possible that many opposition supporters, both on the right and on the left, are hiding their political sympathies under "indecision" or support for the pro-presidential bloc. This is especially true with respect to supporters of political parties and movements subject to persecution from the authorities.

Survey results concerning possible destabilization of the sociopolitical situation as a result of the coming elections appear quite alarming. Here once again, a plurality (46.1 percent) of respondents belong to the "undecided" category. Some 31.3 percent believe there will be destabilization and only 22.6 percent believe there will not. Expectations of undesirable excesses in Azerbaijan's capital, obliquely implying a readiness on the part of respondents and those around them to participate in such actions, are quite high. This cannot help but instill a certain anxiety.

Are the coming elections threatened with the prospect of being declared invalid? Some 48.0 percent of respondents are today prepared to go to the polls, another 20.5 percent are undecided, and 31.5 percent are certain they will not vote. While only 27.3 percent of respondents believe the elections will exert a significant effect on the situation and 60 percent replied negatively to this question, voter activity should be anticipated as fairly high, although survey results still do not guarantee that the elections will have juridical significance.

At the same time, respondents are quite pessimistic about the democratic nature of the coming elections. Thus, an absolute majority of 54.6 percent responded negatively to this question. In this regard, it is the most active segments of the populace that exhibited the greatest pessimism—businessmen (72.7 percent), the intelligentsia (58.1 percent), and housewives (60.0 percent). These figures point out a dangerous trend. Under present conditions, as a rule, the extent to which elections are democratic is directly proportional to the prestige of those elected. So if public opinion judges the new parliamentary elections to be undemocratic, no one will take the new deputies or the laws they pass seriously. With all the consequences this entails. In addition to the above, from all appearances, international organizations will also rely on the results of public opinion surveys in their assessment of the political situation in Azerbaijan. Under such conditions, the democratic nature of the elections is essentially transformed into a question of the survivability of Azerbaijan's statehood.

Virtually equal shares of respondents believe that democracy and law and order will be strengthened as a result of the elections (22.8 percent), that democracy will be curtailed and authoritarianism strengthened (25.6 percent), and that the republic will be plunged into the chaos of anarchy and lawlessness (21.2 percent). The results of the flash survey indicate more an absence in the populace of any clear-cut idea of Azerbaijan's real prospects in history than any definite trends in the republic's development. However, they indicate increased fear, uncertainty, and "expectations of anarchy."

Survey results concerning attitudes towards economic reforms are somewhat more specific, although here too public opinion is appreciably eroded, from all appearances. First of all, analysts have apparently been overestimating the interest of prospective voters in the economic policy of the parties they intend to vote for. Thus, 49 percent of respondents did not know whether supporters or opponents of reforms would be victorious in the elections, while only 28 percent were undecided as to whether supporters or opponents of the present authority would emerge the victors. Some 37.6 percent of respondents predict victory for reform supporters, while 13.4 percent see victory in store for its opponents. Respondents were far less optimistic in assessing the prospects for reforms themselves, however. Only 14.6 percent believe reforms will proceed more rapidly, 12 percent believe they will be curtailed, 28.9 percent found it difficult to respond, and 44.5 percent are convinced that matters will not go beyond the declarations stage. The no less alarming symptom of skepticism in the effectiveness of the newly elected parliament may turn out to be a "delayed-action mine," which in conjunction with confidence in the undemocratic nature of the elections, might bring about the radicalization of society.

On the whole, however, the results cited here reflect an erosion of public opinion in Azerbaijan—the contradictory nature of the results, large number of "undecided" respondents, equal shares of respondents advocating opposing views. Although we should approach the results of the survey with a certain caution, it is quite apparent that the coming elections will not constitute a panacea for all of Azerbaijan's internal misfortunes. Yet the extent to which they are democratic, on the one hand, and the responsibility of voters themselves, on the other, are today not just the desire of many people, but rather a pressing necessity.

Latvia

Protocol on Consultations With PRC Signed

LD3003120395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0931 GMT 30 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[FBIS Translated Text] Riga, 30 Mar—A protocol on consultations between the Chinese and Latvian Foreign Ministries was signed today. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, who arrived in Riga yesterday, held a conversation with his Latvian counterpart, Valdis Birkavs, in the first of a series of working meetings in the Baltic countries. Both ministers voiced satisfaction with the fact that normal relations have now been restored between the new countries. During the meeting, Valdis Birkavs stressed that Latvia wants to build normal relations with Russia, but rules out any kind of entry into CIS structures.

Today, Qian Qichen will visit the RAF minibus factory.

Danish, Latvian Officials Discuss Visa-Free Regime

LD2903164195 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1300 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Danish Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen and his wife Lone Dybkjaer have ended their two-day visit to Latvia. Meeting with Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs today, the Danish prime minister discussed the two countries' cooperation in international organizations and bilateral relations, the possibility of instituting a visa-free regime between Latvia and Denmark, and the issue of the bilateral agreements concluded in the twenties and thirties that are formally in force still. Rasmussen also met today with Anatolijs Gorbunovs, chairman of the Presidium of the Saeima, and State President Guntis Ulmanis.

For her part Lone Dybkjaer, accompanied by Minister of State for the Environment Indulis Emsis, visited a waste recycling plant today. [passage omitted]

Estonian, Latvian Border Guard Heads Meet

LD2903172395 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 0700 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Estonian and Latvian border guards are cooperating, regardless of the fact that many issues about the two countries' borders are not resolved, Lieutenant-Colonel Leonids Lasmanis, the commander of the Latvian Border Guards Brigade, and Captain Tarmo Kouts, the director-general of the Estonian Border Guards Department, told a news conference in Tallinn today. During the meeting in Tallinn they signed an agreement on joint border controls at Valga railway station. Lasmanis was appreciative of the Estonian Government's efforts for border guards, and added that the main obstacle to the development of Latvian border guarding is a lack of funds.

Plan of Baltic Council of Ministers Accepted

WS3003104195 Riga DIENA in Latvian 18 Mar 95 pp 1, 6

[Report by Janis Kulmanis: "Baltic Council of Ministers Accepts Plan of Activities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Riga, 17 Mar—The plan of activities of the Baltic Council of Ministers [BMP], signed in February by the prime ministers of the three Baltic states, has been accepted by the Latvian Cabinet of Ministers. This means that ministers of all branches have taken political responsibility for the fulfillment of the plan. Edvins Andersons, Latvia's representative on the BMP Cooperation Committee, told journalists today that this plan will also be analyzed by the Governments of Lithuania and Estonia.

Gunars Meierovics, state minister for Baltic and Northern countries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated at the news conference that it is already six months since the BMP was established. During this period, 15 working committees have been established, which set tasks for every branch. As is known, the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian prime ministers made a decision on 13 February in Riga that it is necessary to establish four more committees—on technology of information, culture, customs, and border guards.

Meierovics emphasized the main goals of cooperation in the current year—to bring legislation in line with European standards, and to coordinate foreign policy in international organizations. It is foreseen to sign the already initialed agreement on eliminating the visa regime among Baltic states, and to organize conferences on borders, within the framework of "Via Baltica," with the aim of resolving problems connected with border crossings.

Meierovics also reported on his participation in the conference of the Northern Council of Ministers in Reykjavik, where a positive assessment was made of the cooperation among Baltic states. According to Meierovics, this is high time to begin cooperation on the formula of five-plus-three [not further specified]. The Northern Council of Ministers has decided to hold its next meeting in Riga.

By the middle of this year, the BMP will have already begun planing its activities for next year—1996, Meierovics added.

Premier Denies Plan To Break From Party Before Elections

WS3003081595 Riga DIENA in Latvian 18 Mar 95 p 8

[Report by Martins Kibilds: "Gailis Denies Intention To Create Separate Voting List"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Riga, 16 Mar—Notwithstanding ambiguous utterances by Internal Affairs Minister Janis Adamsons in his interview with LAUKU AVIZE, suggesting that [Prime Minister] Maris Gailis would leave "Latvia's Way" [LC] and create his own voting list, the prime minister denies such a possibility.

In reply to the question of whether he will participate in the elections on the list of LC, Gailis told DIENA on Thursday [16 March]: "Of course I will." Questioned once again, if there will be no separate Gailis list, he laughed and answered: "Surely not."

In his interview with LAUKU AVIZE on 10 March, Adamsons, who—according to unofficial information—has already given his consent to join "Latvia's Way," said: "It will be possible to vote for the list of Maris Gailis. I myself will not be candidate on any list, but I will support the party of Gailis." He also said: "All the existing parties should heal and cleanse themselves. At the present moment, none of them is ready for the elections." Furthermore, Adamsons says: "I guarantee the cleanliness of the Gailis list!" These utterances have created an impression that Gailis, along with Adamsons, are planning to establish their own party, independent from LC, thus creating a "clean" team, as opposed to the "dirty" LC.

At the same time, some high-level LC members have admitted in conversations with DIENA that the abovementioned utterances of the interior minister can be regarded as "nothing other than undiplomatic answers to difficult questions."

Lithuania

Cooperation Declaration Signed With Ukraine

WS2903144895 Tallinn BNS in English 1300 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Mar 29, BNS—Ukraine and Lithuania on Tuesday signed a declaration on the prospects of cooperation and a consular convention. President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine and Algirdas Brazauskas of Lithuania signed the documents in Kiev.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Genadi Udovenko and his Lithuanian colleague Povilas Gylys exchanged ratification notes for a friendship and cooperation treaty between the two nations and signed an agreement on the exemption of persons travelling with diplomatic passports from entry visas.

Gylys and Ukrainian Labor Minister Mikhail Kasevich inked an agreement on contract employees.

At a press conference after the signing ceremony, Brazauskas told reporters that the problem of Crimea is Ukraine's internal affair. He also emphasized that citizens of other countries should not interfere in the matter. Kuchma called his contacts with the Lithuanian president "very good." "The future of relations between our countries largely depends on personal contacts between their leaders," the Ukrainian leader said.

Both presidents expressed the view that Lithuania should become a gate to the north and to Europe for Ukraine, and the latter country—a gate to the south for Lithuania.

Commenting on the prospects of closing the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, Brazauskas said Lithuania "perceives the threat that lies in Chernobyl-type reactors." He noted that much is done in Lithuania to upgrade safety standards at its Ignalina nuclear plant.

The Lithuanian leader pointed out that he sees no alternative to nuclear power plants. "Those who suggest to close them should find money for that," he noted, adding that alternative energy sources cost "billions of dollars."

President Concludes Ukrainian Visit

LD2903204395 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas has given normal assessment to the results of local elections in Lithuania. We have foreseen such results of the elections, said Algirdas Brazauskas in Kiev today.

According to the president, the elections have shown that people in Lithuania had begun to be more interested in politics and endeavored to take part in political life. Asked whether the policy of the ruling party would change after the elections the president noted that he was not a member of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party and was not responsible for its faction in the Seimas. At the same time Brazauskas said that some conclusions would be drawn.

The Lithuanian president concluded his visit in Ukraine. He met representatives of the Lithuanian community in Ukraine this morning. Later he received the diploma of a honorary doctor in Kiev University. He visited the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet in the afternoon and then inspected a new Lithuanian embassy building in Kiev.

Vilnius Fears Influx of Chechen Refugees

MM2903160295 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Mar 95 p 4

[Report by Nikolay Lashkevich: "Lithuania Refuses To Accept Refugees From Chechnya, But They Are Entering Illegally"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite strong pressure from the opposition, which has formed an influential support group for Dudayev in the Seimas, the Lithuanian parliament "sees no possibility of setting up a refugee camp or offering refugees help in another form." A statement to this effect had been delivered earlier by Lithuanian Prime Minister A. Slezevicius. Later he was more specific: "The government cannot assume responsibility for accepting and providing for children and sick people arriving from Chechnya."

This stubborness on the part of the Lithuanian authorities, who are against showing concern of this kind, is to be explained not only by the shortage of funds, which are insufficient to maintain Lithuania's own 20,000 orphans, and by the absence of an appropriate legislative amendment on the status of refugees, but also by the possible diplomatic complications of such a step. The Lithuanian leadership does not want to set a precedent—to receive at an official level and provide facilities for children and sick people who will undoubtedly be followed by adult, healthy, political refugees who are supporters of Dudayev. However, it would appear that the government has already been presented with a fait accompli. According to A. Patatskas, a member of the Seimas and the parliamentary goodwill mission which maintains active links with Dudayev's supporters, "many children" have already been delivered to Lithuania, bypassing the official authorities.

The government's reluctance to take Chechen children under its wing, for which it is being roundly abused by the right-wing opposition, who are skillfully exploiting this acute humanitarian problem, is also dictated by the fact that after officially accepting children, sick people, and other Chechen refugees, the authorities would be forced to make concessions and recognize Chechnya as de facto independent. Thus at the last session of the Seimas V. Landsbergis tried to carry a resolution proposing "to treat the Chechen Republic in bilateral relations as a country existing de facto and subjected to attack, and to prepare for the recognition of its statehood de jure as soon as the possibility arises." The resolution will probably not be passed with this wording, but the Lithuanian parliament is capable of expressing support for Chechnya's efforts to become independent in some form or other. The draft of this resolution, which has aroused serious passions in the Seimas, is a sort of answer to the Chechen president's appeal to the world community, circulated in the Lithuanian Republic parliament by the "Union for the Rebirth of the Motherland" faction (Lithuania's conservatives), headed by Vytautas Landsbergis, an ardent supporter of Chechen independence.

This appeal says, in particular, that "Chechnya expects a direct answer as to whether we will be granted or refused concrete aid," and accuses Russia of implementing a "misanthropic policy and the ideology of 'Russocentrism' [Rusism]." Earlier, in an interview with BNS, the Baltic countries' news agency, published in LIETUVOS RYTAS, a major Lithuanian newspaper, Dudayev repeated his charges against the Russian people, "who are quite sick with the disease of 'Russocentrism,' darkened by fascism, Nazism, and chauvinism." In his opinion, the war in Chechnya will last for 50 years. At the same time he stressed that he is prepared to negotiate "with anyone who has power and can resolve something."

All these trenchant remarks put the Lithuanian authorities on their guard, as they are frightened by even indirect support for separatism in any form, since the threat of separatism remains topical for Lithuania to this day. Thus it is doubtful that Dudayev will be able to break through the wall of diplomatic isolation in the Baltic direction, especially in the case of Lithuania; however, everyone in Lithuania predicts a largely uncontrolled influx of Chechen refugees, which will be intensified with the defeat of Dudayev's opposition forces. Children are the first to begin making a breach in the Lithuanian corridor.

Concern Over Lithuanians' Legal Position in Latvia

LD2903201195 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1800 GMT 29 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry Affairs has handed a note to the Latvian Embassy in Lithuania, expressing concern about the legal position of Lithuanian citizens in Latvia.

The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry's Information and Press Department has announced that, according to available information, the Latvian citizenship and migration department is not objectively assessing some facts, and is delaying the registration of Lithuanian citizens in Latvia. Therefore, Lithuanian citizens find themselves in a position of being without rights; they are not entered into the register of the residents, cannot work legally, [passage indistinct].

Although the Lithuanian embassy in Riga has repeatedly applied to various Latvian state institutions, and although Ambassador Algirdas Zvirenas has written a letter about the problems of the legal situation of Lithuanian citizens in Latvia, [passage indistinct], no reply has been received.

Latvia's competent departments are asked in the note to deal in a responsible way with matters concerning the legal status of Lithuanian citizens. It is expected that these problems will not harm [passage indistinct].

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